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ABSTRACT
REVISITING US ECONOMIC STATECRAFT: THREE ESSAYS ON NUCLEAR
REVERSAL, ANTI-AMERICAN POLITICAL VIOLENCE, AND SOCIAL POLICIES
IN TARGET STATES
by
Wondeuk Cho
The University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, 2016
Under the Supervision of Professor Steven B. Redd
This dissertation investigates whether and how U.S. economic statecraft influence policies and
politics of targeted countries. Chapter 1 raises research questions about the role of U.S. economic
statecraft in policies of targeted countries. The chapter summarizes my argument and empirical
findings. Chapter 2 analyzes whether and to what extent U.S. economic statecraft extracts nuclear
reversal commitments from target countries that have ever explored and pursued a nuclear weapons
development. Using updated data on nuclear proliferation between 1970 and 2004, this study finds
that U.S. economic sanctions with international organizations’ involvement and U.S. foreign aid
are likely to extract a suboptimal concession from a target country-reversing nuclear weapons de-
velopment but keeping nuclear latent capacity. In Chapter 3, I examines how U.S. aid inadvertently
produces political violence against Americans in a recipient country. I find that radical-opposition
groups in a autocratic recipient state exercise violent attacks against Americans when U.S. assis-
tance is used for authoritarian incumbents’ political survival and political repression. But, autocra-
cies have fewer incidence of anti-American violence when they are bounded to pseudo-democratic
institutions. Chapter 4 investigates the role of U.S. sanction duration in affecting social policies of
ii
authoritarian countries. I argue that U.S. sanctions reduce autocrats’ resources to buy off political
support from ruling elite groups and so force them to reallocate government spending in such a
way that favor the ruling coalition groups. So, autocratic leaders facing longer U.S. sanctions are
likely to cut their spending on public goods and services. The empirical finding shows that author-
itarian leaders under nominal democratic institutions, however, reduce their expenditure on public
goods to much lesser degree than autocrats without such a institutions. I also find that autocrats
under such institutions decrease government expenditure on social security/protection.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since World War II, the United States has enjoyed a remarkable level of international primacy
with no significant challenge to such primacy from other states. According to hegemonic stability
theory, the U.S., as the dominant state, has shaped and dominated the post-war international system
in such a way that best serves its national interests. To make its dominance sustainable, the U.S. has
employed its foreign policy instruments to extract compliance/concessions from other countries
through diplomatic, economic, and military leverages. Economic leverage in particular has been
widely and popularly used for several decades. Hence, scholarship on economic statecraft has
produced a large volume of theoretical and empirical works, with much attention being paid to the
effect of U.S. sanctions and aid on the policy outcomes of target countries. On one hand, research
on economic sanctions examines how effectively they work and how they influence the political
economy of target states. Research on economic aid, on the other hand, focuses on the effects
of foreign aid on economic development, democratic transition, and leaders’ political survival in
target countries. However, much more work still needs to be done on the role of U.S. economic
statecraft plays in affecting a variety of policies that the existing literature has rather overlooked.
This dissertation consists of three essays that appear to have little in common in terms of out-
come variables. Nevertheless, all three essays all try to shed light on the influence of U.S. economic
instruments on the politics and policies of target countries. Chapters 2 and 4 investigate the direct
effects of U.S. economic statecraft on target governments’ nuclear reversals and social welfare
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policies. Chapter 3 deals with anti-American political violence that U.S. foreign aid provokes in
aid-recipient countries.
The first essay analyzes whether and to what extent U.S. economic statecraft influences nuclear
reversal behaviors of target countries that have already initiated and pursued a nuclear weapons
program. This theme belongs to a topic that has recently produced a large volume of empirical
and quantitative literature on nuclear proliferation (Jo and Gartzke 2007; Montgomery and Sagan.
2009; Sagan 2011; Singh and Way 2004). Scholarship in this field of research mostly focuses on
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and pursues such focus through two theoretical approaches-
demand and supply. First, the demand-side approach to nuclear proliferation theorizes about a
state’s demand for nuclear weapons, focusing on its security threats (Jo and Gartzke 2007), security
guarantees (Bleek and Lorber 2014; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Monteiro and Debs 2014; Reiter 2014),
the role of a nonproliferation regime (Brown and Kaplow 2014), and domestic politics and lead-
ers(Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015; Solingen 2009; Way and Weeks 2014). Second, the supply-side
approach focuses on the development of nuclear technology, outside nuclear assistance (Fuhrmann
2009; Kroenig 2009), and economic capabilities (Jo and Gartzke 2007). However, it is puzzling
that the quantitative studies in this area rarely deal with nuclear reversal behaviors of nuclear aspir-
ing states with a few exceptions 1. At the same time, it is clear that American economic statecraft
plays a role, but the empirical works detailing that influence is scant.
To explain whether U.S. economic statecraft induces a nuclear aspirant’s compliance to non-
proliferation, I discuss theories based primarily on the political externalities of U.S. economic
sanctions and positive inducements to target states.
1Scholars in the field of nuclear proliferation have recently initiated quantitative analysis of nuclear nonprolif-
eration (Early 2012; Mattiacci and Jones 2016; Miller 2014) after I have been already exploring and conducting the
quantitative study of nuclear reversal.
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U.S. negative sanctions in general are ineffective in extracting a nuclear proliferator’s compli-
ance with nonproliferation because the state may expect use of force or conflict with the sanction-
ing state (i.e., the U.S.) and its coalition countries after being targeted by sanctions. So it is rational
for the targeted proliferating state to accelerate the ongoing nuclear weapons program rather than
to comply with demands to stop and rollback nuclear weapons development. In this situation, a tar-
geted proliferator tries to search for alternative trading routes in order to minimize potential costs
of U.S. economic sanctions. However, a proliferating state is more likely to pursue negotiations
with the U.S. and give policy concession, to some degree, in exchange for the lifting of sanctions
and other rewards, when facing international organization sanctions led by the U.S. U.S. sanctions
through international institutions may get rid of a proliferating state’s opportunity to avoid sanction
costs by looking for alternative trading partners and/or investors. Given these conditions, a state
had better reach an agreement with stopping nuclear weapons program but keeping nuclear latent
capability. My main findings are that U.S. sanctions through international organizations and U.S.
foreign aid are likely to extract a target state’s sub-optimal policy concessions - keeping its nuclear
latent capacity.
The second paper examines the determinants of political violence against Americans abroad,
situating such violence in the context of U.S. aid policies. Despite a growing number of studies on
anti-Americanism (Chiozza 2010; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007), few studies pay attention, in a
systematic or empirical way, to the violence dimension of anti-Americanism. The political violence
literature has paid little attention to exploring the phenomena of political incidents against specific
subjects, in particular U.S. citizens and properties. When it comes to anti-American violence,
the literature offers an important rationale. Anti-government groups in a country tend to exercise
violent behaviors against U.S. citizens and/or properties when the U.S. backs up for their repressive
3
dictators by providing them with free resources including U.S. foreign assistance. I hypothesize
here that a recipient’s constituencies can consider U.S. aid as bad money because it can facilitate the
lengthening of its autocrat’s tenure and record of repression. The role of U.S. aid varies depending
on a recipient’s political institutions. Especially, when a recipient state is an autocratic regime
but is bounded to nominal-democratic institutions, it experiences fewer anti-U.S. violence. To
test the argument, this study employs zero-inflated negative binomial regressions to cope with the
excessive zeros in the dependent variable. The study covers 117 developing countries from 1970
to 2007. The findings show that the impacts of U.S. aid on anti-U.S. incidents vary depending on
the presence of institutional constraints in autocracies.
The third essay examines how U.S. economic sanctions impact in two ways social welfare
spending in authoritarian countries. One way is that they may reduce the resources autocrats use to
buy off support from ruling elite groups and so force them to reallocate government expenditures
in such a way that favor their supporting groups. Consequently, autocrats who face U.S. sanc-
tions over a long period are likely to cut their spending on public goods and services, especially
education and health care spending. The second way is that the impacts may vary depending on
political variables such as autocrats’ pseudo-democratic institutions. I hypothesize that U.S. sanc-
tion duration is positively associated with the changes in social spending when dictators and their
ruling elites are bounded together by quasi-democratic institutions such as legislature and political
parties emulating their democratic counterparts. To test this argument, I conduct a series of panel
error-correction models to estimate the effects of U.S. sanction duration on changes in government
expenditures on social security/protection, education and health care. I also implement the multi-
ple imputation to deal with a considerable amount of missing values in the data in order to avoid
a biased estimation. In addition, the study conducts a matching estimation to improve the causal
4
inference of the model. The empirical findings confirm the significant impacts of U.S. economic
sanction on variation in social expenditure.
The empirical findings show that autocrats under nominal democratic institutions reduce their
expenditures on education or public health to much lesser degree than do autocrats with no in-
stitutions, even when U.S. sanctions last longer. When they face longer lasting U.S. sanctions,
however, autocrats with seemingly-democratic institutions decrease government spending on so-
cial security/protection.
The final chapter discusses the findings of three essays and explores ideas for future research.
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Chapter 2
Kicking the Nuclear Ladder: The Effects of U.S. Economic
Statecraft on Nuclear Reversal
Abstract. This essay examines whether U.S. economic statecraft is effective in dissuading nu-
clear aspirants from going nuclear. Conventional wisdom holds that nuclear nonproliferation is not
strongly affected by economic sanctions. This article posits, however, that U.S. economic statecraft
has exhibited a greater effectiveness than previously explained in the literature. This study finds
that when U.S. policy objective is to extract the perfect compliance with nonproliferation from
a nuclear aspiring state, U.S. negative sanctions have no significant impact on the state’s nuclear
reversal. However, U.S. economic statecraft is moderately successful in extracting suboptimal pol-
icy concessions of nonproliferation-“nuclear power without nuclear weapons proliferation.” The
empirical evidence uses a statistical analysis of 18 countries from 1970 to 2004. Analysis shows
that U.S. sanctions through international institutions and U.S. positive inducements (e.g., foreign
assistance) are effective at least in driving nuclear aspirants into remaining in a nuclear latency
status.
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2.1 Introduction
On July 14, 2015, Iran and the P5+1 nations (i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, China, and Russia, plus Germany) reached a momentous agreement that limited Iran’s
nuclear development in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. Media commentators and
policy analysts consider this landmark Iranian nuclear deal as a victory for international sanctions
(Cassidy 2015; Rosofsky 2015). According to the deal called the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA),” Tehran is requested to significantly reduce its capacity to develop nuclear bombs
for more than a decade by eliminating 98 percent of its enriched uranium stockpile. Why did Iran
decide to limit its nuclear weapons development? Did U.S. economic statecraft force/induce Iran
and/or other (previous) nuclear proliferators1 to make decisions to reverse their nuclear weapons
development?
The existing research on nuclear proliferation primarily concentrates on why states go nuclear.
Since Sagan (1996) began his theoretical and empirical work on nuclear proliferation, many in-
ternational relations scholars have conducted quantitative examinations to determine the causes
of nuclear proliferation (e.g., Bleek and Lorber 2014; Brown and Kaplow 2014; Fuhrmann 2009;
Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Kroenig 2009; Monteiro and Debs 2014; Re-
iter 2014; Singh and Way 2004; Way and Weeks 2014). Proliferation studies emphasize a state’s
motivation or intention to pursue nuclear development specifically by looking into domestic poli-
tics (Hymans 2011; Way and Weeks 2014), the nuclear umbrella or security guarantees (Bleek and
Lorber 2014; Monteiro and Debs 2014; Reiter 2014), a state’s openness to the international mar-
ket (Solingen 2009), a state’s ratification of the nonproliferation treaty (Potter 2010), and political
1In this paper, a nuclear proliferator is a state that ever initiated/explored and/or pursued nuclear weapons devel-
opment. A nuclear proliferator is used interchangeably with a nuclear aspirant.
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leaders’ prior experiences (Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015). Recent scholarship, though, takes into
account the supply-side approach to nuclear proliferation. A nuclear aspiring state is more likely to
seek nuclear weapons development when it has outside groups that would supply nuclear weapons
materials or nuclear technology (e.g., Brown and Kaplow 2014; Fuhrmann 2009; Kroenig 2009).
Despite the increase in quantitative studies on determinants of nuclear proliferation, much less at-
tention has been paid to reversal behaviors of nuclear proliferators. In particular, the effect of U.S.
economic statecraft on a state’s nuclear rollback have not, with a few exceptions (e.g., Early 2012;
Miller 2014), been examined systemically or thoroughly.2
Since the 1970s, the United States has taken great efforts to prevent the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons, seeking close cooperation from other countries in the international community.3
The United States has implemented several foreign policy instruments to strengthen nonprolifer-
ation efforts, using for instance economic statecraft-including positive inducements and negative
sanctions. Here, this paper pays attention to evaluating the role of U.S. economic statecraft in
counterproliferation. I will ask whether U.S. positive inducements and/or negative sanctions have
worked at persuading or forcing a state to reverse its nuclear weapons program that it had already
initiated and/or pursued. The answer to this puzzle produces a systematic and quantitative exami-
nation of the impacts of U.S. economic statecraft on nuclear reversal-an area little investigated by
2Early (2012) found that U.S. economic sanctions increased the probability that a target state begin nuclear
weapons programs. Miller (2014) maintained, however, that U.S. economic sanctions had a deterrent effect on nu-
clear pursuit while they have been ineffective in dissuading a nuclear proliferator from withdrawing ongoing nuclear
weapons development. Both scholars posit that US negative sanctions are ineffective in preventing nuclear aspirants
from rolling back their ongoing nuclear weapons development.
3The United States led the establishing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970
and arranged safeguards to control the use of nuclear materials such as uranium. Scholars emphasized the role of
U.S. in international nonproliferation efforts. Nye (1981) argued, for instance, that the U.S. has helped to promote
the establishment of nonproliferation regime (i.e., the NPT). Doyle (1997) also mentioned that U.S. nonproliferation
policy became strong, supporting for the NPT and its nonproliferation norms that emphasized arms reduction and
nuclear export controls. In addition, Kroenig (2016) also acknowledges that it is possible to consider US policy efforts
with nonproliferation after the establishment of the NPT in 1968.
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the quantitative studies of nuclear proliferation.
Relying on updated data of nuclear proliferation from 1970 to 2004, this paper tests quan-
titatively whether U.S. economic statecraft has either forced or induced nuclear proliferators to
rollback their nuclear weapons development. The study assumes that U.S. economic statecraft
brings political consequences to target regimes. U.S. economic statecraft is likely to generate
political externalities, which may threaten leaders’ political survival in target countries. Political
leaders in a sanctioned country are constrained by their domestic political audiences or members of
a winning coalition when they are targeted by U.S. economic statecraft. Leaders’ political careers
may be in danger when their policy performance (e.g., economic hardship generated by foreign
sanctions) is poor. This paper contends that U.S. economic statecraft affects, in a target state,
the domestic constituency’s assessment of its leaders’ policy competence. Political and/economic
distributional consequences of both positive incentives and negative sanctions may impact a sanc-
tioned state’s decisions regarding its nuclear weapons development. This study finds that U.S.
economic statecraft results in a greater probability of nuclear latency status, a suboptimal out-
come of nuclear reversals for a sanctioning state such as the United States. Both U.S. economic
aid and negative sanctions do little in the way of leading to a nuclear aspirant’s perfect compli-
ance with nonproliferation-stable non-nuclear status. But when nuclear development paths are
disaggregated into three outcomes-i.e., stable non-nuclear status, nuclear latency status, and nu-
clear pursuit/acquisition-, U.S. economic statecraft has a substantial impact on a target’s decision
to keep the latent capability. More U.S. foreign aid and negative sanctions through international
organizations make a nuclear aspiring state move down from nuclear pursuit to nuclear latency
status, though not to perfect nonproliferation. The main contribution of this paper to the existing
literature is in revealing the suboptimal impacts of U.S. economic statecraft on nuclear nonprolif-
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eration, bringing nuclear latency status into the paths of nuclear development. Specifically, I argue
that while nuclear aspiring states tend to be reluctant to suspend the ongoing nuclear development,
U.S. sanctions through international organizations induce them to reach a less undesirable nuclear
deal with the U.S.-‘nuclear power without nuclear bombs.’
This chapter assesses how earlier research conceptualizes nuclear weapons proliferation and
identifies the driving forces that induce states to go nuclear. It then examines some conceptual and
theoretical issues and builds a theoretical argument about the role U.S. economic statecraft plays
in leading to nuclear reversal of proliferators.4 The chapter then proposes testable hypotheses and
lays out a research design. Finally, the results of logistic and multinomial logistic regressions are
presented and a discussion/conclusion put forward.
2.2 Existing Research on Nuclear (Non-)Proliferation
Existing literature on nuclear proliferation primarily focuses on causes of the nuclear weapons
proliferation. Scholars find causal factors of nuclear proliferation through qualitative works and
test the statistical correlations using the large-N quantitative research. Here I discuss the concept
of nuclear proliferation and briefly mention the current studies on nuclear proliferation because it
helps define nuclear reversal and understand plausible explanations for nuclear reversal.
2.2.1 The Concept of Nuclear Proliferation
Nuclear proliferation can be defined as “the spread of nuclear weapons” (Sagan and Waltz
2003). Despite this simple definition, the existing and inadequate concept of nuclear proliferation
4In this paper, nuclear reversals are used interchangeably with nuclear withdrawal and rollback.
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may prevent scholars from carrying out rigorous studies (Ogilvie-White 1996). At the same time,
few quantitative studies have conceptually defined or measured a relatively-overlooked feature of
nuclear proliferation-nuclear rollback as the opposite direction of the spread of nuclear weapons.
Some critics suggest that the current research on nuclear proliferation tends to focus too much
on developing bombs by relatively disregarding the aspect of nuclear restraints or reversal (Levite
2002; Solingen 1994). At the beginning of his article, Levite (2002) described the following:
A serious gap exists in scholarly understanding of nuclear proliferation. The gap de-
rives from inadequate attention to the phenomena of nuclear reversal and nuclear re-
straint as well as insufficient awareness of the biases and limitations inherent in the
empirical data employed to study proliferation.(59)
How do the empirical studies conceptualize nuclear proliferation? What proliferation means
is closely related to whether it is a static dichotomy or a dynamic continuum. Some focus on one
dimension of proliferation related to the extent of proliferation: stages or phases of nuclear prolifer-
ation. For example, Singh and Way (2004, 861) explicitly emphasized proliferation as “continuum
instead of a dichotomy,” defining “degrees of nuclearness,” which consist of nuclear acquisition,
the pursuit of nuclear weapons programs, the exploration of the nuclear weapons option, and no
interest in nuclear arms. By the same token, Jo and Gartzke (2007, 167-168) disaggregated nuclear
proliferation into “the presence of a nuclear weapons production program” and “nuclear weapons
possession.” Most quantitative approaches to nuclear proliferation choose either type of nuclear
proliferation paths as the outcome of research interests. However, few quantitative studies have
evaluated the causes of nuclear reversal as another dimension of nuclear weapons policy. In order
to obtain a complete understanding of nuclear proliferation, scholarship on nuclear proliferation
should be interested in conditions under which nuclear proliferators stop and/or reverse their on-
going nuclear weapons programs.
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2.2.2 Explanations of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Why do countries go nuclear? To answer the question, many scholars suggest a variety of
explanations. Sagan (1996) first presented the systematic analysis of nuclear proliferation by of-
fering the three models of security, domestic politics, and norms. First, the security model posits
that nuclear weapons development is associated with the maximization of national security against
security threats. Second, the domestic politics model stresses the political interests of actors within
the state in regard to nuclear pursuit. Lastly, the norms model refers to norms and shared beliefs
about whether nuclear pursuit is “legitimate” and “appropriate.” Since Sagan (1996) suggested
his three theoretical models of nuclear proliferation were suggested, many international relations
scholars have conducted systematic and quantitative examinations of causes of proliferation to find
causal factors that drive nuclear weapons proliferation.
This chapter presents a review of the existing literature on nuclear proliferation as it pertains de-
mand and supply frameworks (Sagan 2011). The demand-side explanation refers to the motivation
or intention to acquire nuclear weapons while the supply-side one is associated with the available
resources for nuclear weapons development. The demand-side factors include, for instance, se-
curity threats, the security guarantee/ defensive alliance from a nuclear-armed state, and domestic
political constraints. The supply-side factors include economic conditions, nuclear technology,
and foreign nuclear cooperation/assistance.
The Demand-Side Explanation
This section lays out how the demand-side conditions influence states’ nuclear behaviors. In
particular, how do security threats and domestic political concerns influence states’ decisions re-
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garding going nuclear?
First, states attempt to develop or obtain nuclear weapons for national security purposes. A
large proportion of existing proliferation literature relies on the security model (Bowen and Kidd
2004; Ogilvie-White 1996; Paul 2000; Sagan 1996). States seek nuclear bombs when they face a
significant conventional or nuclear threat to their security, which cannot be met by existing conven-
tional forces (Sagan 1996). Such a security-based explanation for nuclear arms has been strongly
supported by the realist/neorealist tradition in international relations. For realists/neorealists, the
nuclear weapons possession is regarded as the rational behavior to protect national interests-state
survival-against potential threats in the international system (Jo and Gartzke 2007; Ogilvie-White
1996; Singh and Way 2004). Any state that seeks to maintain its national security must come up
with a counterbalance to any rival state that develops nuclear weapons; the counterbalance involves
gaining access to a nuclear deterrent. In this respect, the acquisition of nuclear weapons plays a
role in deterring the adversaries. Within the international system, the serious concerns about na-
tional survival lead states to maximize power and to try to become the most powerful nation in the
regional or world (Mearsheimer 2003). In this context, states seek nuclear weapons to maximize
national security and deter foreign attacks.
Second, forming a defense pact with a nuclear weapons state or with the dominant state reduces
a state’s motivation to acquire nuclear arms (Bleek and Lorber 2014; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Singh
and Way 2004). This is not only because a state does not have an incentive to possess nuclear
weapons due to nuclear umbrella but also because the powerful nuclear weapons state discourages
a state from developing a nuclear weapons program. For example, Singh and Way (2004, 863)
argued that “a credible security guarantee from a powerful state can dull the desire for nuclear
weapons.” Jo and Gartzke (2007, 170) claimed that “states with security commitments from pa-
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trons with nuclear weapons may be less likely to proliferate.” In contrast, Reiter (2014) found
empirical evidence that neither alliances nor foreign-deployed troops reduces an alliance-partner’s
motive to develop nuclear weapons. However, the variable of foreign-deployed nuclear weapons
is the strong predictor of decreasing the proliferation intention. A nuclear umbrella can provide
a non-nuclear alliance partner with the extended nuclear deterrence. In a similar logic, Gerzhoy
(2015) developed the logic of alliance coercion and argued, based on it, that a nuclear aspiring ally
is compelled to withdraw its nuclear weapons program due to its nuclear patron’s threats of military
abandonment. However, even if in history alliance restraints on a state’s nuclear weapons program
is substantial, it is just effective on a state within defensive alliances and during the Cold War.5
After the end of Cold War, most nuclear arms seekers were states without alliance and so-called
rogue states-Iran and North Korea, for instance. Alliance factor may have a limited influence on
nuclear proliferation in regard to country characteristics and changes in international structure.
Third, domestic-political explanations assume that the decision to go nuclear depends upon the
strategic games over policy makings among domestic political actors (Jo and Gartzke 2007; Paul
2000; Sagan 1996; Singh and Way 2004). Domestic political factors do not necessarily affect a
state’s nuclear ambition in one direction. Domestic politics may encourage or discourage a state’s
nuclear arms development (Sagan 1996, 63). For instance, according to Gray (1999), nuclear
weapons programs are essentially based on their domestic process. Sathasivam (2003) argued that,
in the case of Pakistan, the domestic power interest group forced the Pakistani government to build
and test nuclear arms in response to India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. In the case of Japan, the
domestic constitution, legislation, and non-nuclear principles restrain Japan from building nuclear
5Since 1945, a list of countries that tried but gave up nuclear weapons development includes many countries allied
with the United States - Argentina, Brazil, Canada, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, South Korea, Sweden
and Taiwan (Levite 2002, 300).
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weapons (Hughes 2007). In particular, three non-nuclear principles include ”not manufacturing,
possessing, or importing nuclear weapons” (Hughes 2007, 85).
The Supply-Side Explanation
The supply-side model is associated with the resources necessary to obtain nuclear weapons.
It includes such factors economic/industrial capacity, nuclear technology, and foreign nuclear as-
sistance. Recent studies have shown the importance of nuclear diffusion through the outside assis-
tance (e.g., Kroenig 2009) and proliferation rings or networks (e.g., Chestnut 2007).
First, economic development simplifies a nation’s acquisition of nuclear weapons by providing
sufficient resources (Jo and Gartzke 2007; Singh and Way 2004). For instance, Singh and Way
(2004, 862) argued that states “may achieve the capability to assemble nuclear weapons by an
explicit intentional effort or as an implicit by-product of economic and industrial development.”
Second, nuclear technology can provide states with the opportunity to build nuclear weapons
(Jo and Gartzke 2007; Singh and Way 2004). According to Jo and Gartzke (2007, 169), nuclear
technology is not considered easily obtainable. For instance, Hymans (2012, 8) discussed the
common claims about the role of nuclear technology in the sense that “states that have more prior
experience with nuclear technology might be able to make the bomb more quickly after deciding
to do so.” Nonetheless, nuclear technology is required to build nuclear weapons, regardless of how
it is obtained-through national research or outside assistance and nuclear networks.
Third, nuclear assistance refers to the international spread of nuclear arms through provid-
ing nuclear transfers to non-nuclear powers and nuclear proliferation networks (Braun and Chyba
2004; Chestnut 2007; Kroenig 2009; Montgomery 2005). Most of the proliferation literature de-
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pends on the demand-side approach. Kroenig (2009), however, by criticizing the current overde-
pendence on the demand-side explanation, showed the importance of the supply-side model of nu-
clear proliferation. He argued that the patterns of sensitive nuclear assistance to non-nuclear states
may be explained by the strategic characteristics of the suppliers. Fuhrmann (2009) also found
that civilian nuclear assistance is more likely to lead to some features of nuclear proliferation such
as the initiation and acquisition of nuclear weapons due to its lowering nuclear technology barri-
ers. According to Braun and Chyba (2004), proliferation rings-e.g., a Pakistani scientist Khan’s
network-lead to nuclear technology transfers and challenge global nonproliferation efforts. Thus,
foreign nuclear assistance can be one of the main determinants of nuclear weapons proliferation.
In the next section, I will present a theoretical discussion about possible impacts of U.S. eco-
nomic statecraft on the nuclear reversal commitment by looking into U.S. positive inducements
and negative economic sanctions.
2.3 Theory: U.S. Economic Statecraft and Nuclear Reversal
A nuclear aspiring state considers its distributional effects of international pressures on its
regime survival in regard to the policy concession of nonproliferation. Since embarking on a
nuclear weapons program requires strong support from key political actors or ruling elites, state
leaders rarely reverse their nuclear paths due to anticipated political costs compared to benefits
arising from the nuclear policy change. Nonetheless, since 1970s, key members of the interna-
tional nonproliferation community have experienced some cases of nuclear rollbacks.6 What then
6According to Levite (2002, 62), countries including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, In-
donesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Romania, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Yugoslavia pursued
but reversed their nuclear weapons programs. Countries such as Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Ukraine acquired
and gave up nuclear bombs. In addition, Iran is now in the process of nuclear nonproliferation.
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drives nuclear reversal? Does U.S. economic statecraft induce nuclear aspirants to give up ongoing
nuclear development programs? First, let us consider how nuclear proliferation scholars define
nuclear reversal. Levite (2002, 67) stated that nuclear reversal is7
a governmental decision to slow or stop altogether an officially sanctioned nuclear
weapons program. At the core this definition is the distinction between states that
have launched (indigenously or with external assistance) a nuclear weapons program
and then abandoned it and those that never had such a program in the first place.
Nuclear reversal excludes both termination of unauthorized nuclear weapons-related
activity within a government and private-sector research and development in a nuclear
weapons-related field (e.g., nuclear fuel-cycle technologies) if the latter was not for-
mally pursued as part of an effort either to create a bomb or at least to acquire standby
status.
This definition is commonly mentioned in existing literature on nuclear (non-)proliferation
studies, which can be appropriately linked with my theoretical argument. However, the dichoto-
mous classification of nuclear proliferation/reversal may overlook an important path of nuclear
proliferation. So in theoretical and practical senses nuclear reversal might be disaggregated into a
few outcomes. For example, Lodgaard (2010, 116) argued that nuclear proliferation and rollback
include “rejection, hedging, restraint, active pursuit and acquisition” among which the former three
terms are considered nuclear rollback.8 Similarly, recent studies on nuclear proliferation pay atten-
tion to the feature of nuclear latency (Fuhrmann and Tkach 2015; Sagan 2010). They contend that
current scholarship of nuclear proliferation relatively overlook the importance of nuclear latency in
7Another simple definition of nuclear reversal is the rollback which is “a process in the opposite direction (of
proliferation that moves forward weaponization), reversing intentions and/or capabilities to acquire nuclear arms”
(Lodgaard 2010, 115).
8According to Lodgaard (2010, 116), the three outcomes of nuclear rollbacks can be defined as follows: (1)
rejection is the non-consideration of the option to acquire nuclear weapons, (2) hedging indicates the “maintenance of
an indigenous capacity to produce nuclear weapons on relatively short notice,” and (3) restraint option makes a state
refrain from “proceeding to prominent nuclear activities such as testing of nuclear explosive devices, production of
weapon-grade materials and construction of fuel-cycle facilities that may be used for military ends.”
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accounting for the causes of nuclear weapons development. Meyer (1986) also posited that a state
is said to “have a latent capacity when it has sufficient technical, industrial, material, and financial
resources to support a wholly indigenous weapons program.”9 Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015, 2) built
the dataset focusing on “the development of enrichment and reprocessing facilities” which “pro-
vide countries with the ability to produce fissile material - weapon-grade highly enriched uranium
or plutonium.”10 Nuclear reversal outcomes may include “stable non-nuclear status” or states with
“a certain preparedness for going nuclear if changing circumstances so suggest” (Lodgaard 2010,
115). In accordance with the significance of a state’s nuclear latent capabilities in nuclear prolif-
eration, nuclear development paths are here disaggregated into three outcomes: stable non-nuclear
status, nuclear latency status, and nuclear pursuit/acquisition.11
Before moving on to the theoretical argument, I first delineate the theoretical background of
the political survival approach to international relations to identify the role of U.S. economic state-
craft on nuclear reversal. First, I assume that state leaders make foreign policy choices with the
purpose of maximizing the likelihood of their political survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003;
Schultz 2001). A variety of research groups using the domestic level (of analysis) in international
relations posit that political leaders concern about their domestic political survival as the sine qua
non of foreign policy decisions (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Fearon 1994; Mintz 1993). Fearon
(1994), for instance, argued that political leaders generate domestic audience costs that they pay
9I recite this from the research website of Latent Capacity Proliferation Model at
http://es.rice.edu/projects/Poli378/Nuclear/Proliferation/model.html. The concept of nuclear latency is diversely
described by scholars. According to Stoll’s broad conceptualization, a state with a nuclear latent capacity has
“sufficient technical, industrial, material, and financial resources to support a wholly indigenous weapons program”
(Montgomery and Sagan. 2009, 85). In contrast, Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015) more narrowly conceptualize nuclear
latency, primarily limiting “the development of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) facilities.”
10For more information about the concept/measurement of nuclear latency, see Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015, 3-10).
11With regard to a nuclear proliferating state’s response to economic sanctions, I assume that stable non-nuclear sta-
tus is the perfect policy concession of nonproliferation, nuclear latency is partial/suboptimal compliance, and nuclear
pursuit/possession is non-compliance to the sanctioner’s nonproliferation demands.
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when they back down after having made a public threat during the international crisis. Smith
(1998) emphasized the domestic constituencies’ evaluation of their leaders’ policy performance.
In particular, national leaders revealed to have low competence in foreign policy tasks are more
likely to be removed through re-election, coup, or assassination. Leaders who want to retain power
in office should adopt policies that help them achieve that goal. By the same token, leaders in the
nuclear aspiring state tend to reveal a noncompensatory decision rule for eliminating in the first
place policy alternatives that might harm their political survival (Mintz 1993).12 Thus, political
leaders hardly roll back a nuclear program in progress, given that it typically requires an enor-
mous financial and technological investment that should have a broad base of support among key
domestic constituencies (Fuhrmann and Sechser 2014).
Since the domestic political constraints make leaders in the nuclear aspirant reluctant to with-
draw the existing (and/or ongoing) nuclear weapons (program), major determinants of nuclear pro-
liferation may play a minor role, at most, of inducing nuclear reversal. In this case, international
factors such as major world powers’ influence may affect a state’s domestic political/policy deci-
sions (e.g., Gourevitch 1978; Pevehouse 2002). American statecraft is one of the critical factors to
influence the behaviors of other countries. The United States, after all, is a country that possesses
sufficient resources to pursue its national interest throughout the world (Ross 2007). Therefore, in
explaining nuclear reversal outcomes, this study focuses on the role of the United States and its
economic statecraft, in particular. The argument put forward is that American economic statecraft
influences nuclear rollback behaviors of nuclear proliferators that have already pursued and even
acquired nuclear bombs. The next section provides possible theoretical explanations regarding the
12Based the so-called “poliheuristic theory” using the noncompensatory decision principle, the most undesirable
option for nuclear aspirants may be perfect nuclear withdrawal of existing nuclear development program and infras-
tructure.
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impacts of American negative sanctions and positive inducements on nuclear proliferating states’
reversal behaviors.
2.3.1 The Effects of U.S. Negative Sanctions on Nuclear Reversal
The United States has employed negative sanctions as a foreign policy instrument of coercive
diplomacy to maintain international stability and/or resolve international crises. Sanctions are used
to “presuppose the sender country’s willingness to interfere in the decision-making process of an-
other sovereign government, but in a measured way that supplements diplomatic reproach without
the immediate introduction of military force”(Hufbauer et al. 2007, 5). If the United States im-
poses sanctions against the target state, that state’s political leaders suffer domestic audience costs
that increase as sanctions produce a negative externality such as international isolation, economic
depression/hardship, and higher inflation. In particular, economic sanctions threaten incumbent
leaders’ political survival because they are likely to generate political costs for the targeted lead-
ers through economic damage, political disintegration among domestic societal groups, and even
political protests or violence (Allen 2008b; Marinov 2005; McGillivray and Stam 2004). The do-
mestic political costs from sanctions can lead a targeted government to make a policy concession to
the sanctioning state. But, the sanctioning state can extract the target’s compliance only if sanction
costs for noncompliance outweigh the benefits for noncompliance. In nuclear rollback decisions,
target leaders should calculate the costs and benefits of reversing the nuclear development that has
already been pursued.
However, sanctions rarely extract policy concessions from the target nation.13 The target state
13Existing sanction literature presents some arguments on how a target state can be reluctant to give compliance
to the sender, avoiding the negative externality of economic sanctions. First, political leaders in the target state tend
to divert the economic cost of the sanctions to the sender. Sanctions are designed to impose economic costs to the
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is likely to resist the demands of the sanctioning state when it has an issue of high salience, such
as nuclear weapons development, that involves the state’s national security concerns (Adrian and
Peksen 2007). Since nuclear weapons programs are financially expensive and politically important
to a target state, the state’s leaders face high audience costs if they back down from going nuclear
(Gartzke and Jo 2009). These costs force target leaders to resist making the concessions to the
sanctioning state’s demands for nonproliferation. Instead, the targeted nuclear aspirant seeks to
avoid political and economic damage from imposed sanctions. At the same time, countries fac-
ing critical security threats will seek to build their own nuclear bombs if they have no credible
security guarantees that a nuclear states will provide, according to the security model of nuclear
proliferation. Thus, U.S. international sanctions decrease the likelihood that the target government
will reverse the nuclear weapons development due to its expectation of a potential conflict with the
sanctioning state and its coalition countries.
A nuclear aspirant targeted by negative sanctions would expect potential military conflict with
the U.S. and its coalition states. This conflict expectation may lead the target state to accelerate
its nuclear weapons program rather than suspend it. In this sense, U.S. sanction imposition is in-
directly linked with the external security threats to which the target state may respond by building
nuclear bombs or strengthening its military capabilities. Negative sanctions generate the costly
target state. Economic blockade and trade disruptions make the target economy suffer negative externalities, such as a
higher rate of inflation and quite heavy job losses. The target state, however, searches for alternative trading partners
to reduce negative distributional effects of sanctions. Under this circumstance, some third-party countries play a
sanction-busting role of spoiling sanction effectiveness by offering the opportunistic trade relations to and/or investing
in targeted countries (Drezner 2000; Early 2009, 2011; Lektzian and Biglaiser 2013; McLean and Whang 2010). In
addition to the busting behaviors of third-party countries, target leaders use political manipulation to diminish the
negative impacts of U.S. economic sanctions on their economy. It is widely accepted in the sanction literature that
negative sanctions cause a “rally-round-the-flag effect” through which a targeted state’s leaders generate a nationalistic
sentiment within the society, which would make sanctions less successful (Verdier and Woo 2011). The sanctioned
governments are likely to frame the U.S. demands for nuclear withdrawal and its sanction imposition as foreign threats
to the national sovereignty (Drezner 2001).
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signaling effects so the sender is likely to initiate military conflicts against a target after sanction
imposition (Drezner 1998). When a target’s leaders face sanction imposition of the sender, they
are likely to realize the sender’s resolve because of its costly signaling role. For instance, Lektzian
and Souva (2007, 416) argued that economic sanctions are positively associated with the use of
military force by functioning “a costly signal of a state’s commitment to have a dispute resolved.”
Drezner (1998) also discussed the notion that sanctioning countries are likely to impose sanctions
as an alternative when future conflict is anticipated. The Bush administration began putting more
pressure for the North Korean regime for its nuclear weapons development than did its predecessor
the Clinton administration (Pardo 2014).14 With the U.S. slow commitments to the 1994 Agreed
Framework and its more hawkish policies toward North Korea, the Pyongyang government per-
ceived the U.S. tough sanctions and other measures as significant threats to its regime survival.
Yet rather than give a concession, North Korea accelerated its nuclear weapons development and
even quickly began nuclear testing (Byun and Snyder 2007). Therefore, North Korea, perceiving
itself as a U.S. adversary, was strongly reluctant to make any concessions to the U.S. and its allies
(Drezner 2001).
The discussion described above may lead one to believe that a target state’s chances of ter-
minating its nuclear weapons program is low. Political leaders in the sanctioned country expect
potential conflicts with the U.S. and its coalition countries when they become a target of U.S. sanc-
tions. Thus, when the United States imposes negative sanctions against a nuclear aspiring state, the
target state will be likely to resist America’s nonproliferation demands, even trying to accelerate
nuclear weapons development.
14Pardo (2014) described the situation for the North Korean nuclear issue during the October 2005-October 2006.
He mentioned that the Bush administration’s freezing North Korean accounts in Banco Delta Asia made Pyongyang
suspicious of the U.S.’s sincere commitment to the normalization of bilateral relations whereas North Korea decided
to engage in high-intensity brinkmanship, such as going ahead with its nuclear and missile tests.
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Hypothesis 2.1 Nuclear aspiring states targeted by U.S. negative sanctions have a lower likeli-
hood of reversing their nuclear pursuits.
2.3.2 The Effects of U.S. Multilateral IO Sanctions on Nuclear Reversal
Another factor that might influence nuclear reversal behavior of the target state is U.S. sanction
imposition through international institutions. The United States has implemented both multilat-
eral sanctions and sanctions through international organizations. This section includes as another
main independent variable U.S. sanctions through international institutions rather than multilat-
eral sanctions. As discussed above, negative sanctions are considered ineffective in part because
of third-parties’ sanction-busting and backsliding behaviors. Scholars of economic sanctions ar-
gue that multilateral sanctions, especially through international institutions, are more effective in
extracting policy concessions from the target state than are other sanctions (Bapat and Morgan
2009; Bapat et al. 2013; Drezner 2000; Drury 1998). Sanctions through international organiza-
tions should resolve enforcement problems such as sanction-busting behaviors of third parties to a
considerable extent. Drezner (2000), for instance, contends that “sanctions with reasonably high
levels of international cooperation should impose greater costs on the target country because of the
inability to find alternative markets and suppliers.” International institutions possess enforcement
powers to prevent other countries from defecting and to reduce the probability of backsliding.15
Thus, political leaders in a target state need to recalculate the anticipated benefits for pursuing
nuclear weapons programs and costs of U.S. sanction through international organizations. If they
15In addition, sanctions through international institutions may show higher legitimacy so that the target state has a
difficulty of framing the issue in favor it and relying on the rally-round-the-flag sentiment.
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choose to pursue nuclear weapons development, a target state’ leaders may gain political bene-
fits. Leaders in a target state improves its military power deterring potential security threats from
attacking it and strategically symbolizes nuclear bombs as a national pride.
However, when an international organization is in the U.S. sanction coalition, a target country
cannot help but to encounter potential threats from overseas as well as domestically. A target state
faces domestically much greater economic and political costs of sanctions in which the U.S. and
other members in an international organization would support for the U.S.-led sanctions against
nuclear proliferating state. In this case, it is hard for a target state to find alternative trading routes
and investors in order to avoid negative externalities of sanctions. Resisting nonproliferation de-
mands from the U.S. and the international community is not a good choice for a sanctioned nuclear
aspirant. Economic damages from sanctions may be sufficient enough to put the political survival
of target leaders in danger.
For example, in response to North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile tests on January 6,
2016, the United States recently led the tightened sanctions through the United Nations Security
Council against Pyongyang and its government officials/agencies and companies (Morello 2016)
It was said that the sanctions would be “more robust than any imposed in decades” because the
UN sanctions require member states to inspect all cargo going to or coming from North Korea to
ensure it does not contain anything that would further the country’s nuclear or missile programs.”16
The US-led multilateral sanctions through international organization (esp. the UN) may im-
prove the effectiveness of sanctions to extract some policy concessions because the United States
is one of the only countries in the world with an extensive defense alliance system. Using intra
16According to a CBS news report (April 6, 2016), “China has banned most imports of North Korea coal and
iron ore, the country’s main exports, in a significant increase in pressure on the North under UN sanctions against its
nuclear and missile tests.” http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-tightens-the-trade-screws-on-north-korea/
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alliance politics, the U.S. could induce its third party allies to join sanctions agains the target coun-
tries (Early 2012). When the U.S. forms asymmetric alliance with less powerful countries, it can
receive those countries’ support for US-led multilateral sanctions. There is a tradeoff of security
and policy concession between the U.S. and its weaker allies (Morrow 1991). For example, the
recent nuclear deal between Iran and the US and its coalition states shows that Iranian sanctions
primarily implemented by the U.S. were complemented by the strong cooperation of the EU coun-
tries and member states of the UN in 2006, forcing Iran to change nuclear policy (Borhani 2015).
In addition, South Korea, a U.S. ally, joined the US-led Iranian sanctions under the pressure of
the US-Korean alliance, adding “the names of 102 Iranian firms and 24 people to the blacklist of
those with whom South Koreans cannot do business and also promised to inspect cargo from Iran
more diligently and hold back on investment in oil and gas enterprises.” Like South Korea, the EU,
Canada and Japan have also joined the U.S. sanctions against Iran (Kirk 2010).
Bapat and Morgan (2009) also found that “multilateral sanctions do appear to work more fre-
quently than do unilateral sanctions” because they have “the potential to create more coercive
power than unilateral sanctions.” In their recent study, Early and Spice (2015) argued that economic
sanctions through smaller international institutions can extract secondary sanctioners’ deeper com-
mitments not to spoil sanction effectiveness than those through larger international institutions.
This indicates that despite the variation in sanction effectiveness between the different size of in-
ternational institutions, sanction imposition through international organizations is still effective at
inducing the target’s compliance. According to Palkki and Smith (2012), for an illustration, regard-
less of Libya’s poor economic performance the actual impact of unilateral U.S. sanctions between
1986 and 1992 was insignificant due to Libya’s capacity to continue looking for alternative mar-
kets and foreign petroleum investors. Yet the United States was able to impose substantial costs
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to Qaddafi’s regime using the international institution sanctions, in particular through the United
Nations (Jentleson and Whytock 2005).17
Hypothesis 2.2 Nuclear aspiring states targeted by U.S. sanctions through international organi-
zations have a higher likelihood of reversing their nuclear pursuit.
2.3.3 The Effects of U.S. Positive Inducements on Nuclear Reversal
Reward dimension of coercive diplomacy refers to a strategy that “can use positive induce-
ments and assurances” to influence an adversary. According to George (1991), “the magnitude and
significance of the carrot can range from a seemingly concessions that bring about a settlement
of the crisis through a genuine, balanced quid pro quo” (10). Positive inducements may have an
influence on the policy change of a target state in two regards. As foreign rewards or assistance
increase, a sanctioned state becomes more accountable to the sender country than to its domestic
constituencies. So, when a target state is more dependent upon foreign positive inducements, it is
likely to make a policy concession to the sanctioning state in exchange for material benefits. Like
negative sanctions, on the other hand, positive inducements also have a costly signaling effect.
In contrast to negative sanctions, foreign positive rewards may signal to the target the sender’s
positive attitude toward the target state.
Fist, U.S. positive inducements may lead to the target state’s policy change through ‘aid-for-
policy’ deal. Target leaders tend to be accountable to the aid provider (Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith 2009b). Based on this logic, a target nation may reverse the nuclear development programs
17As Jentleson and Whytock (2005, 82) explain the three phases of the US-led sanctions against Libya: (1) phase
1: the“very limited United States-European cooperation”; (2) phase 2: “the UN Security Council gave its normative
legitimacy and economic weights to the sanctions”; and (3) phase 3: “the United States and Britain worked closely
together were key factors in the variation in coercive diplomacy success.”
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responding to the aid donor’s nonproliferation request. A target state’s leaders benefit their ruling
supporters using foreign aid in exchange for withdrawing the existing nuclear development. If
target leaders believe that the policy concession does not result in regime change or breakdown,
positive inducements may strengthen the power of the moderates within the incumbent govern-
ment. Positive sanctions have distributional consequences in the target state in the sense that they
may improve and/or strengthen the target government’s political legitimacy through the distribu-
tion of economic benefits from them. On the other hand, when the aid-recipient country does not
make a concession, it is likely to become a sanction-target and lose economic benefits that it has
been receiving. In this case, the target nation should be loss-averse. For example, South Korea,
at one point attempted to build nuclear weapons for security purposes but then made a decision to
withdraw its nuclear weapons program because of the U.S. pressure, i.e., the threat of cutting its
assistance and security guarantees (Hersman and Peters 2006). Indeed, South Korea was a major
recipient of U.S. economic and military aid in the post-Korean War period.18 Egypt also initiated
a nuclear program in the 1960s but gave it up in the 1970s because Anwar Sadat, a successor
of Gamal Abdel Nasser, sought to avoid giving much power to the existing ruling elites but pre-
ferred market-oriented reforms (Nincic 2011). At the same time, Egyptian government needed to
withdraw its nuclear exploration in order not to lose economic aid from the US.
Second, U.S. positive inducements retain a significant effect on a target country and third-party
countries as well. Positive rewards such as foreign aid are a positive signal to a recipient country
itself and other countries because a sender spends a considerable amount of its resources in the
aid allocation. For instance, Garriga and Phillips (2014) argued that U.S. aid allocation is prone
18South Korea has received from the US aid of a “total of $11 billion by 1973” and “$3.5 billion during the period
between 1954 and 1970” which was “ equivalent to nearly 5% of South Korea’s total gross national product for the
same period. American economic and military aid combined account for nearly 10% of South Korea’s GNP in that
period”(Han 1980, 1076).
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to follow geo-strategic concerns. Especially during the Cold War, U.S. foreign assistance to a
recipient country played a role in signaling that it was strategically important to the U.S. or at least
the U.S. may not implement hostile policies.
Hypothesis 2.3 Nuclear aspiring states receiving U.S. positive inducements have a higher likeli-
hood of reversing their nuclear pursuit.
2.4 Research Design
This study evaluates the testable hypotheses of a theory of U.S. economic statecraft and nuclear
reversal, using a time-series cross-sectional dataset that include 18 countries and the time period
lasting from 1970 through 2004. The test period is primarily based on a theoretical reason. Since
the birth of nuclear age, the first nuclear club-i.e., the US, USSR/Russia, the United Kingdom,
France, and China-has attempted to deter nuclear proliferation. In particular, the U.S. government
has adopted a nonproliferation policy since the establishment of the 1970 Nuclear Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) (Dunn 2006). Thus, the first club nations are excluded from this dataset. Also ex-
cluded are countries such as Japan and Sweden that withdrew their nuclear weapons programs
before 1970. This doesn’t necessarily cause a sampling problem because the U.S. nuclear nonpro-
liferation activity does not apply to them as targets. This dataset is well documented by previous
studies (Singh and Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007). It does, however, need to be modified for test-
ing the hypotheses of the nuclear reversal based on updated information (Levite 2002; Cirincione
and Rajkumar 2005).
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2.4.1 Dependent Variables
The outcome variable of interest is whether a nuclear-proliferating state that has explored
and/or pursued nuclear weapons programs reverses or keeps pursuing, in a given year, its nu-
clear weapons development. To be included in the dataset, the country must have at least begun an
initial exploration and/or pursuit of nuclear weapons, or engaged in nuclear weapons activity.
Existing quantitative studies of nuclear proliferation tend to place the variable of nuclear la-
tent capabilities on the side of the independent variables. In reality, many nuclear proliferating
countries have retained nuclear latent capacity in the process of nuclear pursuit. Some countries
removed the entire infrastructure and technology with latent capacity after renouncing nuclear
weapons programs. Some countries have maintained nuclear latent capabilities even though they
have suspended existing nuclear weapons development.
The measurement of nuclear reversal conceptually relies on Lodgaard’s discussion on nuclear
rollback. According to Lodgaard (2010, 115), nuclear reversal “is a process in the opposite di-
rection (of nuclear proliferation), reversing intentions and/or capabilities to acquire nuclear arms.
Some states have rolled back to a stable non-nuclear status. Others have kept a certain prepared-
ness for going nuclear if changing circumstances so suggest. Yet others have rolled back and forth
between different degrees of interest in the nuclear option and different degrees of material pre-
paredness to exercise it.” Thus, I regard a state in stable non-nuclear status when it discarded both
the intention and capability to construct nuclear bombs. I also consider a state in nuclear latency
status when it still maintains some degrees of nuclear latent capacity to build nuclear weapons
within some time period if it wants to do while it removes the willingness to make nuclear bombs.
To code dates of nuclear reversal paths for each state, I discuss coding rules from four different
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dataset: Bleek and Lorber (2014), Kroenig (2016), Levite (2002), and Way and Weeks (2014).
Based on the conceptualization of the paths of nuclear weapons development, I use the depen-
dent variable, which consists of two measures. The first dependent variable is a binary measure-
ment. A dichotomous outcome variable, Nuclear reversal, is coded 1 if a nuclear proliferating state
makes a decision to reverse its nuclear weapons development in a given year and 0 if not.
The second dependent variable has value 0 for all country years for no nuclear pursuit (Non-
nuclear status), value 1 for Nuclear pursuit, and value 2 for Nuclear latency. Data for the depen-
dent variable are collected by Way and Weeks (2014) for nuclear paths with nuclear latency from
Fuhrmann and Tkach (2015). A state having an ENR plant in operation is considered a state with
nuclear latency capacity (Fuhrmann and Tkach 2015). But, nuclear latency status as a category of
nuclear reversal outcomes is coded if the state ever acquires and possesses nuclear latent capability
in spite of its renouncing nuclear weapons development. I code a state as in a non-nuclear status if
a state not only has no intention to pursue its nuclear weapons development but also lacks nuclear
latent capacity to quickly restart nuclear weapons programs when circumstances suggest. The data
are a recent updated version, which includes cases ignored by past studies.19
2.4.2 Independent Variables
The data on independent variables primarily depend on the HSEO dataset (Hufbauer et al.
2007). To estimate the impact of U.S. sanctions on the targeted state’s nuclear reversal, U.S. nega-
tive sanctions are measured in a dichotomous way in terms that they are coded 1 for each year that
19A recent review of nuclear proliferation research criticizes existing studies for not accounting for new cases
(Montgomery and Sagan. 2009; Sagan 2011). Way and Weeks (2014) claimed that their data updated Singh and Way’s
(2004) proliferation data in the sense that they either added or revised the cases of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and North
Korea.
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the HSEO dataset records all sanctions imposed by the United States, and 0 otherwise. Another
sanction variable is U.S. economic sanctions through international organizations. The US multilat-
eral IO sanctions is coded as 1 for each year that the United States has imposed negative sanctions
through international organizations. I also analyze the effect of U.S. sanctions on a variation in
nuclear reversal behaviors using US sanction duration and US nuclear sanctions. Including U.S.
sanction duration in the equation reflects a possibility that sanctions are more likely to have the cu-
mulative effect over time rather than the immediate effects. The variable of U.S. nuclear sanctions
is also measured in a dichotomous way. The aim of U.S. nuclear sanction is specifically to prevent
nuclear proliferation.
The US aid (% GDP) variable as a proxy for U.S. positive inducements is a country’s is a
country’s annual inflows of U.S. total aid as a percentage of domestic product (GDP). It appropri-
ately captures a country’s aid-dependence on the U.S., which indicates that the country has more
incentives to give policy concession to the U.S. in exchange for U.S. aid allocation. Alternatively,
the US aid variable includes U.S. economic aid and military aid flowing into targeted countries. It
is measured as the natural logarithm of U.S. total aid in a given year (the result is reported in the
section of Appendix.). It is argued that the the increase in superpower aid (e.g., U.S. aid) by the
aid-recipient country is regarded as the actual increase of the superpower’s support to the recipient
country no matter how big the recipient’s economic size is (Mintz and Heo 2014).
2.4.3 Control Variables
For controlling for other factors to a proliferating state’s affect nuclear reversal behaviors, the
study includes several relevant variables including Sensitive nuclear assistance, Civil nuclear co-
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operation, NPT ratification, US security alliance, Trade openness, GDP per capita (log), Polity
score, Disputes, and Rivalry.
First, then, in line with the recent studies on the supply-side of nuclear proliferation, I include
both foreign sensitive nuclear assistance (Kroenig 2009)20 and civil nuclear cooperation (Fuhrmann
2009). Sensitive nuclear assistance is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a nuclear proliferating
state obtained sensitive nuclear materials or technologies from abroad, and 0 otherwise. Sensitive
nuclear transfers enable nuclear aspiring states to overcome technical obstacles in pursuing nu-
clear weapons development. At the same time, purchasing foreign sensitive nuclear technology is
said to be less expensive than the indigenous nuclear weapons development in part because of nu-
clear suppliers’ strategic interest in helping nuclear aspirants to obtain sensitive nuclear technology
(Kroenig 2009). However, it still should not be always less expensive to obtain foreign sensitive
nuclear assistance given that international community works hard to take measures to deter the
spread of nuclear weapons technology. In that situation, nuclear aspiring states need to pay both
political and economic costs as it becomes more difficult for them to obtain the access to sensitive
nuclear technology from abroad. For example, according to a news report, North Korean govern-
ment “bribed top military officials” in Pakistan “to obtain access to sensitive nuclear technology
in the later 1990s” through the secretive deal with transferring more than $3 million in payments
(Smith 2011). Thus, it is expected that Sensitive nuclear assistance is negatively associated with a
state’s nuclear reversal (Bleek and Lorber 2014; Kroenig 2009; Reiter 2014).
Civil nuclear cooperation is a variable, which counts the aggregated number of bilateral civil-
20“Sensitive nuclear assistance takes three forms. States receive sensitive assistance when they receive assistance
in the design and construction of nuclear weapons, receive significant quantities of weapons-grade fissile material, or
receive assistance in the construction of uranium-enrichment or plutonium-reprocessing facilities that could be used
to produce weapons-grade fissile material” (Kroenig 2009, 168)
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ian nuclear agreements that a proliferating state has signed in a given year (Fuhrmann 2009). Civil
nuclear cooperation is said a key determinant of nuclear proliferation because a such cooperation
enables a state to obtain the capacity to pursue nuclear weapons programs. The probability of
nuclear proliferation is said to be increased by the number of civil nuclear agreement (Fuhrmann
2009). Some scholars, however, argued that civil nuclear agreements often used by the interna-
tional community may play a role in dissuading nuclear aspiring states from obtaining access to
sensitive nuclear technology (Bluth et al. 2010, 190). Thus, the number of civil nuclear agreements
may also decrease a proliferating state’s incentive to pursue nuclear weapons development.
Second, a state’s nuclear behaviors tend to be affected by domestic variables. Previous re-
search has found that political factors have no significant impact on nuclear proliferation (Jo and
Gartzke 2007). However, some recent studies has founded that domestic political variables have
a significant influence on a state’s nuclear development commitments (Fuhrmann 2009; Kroenig
2009). For instance, Way and Weeks (2014) found that “personalistic” dictatorships are more likely
to pursue nuclear weapons than are other political regimes. It is expected that more democratized
countries are more likely to reverse nuclear weapons development than less democratized countries
(Polity score). Polity score reflects a proliferating state’s regime type based on the 21-point scale
(Marshall and Gurr 2011). This variable ranges from -10 to +10, with higher values representing
greater levels of democracy and with lower values indicating greater levels of autocracy.
The Nonproliferation Treaty membership (NPT ratification) is a dichotomous variable mea-
sured 1 if a proliferating state has ratified the NPT in a given year and 0 if not. A state’s ratification
of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) tends to signal its willingness to conform to international
rules/norms over the nonproliferation commitments. It is expected that a state’s NPT ratification
is more likely to increase the probability of its nuclear rollback commitments (Bleek and Lorber
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2014; Fuhrmann 2009).
Third, several international factors may influence a state’s nuclear reversal behaviors. Security
guarantees through defense pacts are likely to reduce a state’s motivation to go nuclear. It is
expected then that security alliance with the U.S. (US security alliance) is more likely to increase
the probability that a proliferating state withdraws its nuclear weapons development in accordance
with the existing findings (Bleek and Lorber 2014; Gerzhoy 2015; Kroenig 2009; Reiter 2014).
A state’s involvement in international disputes (Disputes), however, may decrease its incentive
to withdraw the ongoing nuclear development (Brown and Kaplow 2014; Fuhrmann 2009; Reiter
2014). In a similar vein, having an enduring rivalry (Rivalry) may decrease a state’s intention
to reverse its ongoing nuclear pursuit due to security concerns. The next international factor is a
state’s openness to trade (Trade openness). When a state is more open to the international economy
and economically more interdependent, it is more likely to stop nuclear development and rollback
its nuclear programs because it does not want such risky behaviors to hurt its economy and ruling
elites (Solingen 1994, 2012). It is expected that the more open a state’s economy is, the higher the
probability that it reverses its nuclear weapons development (Brown and Kaplow 2014; Kroenig
2009).
Lastly, I takes into account, using a method suggested by Carter and Signorino (2010), the
temporal dependence in the data. The study includes a variable that counts the number of years
that pass with a nuclear pursuit or non-nuclear-pursuit (Years) with its square (Years2) and its cube
(Years3). All independent and control variables are measured as the lagged one due to possible
lag-effect of sanctions on nuclear behaviors.
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2.5 Methods and Results
To test this paper’s arguments, the study estimates a series of binary logit and multinomial logit
model (MNLM).21 However, the analysis produced the warning message of “... observation com-
pletely determined. Standard errors questionable,” when running a standard logit regression. This
results from problems of complete- or quasi-separation in the small-sample data. Some studies
suggest that researchers should implement penalized likelihood logistic regression to cope with
the problems of separation and finite sample biases (Allison 2004; Brown and Kaplow 2014; Firth
1993; Zorn 2005). In this case, one or more of my independent variable are excellent predictors
of nuclear reversal (Brown and Kaplow 2014; Zorn 2005). To run a penalized likelihood logistic
model, I use the command “firthlogit” in Stata.
It begins with the binary dependent variable-nuclear pursuit vs. nuclear reversal. Table 2.1
shows the results of five logistic regressions that test whether U.S. economic statecraft is associ-
ated with a change in the likelihood of a nuclear aspirant’s reversing a nuclear weapons devel-
opment. Regarding the effects of U.S. economic statecraft on nuclear reversal, Models 1 and 2
include U.S. negative sanctions, U.S. sanction duration, and U.S. aid (% GDP) plus control vari-
ables while Models 3 and 4 include U.S. multilateral IO sanctions and U.S. non-IO sanctions plus
control variables. First, the coefficient for U.S. negative sanctions is statistically insignificant and
negative, which is, however, in the expected direction. The coefficient for U.S. sanction duration
is also insignificant but positive. The result in Model 3, on the other hand, shows that the variable
of U.S. non-IO sanctions decreases the probability that a nuclear-aspiring state reverses its nuclear
pursuit. For instance, the logit coefficient on U.S. non-IO sanctions is -1.990 and its odd ratio is
21Quantitative literature on nuclear proliferation conducts multinomial logit and event history or hazard model to
deal with multi-outcome dependent variable (Singh and Way 2004; Bleek and Lorber 2014; Kroenig 2016).
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0.137. This means that, other things being equal, the odds of a nuclear proliferating state reversing
its nuclear pursuit are almost 0.14 times as likely when under U.S. non-IO sanctions than when
under no such sanctions. In fact, becoming a target of U.S. non-IO sanctions decreases the odds of
reversing nuclear pursuit by over 86 percent. However, U.S. sanctions with IO involvement have
a positive sign (direction toward nuclear reversal) but are not statistically significant in affecting a
state’s nuclear reversal behavior. The coefficient for U.S. multilateral IO sanctions is, for instance,
2.141 in Model 4. The odds ratio for the variable is 8.5. This means that, other things being equal,
the odds of reversing nuclear weapons development increase by over 750 percent. Regarding the
impacts of U.S. positive inducements, U.S. aid (% GDP) has a insignificant but positive effect on
nuclear reversal in all five models (Models 1-5). Overall, these findings show that, in a binary
choice setting (nuclear reversal vs. pursuit), neither U.S. negative sanctions nor U.S. nuclear sanc-
tions are not influential factors in extracting policy concessions of nuclear nonproliferation from a
target state. But, U.S. multilateral IO sanctions are effective in inducing a state’s reversal behavior.
Let us now turn to the determinants of each of a trichotomous nuclear behavior, using a multi-
nomial logit model (MNLM) to examine the likelihood that a specific outcome is determined in
nuclear development paths. In the multinomial logit models, the study estimates the effects of
U.S. economic statecraft for stable non-nuclear status (outcome 0), nuclear pursuit/acquisition
(outcome 1), and nuclear latency status (outcome 2). The reference category of the dependent
variable is non-nuclear status. Model 6 in Table 2.2 shows the effects of U.S. negative sanctions
on each outcome of a state’s nuclear proliferation commitments. U.S. negative sanction imposi-
tion lead to a positive effect on nuclear pursuit. However, they are not statistically significant in
pursuit and latency outcomes. U.S. sanction duration in Model 7 is also insignificant in affecting
both nuclear pursuit and latency outcomes. Model 8 shows that, when the U.S. imposes economic
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Table 2.1: Logit Analysis of Nuclear Reversal, 1970-2004
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model4 Model 5
US negative sanctions -0.593
(0.646)
US sanction duration 0.0142 0.0262
(0.0360) (0.0327)
US multilateral IO sanctions 1.724 2.141+
(1.174) (1.245)
US non-IO sanctions -1.990∗ -1.803+
(0.947) (0.992)
US nuclear sanctions -1.057 -1.439
(0.997) (0.909)
US aid (% GDP) 0.138 0.121 0.164 0.111 0.0608
(0.127) (0.121) (0.120) (0.134) (0.161)
Polity score 0.128∗ 0.134∗ 0.163∗∗ 0.152∗ 0.128∗
(0.0559) (0.0555) (0.0627) (0.0623) (0.0566)
Trade openness (log) 1.312+ 1.211+ 1.784∗ 1.867∗ 1.373+
(0.779) (0.706) (0.727) (0.727) (0.701)
Sensitive nuclear assistance -0.117 -0.183 0.0934 0.247 0.134
(0.730) (0.687) (0.623) (0.635) (0.678)
Civil nuclear cooperation 0.0733∗ 0.0665+ 0.128∗ 0.125∗ 0.0709∗
(0.0362) (0.0349) (0.0500) (0.0501) (0.0334)
GDP per capita (log) -0.716 -0.650 -1.244∗ -1.231+ -0.630
(0.459) (0.453) (0.621) (0.630) (0.470)
NPT ratification 3.048∗∗ 2.812∗∗ 4.159∗∗ 4.160∗∗ 2.973∗∗
(1.051) (0.978) (1.266) (1.267) (1.009)
US security alliance 0.556 0.663 0.565 0.643 0.800
(0.627) (0.618) (0.674) (0.668) (0.643)
Disputes -0.102 -0.152 0.124 0.164 0.0754
(0.360) (0.282) (0.128) (0.117) (0.190)
Rivalry -0.430 -0.460 -0.612+ -0.589+ -0.557
(0.365) (0.341) (0.331) (0.333) (0.374)
Proliferation years 0.396 0.430 0.376 0.391 0.444
(0.313) (0.329) (0.332) (0.314) (0.320)
Non-proliferation years 6.885∗∗ 7.367∗∗ 6.382∗∗ 6.465∗∗ 7.450∗∗∗
(2.163) (2.405) (2.282) (2.081) (2.075)
Constant -4.809 -5.071 -3.217 -3.764 -6.323
(4.188) (4.045) (4.226) (4.297) (4.477)
Observations 528 528 528 528 528
AIC 49.84 44.78 44.62 44.89 43.23
BIC 126.7 121.6 125.7 130.3 124.3
Log likelihood -6.918 -4.391 -3.310 -2.444 -2.615
Note: Penalized likelihood coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
All time-variant explanatory variables are lagged at t-1.
Squared and cubed terms for temporal dependence are not reported.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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sanctions against a nuclear aspirant through international organizations, it can extract suboptimal
and/or partial compliance i.e., a nuclear latency outcome. This result indicates that when it comes
to America’s higher goals (a target state’s complete and/or optimal concessions of nuclear nonpro-
liferation), U.S. economic sanctions are generally ineffective. However, with lower or sub-optimal
goals (nuclear power with nuclear disarmament; (Miller and Sagan 2009), U.S. economic statecraft
is moderately successful and effective in nonproliferation outcomes.
In regard to the substantive interpretation of the results (Table 2.2), this study interprets the
results using the relative risk ratios (rrr), similar to odd ratios in the logistic estimation. In Model 8,
for example, for the category of nuclear latency, the rrr value for the U.S. IO sanctions is 37.6. This
means that the relative risk of choosing nuclear latency over non-nuclear status is approximately
38 times for a state targeted by U.S. sanctions involving international organizations relative to a
state under no such sanctions. The rrr value for the U.S. multilateral IO sanctions is 64 in Model 9.
U.S. aid (% GDP) is, in Models 8 and 9, both positively and significantly associated with nuclear
latency outcome, relative to non-nuclear status. For instance, the rrr value for U.S. aid (% GDP) is
1.35 for the category of nuclear latency in Model 8. This represents the effect of a change of one
percent of U.S. aid/GDP in changing the odds of selecting either nuclear latency or non-nuclear
status. The odds of 1.35 means that for every percent of U.S. aid/GDP, the odds of a state adopting
nuclear latency over non-nuclear status increase by almost 1.5 times.
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 plot the predicted probabilities of key independent variables (i.e., U.S. mul-
tilateral IO sanctions and U.S. aid (% GDP) for each category of nuclear development outcomes.
In Figure 2.1, plots the predicted probability for U.S. IO sanctions based on Model 9. The pre-
dicted probability of continuing nuclear pursuit is around 0.9 and is highest (near 1) but drops to
near 0.5 when the U.S. imposes sanctions through an international organization. However, it is
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Table 2.2: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Nuclear Reversal, 1970-2004
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Base outcome (Non-nuclear)
Nuclear pursuit
US negative sanctions 1.123
(1.167)
US sanction duration 0.00528
(0.0528)
US multilateral IO sanctions -0.338 0.00470
(1.062) (1.032)
US non-IO sanctions 3.039 3.086
(2.157) (2.174)
US nuclear sanctions -0.641 0.0503
(0.922) (0.881)
US aid (%GDP) -0.0919 -0.0771 -0.113 -0.138 -0.0964
(0.142) (0.126) (0.207) (0.251) (0.128)
Sensitive nuclear assistance 0.602 0.454 0.460 0.479 0.329
(1.187) (1.078) (1.244) (1.177) (0.973)
Polity -0.128∗ -0.120∗ -0.135∗ -0.136∗ -0.119∗
(0.0620) (0.0584) (0.0596) (0.0602) (0.0598)
Trade openness (log) -3.551∗∗ -3.372∗∗ -4.017∗∗∗ -3.928∗∗∗ -3.286∗∗
(1.126) (1.254) (1.141) (1.051) (1.226)
Civil nuclear cooperation -0.139∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗ -0.192∗∗ -0.191∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗
(0.0403) (0.0406) (0.0587) (0.0594) (0.0371)
GDP per capita (log) 0.473 0.300 0.894 0.897 0.342
(0.608) (0.560) (0.774) (0.815) (0.605)
NPT ratification -2.146 -1.737 -2.983 -3.028 -1.876
(1.499) (1.341) (1.950) (2.110) (1.410)
US security alliance -0.155 -0.476 -0.0261 -0.0126 -0.493
(0.685) (0.557) (0.729) (0.707) (0.494)
Disputes 0.0466 0.0837 -0.0325 -0.0110 0.0532
(0.177) (0.156) (0.139) (0.132) (0.135)
Rivalry 0.817∗ 0.782+ 0.913∗ 0.917∗ 0.782+
(0.417) (0.408) (0.438) (0.438) (0.411)
Proliferation years 0.769∗∗ 0.887∗∗∗ 0.624∗ 0.640∗ 0.880∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.200) (0.301) (0.305) (0.194)
Constant 11.38+ 12.00+ 10.67 10.27 11.45
(6.889) (7.090) (6.915) (7.118) (7.193)
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Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Base outcome (Non-nuclear)
Nuclear Latency
US negative sanctions 0.0610
(0.637)
US sanction duration 0.0188
(0.0380)
US multilateral IO sanctions 3.628∗ 4.159∗
(1.598) (1.797)
US non-IO sanctions -0.831 -0.782
(1.133) (1.233)
US nuclear sanctions -1.539 -2.196
(2.919) (2.471)
US aid (%GDP) 0.307∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗
(0.0907) (0.0923) (0.0661) (0.0840) (0.104)
Sensitive nuclear assistance 1.090 1.045 1.317 1.342 1.132
(1.191) (1.138) (1.166) (1.153) (1.189)
Polity 0.0637 0.0526 0.0806 0.0769 0.0641
(0.0631) (0.0618) (0.0754) (0.0742) (0.0668)
Trade openness (log) -3.123∗ -3.137∗ -2.999∗ -2.895+ -3.085∗
(1.469) (1.498) (1.500) (1.501) (1.492)
Civil nuclear cooperation -0.0567 -0.0541 -0.0566 -0.0552 -0.0568
(0.0440) (0.0429) (0.0484) (0.0478) (0.0434)
GDP per capita (log) -0.726 -0.596 -0.984 -1.055 -0.888
(0.505) (0.516) (0.789) (0.778) (0.555)
NPT ratification 2.139 2.095 2.267 2.319 2.274
(1.850) (1.822) (1.907) (1.883) (1.815)
US security alliance 1.383 1.292 1.759∗ 1.818∗ 1.443+
(0.904) (0.892) (0.796) (0.807) (0.844)
Disputes -0.0464 -0.0668 -0.0416 0.0161 0.0287
(0.170) (0.174) (0.164) (0.137) (0.138)
Rivalry 0.0547 0.0709 0.0263 -0.0336 -0.0393
(0.326) (0.324) (0.325) (0.373) (0.351)
Proliferation years -0.783 -0.780 -0.865 -0.845 -0.775
(0.543) (0.504) (0.686) (0.686) (0.521)
Constant 16.65∗ 15.62+ 18.04 18.17+ 17.81∗
(8.135) (8.211) (11.03) (10.82) (8.410)
Observations 528 528 528 528 528
AIC 399.0 402.3 374.4 373.1 398.7
BIC 471.6 474.8 447.0 445.7 471.3
Log likelihood -182.5 -184.1 -170.2 -169.6 -182.4
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over country appear in parentheses.
All time-variant explanatory variables are lagged at t-1.
Squared and cubed terms for temporal dependence are not reported.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .00140
Figure 2.1: U.S. IO sanctions and Predicted Probabilities of Nuclear Reversal Outcomes
not statistically significant. The probability of adopting nuclear latency status climbs slightly to
near 0.5 from near zero when a state becomes a target of U.S. multilateral IO sanctions. In Figure
2.2, the predicted probability of continuing pursuit is highest (almost 1.0) at the lowest US aid (%
GDP) and drops to a low level (near 0) at the highest level of US aid (% GDP) in a target state.
The probability of opting for nuclear latency is the lowest (almost 0) at the lowest level of US aid
(% GDP), and climb to near 1, at the highest level of US aid (% GDP).
Models 11-15 in Table 2.3 investigates whether U.S. IO sanctions and U.S. aid (% GDP) lead to
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Figure 2.2: U.S. aid (% GDP) and Predicted Probabilities of Nuclear Reversal Outcomes
the transition from nuclear pursuit to nuclear latency status. The coefficients for U.S. multilateral
IO sanctions have a statistically significant and positive effect on a state’s nuclear latency behavior
in Models 13 and 14. U.S. aid (% GDP) has a significant impact in all models (Models 11-15).
In contrast, Models 16-19 investigate the onset of nuclear reversal outcomes (i.e., from nuclear
pursuit to nuclear latency or to non-nuclear) only, excluding decisions to continue nuclear reversal.
In the model of the transition from pursuit to latency (Models 16 and 17), the presence of U.S.
IO sanctions has a positive and significant effect on the probability of transition in nuclear latency
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status. U.S. aid (% GDP) has , on the other hand, an insignificant impact in Models 16 and 19 (i.e.,
nuclear latency and non-nuclear status).
The remaining section of the results deals, based on the existing findings, with the influence
of control variables in explaining nuclear reversal outcomes. First, a state’s NPT ratification has a
consistent and positive relationship with its commitment to nuclear reversal in almost all models
in logit analysis of nuclear reversal (Models 1-5 in Table 2.1). This finding confirms the evidence
gathered from existing studies (Bleek and Lorber 2014; Fuhrmann 2009). But, the variable has
no significant effect on nuclear latency and nuclear pursuit in all models in multinomial logit
regression in Table 2.2 in spite of its expected direction.
Second, the previous research emphasizes the deterrent effect of U.S. security alliances in
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The result of analysis offers up mixed findings with
inconsistent significance-in Models 8-10, US security alliance has a significant and positive effect
on nuclear latency outcome. U.S. security alliance also has a positive and significant effect on the
transition from nuclear pursuit to latency (Models 11-15 in Table 2.3) or to latency onset (Models
15 and 17 in Table 2.4).
Third, some scholars have focused on the role of a state’s openness to the world on nuclear
proliferation (Solingen 1994, 2009). The findings in the logit regression are consistent with the
results of the existing quantitative studies in that an increase in trade openness opens up more
incentives for a state to reverse its nuclear weapons development (Models 1-5). Trade openness
variable also yields similar findings in the multinomial logistic models. Rivalry variable is nega-
tively associated with a proliferating state’s nuclear reversal in logit analysis (Models 3-4) while it
has a positive impact only on nuclear pursuit status in multinomial logit analysis (Models 6-10).
The results confirm previous findings (Brown and Kaplow 2014; Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015).
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Disputes variable has, however, no significant relationship with nuclear reversal in spite of the
expected direction.
Finally, according to the existing literature (e.g., Fuhrmann 2009; Kroenig 2009), the supply-
side determinants to nuclear proliferation are expected to influence nuclear reversal outcome(s).
On one hand, sensitive nuclear assistance is anticipated to encourage a state to develop its nuclear
weapons (Kroenig 2009). It has no significant influence on a proliferating state’s nuclear policy
change in logit and multinomial logit models in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. Such a finding does not
confirm the previous findings (Bleek and Lorber 2014; Kroenig 2009; Reiter 2014). However, the
variable is statistically and positively significant in logit analysis-transition from pursuit to latency
in Models 11-15. In contrast, civil nuclear cooperation have a significant relationship with nuclear
reversal in both logit and multinomial logit regression. These findings contradict previous findings
in that the international community may use civil nuclear agreements to dissuade a state from
obtaining access nuclear weapons technology (Bluth et al. 2010, 190).
2.5.1 Robustness Analysis
Overall, the findings in the previous section are consistent with this study’s hypotheses. To
avoid the spuriousness of statistical results, a few robustness checks were conducted on the empir-
ical analysis to show the validity of the inference from the data. The detailed results can be found
in Appendix 1. First, one of the most problematic issues in nuclear proliferation literature, how-
ever, is the measurement of nuclear behavior because nuclear programs are usually implemented in
secrecy (Montgomery and Sagan. 2009; Sagan 2010). Recent quantitative works on nuclear prolif-
eration have constructed several new datasets with nuclear proliferation dates by updating and/or
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Table 2.3: Logit Analysis of U.S. Economic Statecraft and Nuclear Reversal: from pursuit to
latency
Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
US negative sanctions -0.282
(0.590)
US sanction duration 0.000713 0.00753
(0.0244) (0.0246)
US multilateral IO sanctions 2.655* 2.646*
(1.058) (1.040)
US non-IO sanctions -3.435** -3.419**
(1.251) (1.208)
US nuclear sanctions 0.266 -1.456
(0.941) (1.059)
US aid (% GDP) 0.337*** 0.332*** 0.338*** 0.339*** 0.315***
(0.0879) (0.0878) (0.0942) (0.0955) (0.0898)
Sensitive nuclear assistance 1.019* 1.022* 1.252** 1.250** 1.123*
(0.435) (0.437) (0.444) (0.444) (0.436)
Polity 0.0975** 0.0946** 0.100** 0.100** 0.104**
(0.0343) (0.0334) (0.0373) (0.0374) (0.0355)
Trade openness (log) -1.892*** -1.893*** -1.945*** -1.948*** -1.729***
(0.471) (0.484) (0.520) (0.527) (0.496)
Civil nuclear cooperation -0.0350* -0.0350* -0.0376* -0.0377* -0.0355*
(0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0159)
GDP per capita (log) -0.802* -0.763* -1.080* -1.077** -0.966*
(0.391) (0.383) (0.420) (0.416) (0.418)
NPT ratification 1.982** 1.895** 2.073** 2.067** 1.896**
(0.707) (0.717) (0.693) (0.690) (0.735)
US security alliance 1.428** 1.440** 1.819** 1.818** 1.637**
(0.496) (0.497) (0.555) (0.553) (0.525)
Disputes -0.386+ -0.399+ -0.350+ -0.354+ -0.349+
(0.207) (0.205) (0.205) (0.206) (0.210)
Rivalry -0.0786 -0.0701 -0.103 -0.101 -0.150
(0.312) (0.312) (0.317) (0.316) (0.322)
Proliferation years -0.931** -0.942** -0.836** -0.831** -0.920**
(0.343) (0.341) (0.323) (0.322) (0.342)
Non-proliferation years 0.699* 0.704* 0.795* 0.799* 0.712*
(0.353) (0.351) (0.372) (0.372) (0.352)
Constant 10.77** 10.44** 12.74*** 12.73*** 11.46**
(3.635) (3.625) (3.720) (3.685) (3.750)
Observations 528 528 528 528 528
AIC 149.9 143.8 137.0 138.8 143.0
BIC 226.8 220.7 218.1 224.1 224.2
Log likelihood -56.96 -53.92 -49.51 -49.38 -52.52
Note: Penalized likelihood coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
All time-variant explanatory variables are lagged at t-1.
Squared and cubed terms for temporal dependence are not reported.
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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Table 2.4: Logit Analysis of Nuclear Reversal Onset
pursuit-to-latency pursuit-to-non nuclear
Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19
US multilateral IO sanctions 2.582∗ 2.589∗ -0.0364 0.128
(1.172) (1.245) (0.957) (1.242)
US non-IO sanctions -2.010 -1.892 -2.508∗ -2.491+
(2.082) (2.060) (1.220) (1.294)
US nuclear sanctions -0.500 -0.312
(1.138) (1.564)
US aid (% GDP) 0.165 0.132 -5.471 -5.450
(0.472) (0.548) (5.361) (5.213)
Sensitive nuclear assistance 0.250 0.349 -1.533 -1.492
(1.226) (1.181) (1.414) (1.541)
Polity 0.0827 0.0790 -0.155+ -0.159+
(0.111) (0.115) (0.0855) (0.0835)
Trade openness (log) 0.312 0.418 2.234∗ 2.266∗
(1.011) (1.104) (1.059) (1.105)
Civil nuclear cooperation 0.0463 0.0455 0.127∗∗ 0.128∗∗
(0.0693) (0.0705) (0.0458) (0.0446)
GDP per capita (log) -0.768 -0.741 -0.937 -0.909
(0.845) (0.841) (0.659) (0.734)
NPT ratification 3.680 3.618 1.982∗ 1.991∗
(2.521) (2.598) (0.818) (0.825)
US security alliance 3.385∗∗ 3.368∗∗ 0.768 0.770
(1.183) (1.198) (1.053) (1.077)
Disputes -0.0684 -0.0483 0.174 0.189
(0.329) (0.344) (0.170) (0.133)
Rivalry -0.290 -0.317 -0.998 -0.994
(0.486) (0.510) (0.859) (0.864)
Proliferation years 0.143 0.149 0.484 0.488
(0.611) (0.604) (0.407) (0.420)
Constant -3.916 -4.452 -6.665 -7.097
(9.500) (9.338) (7.118) (8.249)
Observations 399 399 448 448
AIC 95.41 97.29 120.8 120.7
BIC 159.2 165.1 186.5 186.4
Log likelihood -31.70 -31.64 -44.39 -44.37
Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over country appear in parentheses.
All time-variant explanatory variables are lagged at t-1.
Squared and cubed terms for temporal dependence are not reported.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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revising the existing periods of nuclear proliferation-the updated datasets of Jo and Gartzke (2007)
and Kroenig (2016). Second, the empirical findings are robust to alternative measures of U.S. pos-
itive inducements-US aid (log). It is argued that the the increase in superpower aid (e.g., U.S. aid)
by the aid-recipient country is regarded as the actual increase of the superpower’s support to the
recipient country no matter how big the recipient’s economic size is (Mintz and Heo 2014). The
substantive results are unchanged. Third, as another robustness check, the study also subset the
data by excluding non-NPT nuclear weapons states that possessed nuclear weapons-India, Israel,
and Pakistan. The substantive results are still robust. Fourth, the Cold War and the Post-Cold War
were separatged because for many countries in the world the dissolution of the Soviet Union led
to a decrease in the efficacy of possession nuclear weapons (Fuhrmann and Sechser 2014; Sagan
1996). Despite adding the Cold war variable, the results still support the main hypotheses. Lastly, I
add the variable of Liberalization for a state’s openness with the international economy, in addition
to trade openness (Solingen 2009). The finding remains unaltered. All these findings of robustness
tests are reported in the appendix.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper tests whether U.S. economic statecraft influences nuclear reversal. The empirical
evidence suggests that U.S. negative sanctions have a detrimental effect on counterproliferation
in both the logistic and multinomial logistic estimations. In other words, when states that have
initiated or pursued nuclear development come under U.S. sanction imposition, they are less likely
to reverse their nuclear pursuit. The findings indicate that with regard to nonproliferation U.S.
sanctions result in counterproductive outcomes. U.S. sanctions produce negative political and
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economic externalities, as sanctioned states may anticipate the U.S. using of military force against
them (Lektzian and Souva 2007).
In contrast, when nuclear reversal outcomes are disaggregated into non-nuclear status, nuclear
latency, and nuclear latency, U.S. positive inducements including US aid (% GDP) have a posi-
tive impact on a proliferating state’s decision to maintain nuclear latent capacity in exchange for
renouncing nuclear weapons development. These findings suggest that U.S. aid allocation pro-
vides a costly signal to recipient countries; they are sufficiently important geo-strategically that
their political survival will not be hurt and that they are not potential targets for U.S. military at-
tack (Garriga and Phillips 2014). U.S. sanctions through international institutions leads to a state’s
decision to choose nuclear latency over nuclear pursuit.
These findings offer several important contributions to the current literature on nuclear (non-
)proliferation. They confirm the detrimental effects of U.S. negative sanctions on unintended prod-
ucts such as a state’s continuing to pursue nuclear weapons development due to potential imminent
threats from the U.S. and its coalition countries However, the results indicate that if the U.S. were
to adopt a lower standard of success in its economic statecraft (e.g., U.S. sanctions through in-
ternational institutions, U.S. positive inducements), it could extract from a proliferating state a
sub-optimal policy concession like “nuclear latency status” or “nuclear power without nuclear
proliferation.” At the same time, when the U.S. induces more international cooperation using its
negative sanctions, it may lead to a partial nonproliferation outcome. The 1994 Agreed Frame-
work between the U.S. and DPRK illustrates, despite its later breakdown, the effectiveness of
positive inducement in nonproliferation and/or nuclear reversal. The recent negotiation and the
conditional agreement over nuclear withdrawal between the West (in particular the U.S.) and Iran
imply that U.S. sanctions through international institutions and U.S. positive inducements (e.g.,
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lifting existing sanctions) can be effective enough to extract a nuclear-aspiring state’s compliance
with nonproliferation.
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2.7 Appendix I
2.7.1 Robustness Analysis
• Alternative nuclear datasets (Models A1-A2). As I discussed in the paper, it is sometimes
difficult to identify whether states are pursuing the bomb in light of the secrecy that often
shrouds nuclear weapons programs. To address this issue, I recode the dependent variable
using two alternative nuclear behavior datasets coded or produced by (Jo and Gartzke 2007)
and (Kroenig 2016). The results show that U.S. IO sanctions remains closely associated with
a state’s nuclear latency behavior when I use the Jo and Gartzke (2007) and Kroenig (2016)
dataset to construct my dependent variable.
• Alternative measure of U.S. positive inducements (Models A3-A4). Alternatively, the US
aid variable includes U.S. economic aid and military aid flowing into targeted countries. It
is measured as the natural logarithm of U.S. total aid in a given year. It is argued that the
the increase in superpower aid (e.g., U.S. aid) by the aid-recipient country is regarded as
the actual increase of the superpower’s support to the recipient country no matter how big
the recipient’s economic size is (Mintz and Heo 2014). The results show that U.S. aid (log)
is positively associated with the category of nuclear latency status indicating that a state
receiving the higher level of U.S. total aid, regardless of its economic size, adopts nuclear
latency status.
• Excluding non-NPT nuclear weapons states (Models A5-A6). The study also subsets the
data by excluding non-NPT nuclear weapons states (i.e., India, Pakistan, and Israel) that
acquired nuclear weapons One could argue that de facto non-NPT nuclear weapons states
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have already acquired nuclear bombs and lack the intention to reverse their existing nuclear
weapons development. Thus, those countries are unlikely to ever reverse nuclear pursuit.
Yet, the findings are similar when the study exclude country-year observations representing
three de facto nuclear weapons states and even coefficients for main independent variables-
U.S. IO sanctions and U.S. aid (% GDP) have a much stronger explanatory power in deter-
mining nuclear latency status. Unlike previous findings, U.S. sanction duration has a positive
and significant relationship with nuclear latency outcome when the study exclude non-NPT
nuclear weapons states.
• Including Cold War dummy (Model A7). The change of international structure influences
a state’s behavior according to neo-realist argument. The collapse of the Soviet Union might
decrease a nuclear proliferating state’s incentive to keep pursuing nuclear weapons develop-
ment in part due to the reduction of security threats. My findings remain largely unchanged
when I control for the Cold War period.
• Superpower alliance (Model A8). This study argued that security alliance with the U.S.
tends to discourage proliferating states to keep pursuing nuclear weapons program. It is
said that alliances with nuclear-armed superpowers (i.e., the U.S. and the USSR/Russia) can
play a deterrent role in dissuading a state from pursuing nuclear weapons development and
also provide it with nuclear umbrella (Fuhrmann and Horowitz 2015). A robustness analysis
shows that the findings are similar to previous ones.
• Adding liberalization variable (Model A9). My initial empirical tests include, based on
Solingen (2009) argument, trade openness representing a state’s integration with the inter-
national economic system. For another robustness check, the study also include the variable
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of a state’s liberalization measuring 5-year changes in trade openness over time (Bleek and
Lorber 2014). Model 8 shows, however that both U.S. IO sanctions and U.S. aid (% GDP)
remain statistically significant when I add another factor that might influence a state’s rever-
sal behavior.
52
2.7.2 Summary Statistics, Nuclear Proliferation Period,US Economic Sanc-
tions, 1970-2004, Operationalizations of Control Variables
Table 2.5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Nuclear reversal 0.35 0.477 0 1 555
Nuclear reversal outcomes 0.884 0.651 0 2 630
US negative sanctions 0.395 0.489 0 1 612
US nuclear sanctions 0.208 0.406 0 1 612
US sanction duration 5.835 10.538 0 54 612
US multilateral IO sanctions 0.157 0.364 0 1 612
US non-IO sanctions 0.284 0.451 0 1 612
US aid (% GDP) 0.647 2.155 0 22.5 612
Sensitive nuclear assistance 0.363 0.481 0 1 612
Polity2 -1.017 7.599 -10 10 597
Trade openness (log) 3.68 0.72 0.6 5.9 612
Civil nuclear cooperation 14.871 13.372 0 63 612
GDP per capita (log) 8.640 0.823 6.9 10.6 599
NPT ratification 0.629 0.483 0 1 612
US security alliance 0.33 0.471 0 1 612
Disputes 1.376 2.071 0 27 612
Rivalry 0.763 1.183 0 5 612
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Table 2.7: Nuclear Proliferation Period (updated)
Singh and Way (2004) Jo and Gartzke (2007)
Explore Pursue Acquire Program Acquire
Algeria 1983-
Argentina 1968-1977 1978-1990 1978-1990
Australia 1956-1960 1961-1973
Brazil 1953-1977 1978-1990 1978-1990
Egypt 1960-1964 1965-1974
India 1954-1963 1964-19787 1988- 1964-1987 1988-
Iran 1976-1984 1985- 1974-
Iraq 1976-1982 1982-1995 1973-2002
Israel 1949-1957 1958-1968 1955-1965 1966-
Korea, North 1965-1979 1980-2005 2006- 1982-2005 2006
Korea, South 1959-1969 1970-1978 1971-1975
Libya 1970-2003 1970-2003 1970-2003
Pakistan 1972-1986 1987- 1972-1986 1987-
Romania 1985-1990 1981-1989
South Africa 1969-1973 1974-1978 1979-1991 1971-1978 1979-1990
Syria 2000-2009
Taiwan (1) 1967-1977 1967-1976
Taiwan (2) 1987-1988
Yugoslavia 1974-1988 1982-1987
Source: Way and Weeks (2014)
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Table 2.8: US Economic Sanctions, 1970-2004
country Sanction Periods Sanction Goals
Argentina 1977-1983 Improve human rights
1978-1982 Adhere to nuclear safeguards
Brazil 1977-1984 Improve human rights
1978-1981 Adhere to nuclear safeguards
India 1971 Cease fighting in East Pakistan (Bangladesh)
1978-1982 Adhere to nuclear safeguards
1998-2001 Retaliate for nuclear test
Constrain nuclear program
Iran 1979-1981 Release hostages
Settle expropriation claims
1984- Terminate support for international terrorism
End war with Iraq & Renounce WMD
Iraq 1980-2003 Terminate support for international terrorism
Renounce WMD
1990-1991 Withdraw from Kuwait & Release hostages
1991-2003 Renounce WMD & Destabilize Huessein government
Israel 1970-1983 Withdraw from Sinai & Implement UN Resolution 242
Push Palestinian autonomy talks
Korea, North 1970- Impair military potential
Destabilize communist government
1993-1994 / 2002- Renounce nuclear weapons
Korea, South 1973-1977 Improve human rights
1975-1976 Forgo nuclear reprocessing
Libya 1978-2004 Terminate support for international terrorism
Destabilize Gadhafi government
Stop pursuit of chemical, nuclear weapons
Pakistan 1971 Cease fighting in East Pakistan (Bangladesh)
1979-2001 Adhere to nuclear safeguards & stop pursuit of nuclear weapons
1999-2001 Restore democracy
Romania 1983-1989 / 1990-1993 Improve human rights & Ease restrictions on emigration
Establish democracy, election
South Africa 1975-1982 Adhere to nuclear safeguards
Avert explosion of nuclear device
1985-1991 End apartheid
Syria 1986- Terminate support for international terrorism
Taiwan 1976-1977 Forgo nuclear reprocessing
Yugoslavia 1991-2001 End civil war in Bosnia, Croatia
1998-2001 Stop aggression in Kosovo & Destabilize Milosevic
Source: Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott and Oegg (2007, 20-33)
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Table 2.9: Multinomial Logit Analysis of Nuclear Reversal, 1970-2004
Jo & Gartzke (2007) Kroenig (2016)
Model A1 Model A2
Nuclear Pursuit Nuclear Latency Nuclear Pursuit Nuclear Latency
US IO sanctions 1.271 2.420∗∗ 1.609 2.181+
(0.946) (0.845) (1.038) (1.211)
US non-IO sanctions 0.347 -0.497 0.978 -1.774
(0.792) (0.819) (0.870) (1.648)
US aid (% GDP) 3.257 -1.818 0.543 0.657
(2.951) (3.063) (0.432) (0.419)
Sensitive nuclear assistance 0.438 0.415 -0.425 1.406
(0.735) (1.351) (0.646) (1.032)
Polity2 -0.0979∗ 0.192∗ -0.00769 0.00151
(0.0397) (0.0781) (0.0550) (0.0597)
Trade openness -0.0210+ -0.0788∗∗∗ -0.00252 -0.0530∗
(0.0116) (0.0239) (0.00804) (0.0269)
Civil nuclear cooperation 0.0284 -0.0946∗∗∗ -0.0586∗ -0.0470
(0.0366) (0.0253) (0.0267) (0.0308)
GDP per capita (log) 1.277 0.392 0.708 0.808
(1.025) (1.009) (0.807) (0.631)
NPT ratification -1.517 1.735∗ -3.566∗ -0.455
(1.134) (0.773) (1.455) (0.936)
US security alliance -2.406+ 2.512∗∗∗ -1.051 0.133
(1.337) (0.657) (0.670) (0.702)
Disputes 0.846∗∗∗ -0.272 0.0430 -0.0282
(0.205) (0.312) (0.144) (0.186)
Rivalry 0.141 0.0856 0.0918 0.158
(0.291) 0.0856 (0.340) (0.341)
Year 1.437∗∗∗ -1.013+ 0.400 -0.489
(0.350) (0.606) (0.248) (0.354)
Year2 -0.0738∗∗∗ 0.184∗ -0.0205 0.0548
(0.0224) (0.0817) (0.0248) (0.0356)
Year3 0.00101+ -0.00621∗ 0.000332 -0.00153
(0.000522) (0.00311) (0.000580) (0.000961)
Constant -11.33 -1.375 -2.603 -3.450
(8.985) (8.636) (6.331) (5.712)
Observations 460 523
Log-likelihood -180.7 -251.5
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering over country appear in parentheses.
All time-variant explanatory variables are lagged at t-1.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < .01, ∗∗∗ p < .001
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Chapter 3
Another Aid Curse?: U.S. Foreign Aid, Autocratic Institutions,
and Political Violence against Americans, 1970-2007
Abstract. This paper examines the determinants of political violence against Americans abroad,
situating such violence in the context of U.S. aid policies. Despite a growing number of studies on
anti-Americanism (Chiozza 2010; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007), few studies pay attention, in a
systematic or empirical way, to the violence dimension of anti-Americanism. The political violence
literature has paid little attention to exploring the phenomena of political incidents against specific
subjects, in particular U.S. citizens and properties. When it comes to anti-American violence,
the literature offers an important rationale. Anti-government groups in a country tend to exercise
violent behaviors against U.S. citizens and/or properties when the U.S. backs up for their repressive
dictators by providing them with free resources including U.S. foreign assistance. I hypothesize
here that a recipient’s constituencies can consider U.S. aid as bad money because it can facilitate the
lengthening of its autocrat’s tenure and record of repression. The role of U.S. aid varies depending
on a recipient’s political institutions. Especially, when a recipient state is an autocratic regime but
is bounded to nominal-democratic institutions, it has a lower likelihood of experiencing anti-U.S.
violence.
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3.1 Introduction
Since the end of World War II, the United States has become the object of both hatred and
love. People living outside the U.S. have, in a variety of ways, expressed their discontent with
the country and its foreign policies. Anti-American sentiments are seen in published criticism,
non-violent demonstrations and deadly terrorist attacks. Protesters are often seen in front of U.S.
embassies burning American flags. Others detonate explosives on U.S.-owned properties such
as local branches of U.S. banks, multinational corporations, and even American churches. Such
violent behaviors are often a reaction to the U.S.’s support of dictators. In the late 1960s, the
United States did back the Greek military junta and in the 1950s began supporting the Franco
regime of Spain. In Africa, the United States offered its backing for decades to Mobutu Sese Seko
who coercively governed the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Latin America, the United States
provided material and political support to the Pinochet regime of Chile after its coup in 1973.
In Asia, U.S. government became an important sponsor of President Ferdinand Marcos of the
Philippines (The Economist, Feb. 19, 2005). During the Cold War, many anti-American incidents
took place in all of those countries.
Anti-American resentment and violence persists even today. During the recent “Arab Spring,”
protesters in Cairo accused the United States of protecting the Mubarak regime for 30 years by as-
sisting it with a large amounts of aid while relatively ignoring the political liberalization for Egyp-
tian people (England 2011). In 2012, the U.S. Ambassador to Libya was killed in Benghazi due
to terrorist attacks on the U.S. Special Mission Compound and Annex. With anti-Americanism’s
resurgence in many third world, scholars have revisited anti-Americanism research primarily fo-
cusing on public opinion/attitude (e.g., Blaydes and Linzer 2012; Bush and Jamal 2015; Chiozza
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2010; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007) and terrorism (e.g., Krieger and Meierrieks 2015; Neumayer
and Plümper 2011). Despite these academic efforts, few have systematically investigated anti-
Americanism in the context of political violence looking into causal mechanisms through which
U.S. foreign aid leads to political actions against Americans in a recipient state.
A growing number of studies have focused on the externalities of foreign aid in recipient coun-
tries. Proponents of foreign aid posit that aid flows are (conditionally and) positively associated
with boosting economic activity and subsequently lead to economic growth (Bearce and Tirone
2010; Karras 2006; Minoiu and Reddy 2010). At the same time, recipient governments increase
their investment in public goods and improve the welfare conditions of the general public (Alvi
and Senbeta 2012). Pessimists of aid effectiveness point to the counterproductive impacts of aid
on the political economy of authoritarian recipients. For example, foreign aid helps autocrats stay
in office and lowers the risk of ouster by revolutionary threats (Ahmed 2012; Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith 2009b; Licht 2010; Smith 2008) and decreases the likelihood of democratization or
regime change (Kono and Montinola 2013; Kono, Montinola and Verbon 2015; Morrison 2012;
Wright 2009).
This essay empirically investigates the effect of U.S. aid on the frequency of anti-American in-
cidents by proposing a theory that accounts for how U.S. foreign aid leads political groups outside
the winning coalition to resort to violent behaviors against Americans in dictatorships. The study
focuses on the negative externalities of U.S. aid to domestic politics in autocracies. As U.S. foreign
aid influences autocratic recipients’ domestic policies and/or governance, it may also increase or
decrease extreme opposition groups’ incentives to behave aggressively toward Americans in their
national territory. The study argues that U.S. foreign aid flowing to an authoritarian recipient gives
rise to more political incidents against Americans than it does when flowing to a democracy. Vari-
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ation in autocratic institutions has an intervening effect on the relationship between U.S. foreign
assistance and anti-Americanism. To test this argument, the study employs a series of statistical
estimations to deal with count data for 117 developing countries from 1970 to 2007. The results
confirm the positive impact of U.S. aid on the frequency of anti-American incidents in autocracies
compared to in democracies when the study uses U.S. aid as a share of gross domestic product
(GDP) of a recipient country. the study also finds that when an autocratic recipient has politics
institutions, the effect of U.S. aid on anti-American incidents in that country is significant. A
substantive interpretation of the results indicates that autocracies having institutional constraints
are predicted to experience fewer anti-American incidents than either democracies or autocracies
without such constraints.
This research makes a significant contribution to both existing anti-Americanism and Ameri-
can foreign policy studies. Earlier studies have tended to focus on the attitudinal aspect of anti-
Americanism. However, previous work pays less attention to the behavioral dimension of anti-
Americanism across countries. The research also adds to the growing body of literature that looks
at the adverse effects of U.S. foreign policy as represented by foreign aid in recipient countries.
It offers theoretical and empirical findings that a dictatorship with a more inclusive institutional
process is particularly prone to experience fewer anti-American incidents.
The next section reviews the literature regarding the concepts and the determinants of anti-
Americanism. The study then offers a theory regarding the condition on which U.S. foreign aid
increases the frequency of anti-American incidents in recipient states. To evaluate the hypotheses,
the section on the research design consists of measurement and the methodological techniques.
The study relies on a series of statistical models using zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB)
regression to account for both the overdispersion and excessive zero in the data. Results and
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implications are discussed at the end.
3.2 Literature Review: Defining and Analyzing Anti-Americanism
Scholars have proposed the concepts about anti-Americanism focusing on two dimensions1: (1)
anti-Americanism is associated with attitudes/views toward the United States, U.S. society, culture,
and foreign policies, and (2) anti-Americanism is about behaviors/actions toward Americans and
U.S. foreign policies.
A growing number of studies emphasize the attitudinal approach of anti-Americanism. Katzen-
stein and Keohane (2007, 12) regarded “anti-Americanism as a psychological tendency to hold
negative views of the United States and of American society in general.” Anti-Americanism may
be viewed as an attitude. Oh and Arrington (2007, 331) posited that anti-American sentiment rep-
resented “the negative attitudes of foreigners toward the US, her policies, and/or the consequences
of those policies” in evaluating anti-Americanism in South Korea.2 Naghmi (1982, 508) defined
anti-Americanism as “an unfavorable, or hostile attitude toward the American people, government,
symbols, or policy” when looking to Pakistan’s public attitude toward the United States. Friedman
(2012, 5) posited that “the term anti-Americanism is variously defined as an ideology, a cultural
prejudice, a form of resistance, a threat, or as opposition to democracy, the rejection of modernity,
1Datta (2014) summarized well the literature on defining anti-Americanism in three ways. According to his review,
scholars described anti-Americanism in the sense of “actions or statements” against U.S. policy, society, and values, “a
prejudice” against the United States, and “an attitude” on policies/values of Americans and the U.S. government (Datta
2014, 5). Krastev (2004, 7) posited that “[a]nti-Americanism is a systematic opposition to American as a whole” by
accommodating the expression forms of both the attitudinal and behavioral perspectives-from “[t]errorist acts against
American citizens, unfavorable verdicts in opinion polls, commercial boycotts, hostile campaign speeches and media
coverage, and graffiti on city walls.”
2According to Shin (1996, 789), anti-Americanism “encompasses a great variety of attitudes, beliefs, and circum-
stances: it may arise out of nationalism, anti-Western sentiment, anti-capitalism or anti-modernity, fear of nuclear war,
in defense of traditional ways of life and culture, and out of resentment of political and economic dominance.”
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or neurotic envy of American success.”
On the other hand, some studies pay more attention to the behavioral dimension of anti-
Americanism. Scholars like Tai, Peterson and Gurr (1973) and Rubinstein and Smith (1988) de-
scribed anti-Americanism in the sense of actions or statements against U.S. policy, society, and
values. For example, Rubinstein and Smith (1988, 36) defined anti-Americanism as “any hos-
tile action or expression that becomes part and parcel of an undifferentiated attack on the foreign
policy, society, culture, and values of the United States.”
Studies on anti-Americanism propose various typologies of anti-Americanism regarding the
causes of anti-American sentiment. Some factors are common across studies. Recently, in-
ternational relations scholars revisited anti-Americanism not only focusing on a conceptual dis-
cussion but also empirically analyzing anti-Americanism (e.g., Chiozza 2010; Katzenstein and
Keohane 2007). In particular, Katzenstein and Keohane (2007, 35-41) broadly categorized anti-
Americanism as following one of four approaches: liberal, social, sovereign-nationalist, and radi-
cal anti-Americanism. First, liberal anti-Americanism is common in advanced industrialized coun-
tries. This kind of identity tends to share a liberal ideology such as Western values. Second, social
anti-Americanism is associated with democracies embedded in social welfare policies and the ac-
ceptance of various types of democracy. Third, sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism is mainly
related with nationalism, national sovereignty, and people’s perceptions of power relations in the
world. For instance, with their nations penetrated by foreign economic and military presences,
indigenous citizens are hostile to the United States out of their tendency to protect themselves and
their identity (Tai, Peterson and Gurr 1973, 458). Lastly, radical anti-Americanism is strongly
associated with violent actions against Americans.
Liberal anti-Americanism posits that people in advanced democracies share similar ideals and
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political freedoms as do the United States citizens. Yet they criticize U.S. foreign policies and/or
the hypocrisy of U.S. behaviors. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. wars on terror has stirred
up a considerable amount of anti-American sentiment around the world. This is partly because U.S.
foreign policy has been perceived as being relatively unilateral. Unlike the widespread support for
U.S. military campaigns against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, American military interven-
tion in Iraq in 2003 led to an outbreak of severe anti-Americanism in Europe. A large number
of people in Europe stood against U.S. unilateralism. They expressed their sentiments against
U.S. foreign policy through mass demonstrations (Fabbrini 2010). Some scholars have noted that
U.S. post 9/11 foreign policy has given rise to a new wave of anti-Americanism, “provoking the
widespread public expression of antipathy toward the United States” (Singh 2007, 26).
The second approach, social anti-Americanism, “derives from a set of political institutions that
embed liberal values in a broader set of social and political arrangements that help define market
processes and outcomes left more autonomous in the U.S." (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007, 31).
It is closely associated with the conflicts of social values that both Americans and people in other
countries regard as salient. Such conflicts over social values include the negative perceptions of the
market-driven American value system, the death penalty, social protection, and so on. In practice,
social anti-Americanism is not stronger than other forms of anti-Americanism (Katzenstein and
Keohane 2007).
The third, sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism, can be found in most of the developing
world. According to Katzenstein and Keohane (2007, 32), nationalists tend to emphasize “sovereignty”
and collective “nationalism.” Nationalist identities tend to generate the potential for anti-American
sentiments while sovereignty “becomes a shield against unwanted intrusions from America.” The
concept of sovereignty is critical to nationalists in developing countries. Members of national-
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ist groups may consider foreign interventions and penetrations as a threat to national sovereignty.
Sovereignty and nationalism are linked with some factors that may create potential anti-American
sentiments within a country: U.S. economic/military presence and U.S. foreign direct investment.
American economic and military presence faced strong resistance from a hosting country be-
cause nationalist-revolutionary groups often regarded the foreign direct investment (FDI) as a sym-
bol of economic exploitation or the foreign military deployment as an infringement on their na-
tional sovereignty in the developing world (Rubinstein and Smith 1988; Tai, Peterson and Gurr
1973). Rubinstein and Smith (1988, 41) contended that revisionist or revolutionary groups tend to
resist the spread of American capitalism since they identify it with “the perpetuation of traditional
values and institutions” that they want to overthrow. In their study on terrorism, Krieger and Meier-
rieks (2015) evaluated the impact of capitalism on anti-American terrorism. They found that anti-
market political groups intentionally attack the U.S. as a primary supporter of market-capitalism
and globalization. Especially, during the transition from clientalism to market-capitalism, tra-
ditional power groups that have usually benefited from “the pre-market clientalist-traditionalist
order” in the country may strategically target the United States “to effectively voice dissent and
rollback pro-market developments” (Krieger and Meierrieks 2015, 59).
Nationalists regard foreign military deployment as an infringement on their sovereignty (Ru-
binstein and Smith 1988; Tai, Peterson and Gurr 1973). A foreign political/military presence in a
nation may directly motivate nationalists to resist it. In particular, the asymmetry of a security al-
liance between the U.S. and less powerful countries can cause ambivalent responses from a hosting
country. Its people welcome the military security while feeling discontented about the decrease of
national autonomy.
Lastly, the fourth possible approach to anti-Americanism is radical anti-Americanism, which
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renounces all U.S. economic policies and institutions in the world (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007).
For revolutionary groups, their incumbent governments embrace U.S. institutional features and val-
ues that these groups strongly disapprove of. In extreme cases, this type of anti-Americanism can
be fomented into revolutionary movements that attack both their own governments and Americans.
This is similar to “revolutionary” anti-Americanism as defined by Rubinstein and Smith (1988).
They argued that revolutionary/opposition groups seek to “overthrow regime closely identified with
the United States,” and such an attempt also includes violent attacks against the U.S. government
and Americans (Rubinstein and Smith 1988, 42).
Of these aforementioned types of anti-Americanism, the latter two are what most often produce
anti-U.S. violence. The next section explores a theoretical argument about how U.S. foreign aid
influences anti-American incidents.
3.3 Theoretical Argument: U.S. Aid and Anti-American Vio-
lence
In pursuing its national interests, every country employs several foreign policy instruments
including military intervention or use of force, economic sanctions, foreign aid, and public diplo-
macy (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2014). The available range of those tools depends on a country’s
available resources. The more resourceful a country is, the more extensive her policy instruments
are. In this respect, the United States has been one of the most resourceful countries, as it has avail-
able to it many policy tools. Among such tools, foreign aid has been leveraged to maximize U.S.
national interest. The Unites States has can operate as a donor government and buy from recipient
countries policy concessions or cooperation; leaders of the recipient countries gain additional and
unearned income that they can freely spend to promote economic development and improve public
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goods and services.
Critics contend, however, that foreign aid is ineffective at economic development and/or the
poverty reduction in a recipient country. Its ineffectiveness is due to its fungibility. In using foreign
aid, leaders in a recipient country can freely convert it to their own use, for example, to maximize
their leadership tenure. Thus, the theoretical arguments begin with the general assumption of the
existing literature. What the leader of a country prioritizes is political survival (Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2003). Autocratic leaders in the developing world tend to utilize available resources and/or
tools to stay in power.
In estimating anti-Americanism, this study proposes theoretical explanations for anti-American
incidents. The study discusses why U.S. foreign aid can increase the frequency of anti-American
events in the developing world. It then accounts for the intervening effect of political institutions
on the relationship between U.S. aid and anti-American incidents. Existing studies on aid-survival
relationships suggest that the negative externality of foreign aid might be of increasing the dissi-
dent’s opportunities to express their discontent to both the home government and the donor country
(esp. the United States) (Ahmed 2012; Kono and Montinola 2009; Licht 2010; Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith 2007, 2009b; Smith 2008).
Why and how does U.S. aid raise the number of anti-U.S. violence in recipient countries.
This section identifies two theoretical explanations-the “accountability” hypothesis3 and “aid-
fungibility” hypothesis. The accountability hypothesis assumes that unlike a democracy, an au-
tocratic aid-recipient state becomes accountable to ruling coalition groups, a small segment of the
3According to literature on comparative political system, democratic institutions make political leaders account-
able for their policy performances to a broad range of domestic constituencies. In similar vein, authoritarian leaders
should also be accountable to their selectorate groups. Those groups comprise insiders who have the ability to depose
an incumbent dictator (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Li and Gilli 2014).
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entire population, while relatively ignoring the general public when its resource is more depen-
dent upon foreign aid. The aid fungibility hypothesis, on the other hand, posits that since political
leaders may divert foreign aid to resources so as to maximize their political survival (e.g., through
co-optation and repression), opposition groups outside the winning coalition have an incentive to
express, through violent actions, their discontent with the U.S.
The first causal link is that U.S. foreign aid may generate a negative externality through so-
called aid-for-policy deals. Such deals create some policy conditionality in that recipient leaders
make policy concessions; they exchange their policies for donors’ aid (Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith 2009b; Morrison 2012). The policy concessions may suit the donor’s policy preferences
but are often at odds with the preferences of domestic political groups outside the ruling coalition.
Thus, policy concessions, since they make their incumbent leaders much less accountable to other
segments of social groups in the country, may increase the political opportunity of such groups
to express their discontent with their government as well as with the United States. In particular,
policy concessions to donors may lead to domestic opposition/discontents from their constituen-
cies, particularly nationalists and revolutionaries. Those nationalists and/or revolutionary groups
consider the aid-for-policy deals as a loss of sovereignty/autonomy; they condemn the United State
as the enemy of the national autonomy and pride. Political leaders in the developing world have
taken an anti-communist stance in deference to U.S. foreign policy interests and in return have re-
ceived U.S. economic and military assistance. As a way of preventing the spread of communism,
the United States has given economic aid to authoritarian countries that border communist coun-
tries, such as Pakistan and Honduras (Meernik and Poe 1998). According to French (1997), Zaire
was strongly supported by the United States during the Cold War because of its anti-communist
frontline in the Central African region. (Askin and Collins 1993) described U.S. support for the
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Mobutu regime as follows: “In 1983, after Zaire sent troops to defend U.S.-backed Chadian Presi-
dent Hissen Habre, President Reagan praised Mobutu’s courageous action” and rewarded him with
a request to Congress for the doubling of U.S. foreign aid” (79).
These kinds of deals provide a recipient state with foreign aid as unearned revenues and this
makes them less to domestic groups outside the ruling coalition (Knack 2004; Smith 2008). As
their dependence on foreign aid increases, autocratic leaders rely much less on domestic ordinary
citizens and thus have little incentive to expand public goods and/or invest in good governance for
the general public than doe their democratic counterparts (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2007).
Instead, autocratic leaders tend to spend aid money on their winning coalition by increasing private
goods. Autocratic countries use foreign aid for economic development and social welfare to a
much lesser degree than do democratic countries. Aid in fact tends to increase inequality as it may
be spent on projects that have no productive value or are for the public goods and services. For
the general public in a recipient country (esp. an autocratic country), foreign economic assistance
seems to improve their social welfare very little and to increase the inequality between the ruling
elites and ordinary people outside the ruling coalition. Like oil wealth, foreign aid may lead
to another source of rent-seeking among ruling elites. Political corruption resulting from ruling
coalition’s rent-seeking behaviors may increase the level of grievances among political groups
outside the ruling coalition. In their use of foreign aid, authoritarian leaders tend to implement
patronage politics rather than carry out productive policies. Unless the institutional process take
into account their demands or grievances, political actors left out from this rent-seeking have an
incentive to resort to political violence. In this context, political groups outside the ruling groups
may either rely on direct violence to the incumbent government or strategically take out their
grievances on a third-party target-especially, the aid-donor country (e.g., the United States) that
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the incumbent government cares strongly about. According to some studies, a large number of
Muslim publics supported, with such political reasons, for political violence against Americans
(Berger 2014; Tessler and Robbins 2007). Islamist radicals and extreme groups opposing their
governments often committed violent attack on Americans, taking advantage of those support from
the publics.
Secondly, the aid fungibility argument holds that foreign aid has a detrimental impact on the
socio-political conditions of recipient countries, as it augments the autocratic surviving capac-
ity. Autocratic rulers try to stay in power as long as possible using co-optation and repression
in general. Foreign aid seems like bad money because it might help dictators survive longer and
effectively prevent revolutionary threats and opposition movements. As free resources, incum-
bent autocrats discretionally allocate dollars from U.S. foreign aid through private goods so as to
survive politically. Dictators invest free money to repress revolutionary movements, for instance
increasing defense spending and strengthening security forces. Democratic recipients tend to re-
distribute it to the general public as public goods (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). Bader
and Faust (2014, 576) mentioned that “autocratic recipient governments use foreign aid at least
partly for their survival, be it by redistributing additional rents to strategic groups or by financing
repression.”
To maintain a regime, dictators must handle only a small winning coalition, which permits
them to relatively ignore the general public and its welfare. To keep their power, they merely
distribute private goods and great privilege to the ruling elites. Autocrats employ a repressive
strategy of suppressing political dissidents and deterring revolutionary threats. Aid inflows from
foreign donors tend to increase the resources available to repress dissidents.
The fungibility of foreign aid posits that aid may often be converted as military expenditures,
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which can contribute to the development of its military capability to defend the country from for-
eign invasions or to deter/repress dissident movement in autocracies. Kono and Montinola (2013),
in their study on the relationship between aid and domestic unrest, argued that foreign aid expands
dictators’ repressive capacity to deter dissidents, to fund repressions. In particular, they found that
foreign aid helped autocrats reduce domestic unrest by using the repressive strategy and by in-
creasing military spending to deter opposition movements. In response, opposition/revolutionary
leaders in autocratic regimes have a strong incentive to manipulate and utilize anti-American sen-
timents in order to boost mass support and to compensate for their vulnerability to incumbent
dictators. In this context, Americans and U.S. properties abroad can be very useful targets of
scapegoating for threatened political groups. For opposition groups, the United States is the pri-
mary donor country to support authoritarian leaders but is also one of the most visible and pow-
erful countries (Neumayer and Plümper 2011; Tai, Peterson and Gurr 1973). At the same time,
the United States has, since the end of World War II, established and maintained a U.S.-led inter-
national system along with its Western allies. Revolutionary groups strategically blame the U.S.
for all of their internal political struggles between themselves and incumbent governments. So,
they may attain the internal cohesion and anticipate political support from the ordinary public by
attacking the U.S., especially the U.S. embassies and the properties of U.S.-owned multinational
corporations. In this respect, revolutionary-opposition groups take advantage of anti-Americanism
as an instrumental purpose (Rubinstein and Smith 1988). Blaydes and Linzer (2012) and Rubin
(2002) seek to find the source of Islamic anti-Americanism and maintain that elites and radical
Islamists tend to receive great political benefits for popular anti-American appeals. In particular,
“political elites need to persuade mass public to feel it possible to spit on the United States” (Ru-
bin 2002, 83). According to the discussion of Ratner (2009), political challengers often implement
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anti-Americanism to weaken and also delegitimize incumbent dictators.
Lai and Morey (2006, 388-389) also explained how U.S. aid for anti-communist power was
transferred to boost autocrats’ repression capacity during the Cold War. They discussed the Iranian
case where the United States “provided aid and training for the national police and intelligence
services of the Shah (in Iran), which shared responsibility for internal security. The United States
security assistance programs greatly improved the effectiveness of Iran’s security forces and there-
fore substantially increased the Iranian state’s ability to use repression.” Kono and Montinola
(2013) also argued that authoritarian rulers primarily rely on the military or coercive forces in sup-
pressing public discontent. To pay for this costly coercive capability, autocrats sometimes rely on
foreign aid. For instance, “with no strong state or party as his beck and call, Marcos (of Philip-
pines) had little choice but to rely on the military” (Slater 2010, 177). As an important U.S. ally
during the Cold War, the Philippines has, since 1970, received about 80% of its military aid from
the United States government (Lee 2008). This misuse of foreign aid might help autocrats stay in
power and even develop their repressive capacity to deter revolutionary threats. This will generate
greater sources of anti-American sentiments to dissidents and/or discontented groups and further
strengthen the incentive to resort sometimes to violent behaviors against Americans. This suggests
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3.1 As U.S. aid increases, autocratic regimes experience more anti-American inci-
dents than democracies.
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The Role of Psuedo-Democratic Institutions: Two Competing Explanations
Do anti-American incidents vary across autocratic countries? The existing literature on author-
itarianism point out that dictators in maximizing their political survival use their main instruments
such as “co-optation” and “repression” (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014; Gandhi and Przeworski
2007; Magaloni 2008). The political survival of autocrats is primarily based on the support of their
winning coalition. The maximization of regime survival may rely on autocrats’ governance and/or
policies regarding both public and private goods. Recent scholarship demonstrates that authoritar-
ian countries exhibit a considerable variation in their governance patterns. What makes autocrats’
governance so varied are “nominal-democratic institutions” (e.g., political party and/or legisla-
ture). Autocratic institutions play the role of deterring potential revolutionary threats from both
inside and outside the winning coalition. Through a co-optation strategy, autocrats respond to the
demands of ruling elites by distributing to them private goods and material benefits. In other words,
autocratic countries with institutions tend to be more accountable to the winning coalition groups
than do other dictatorships with no institutions and/or a relatively small winning coalition. This
variation in accountability implies that autocratic rulers have different incentives in distributing
unearned foreign incomes (i.e., foreign aid and oil rent). Foreign aid inflows can be an enormous
source of both economic and political benefits to members of the winning coalition and/or some-
times even to the broader segment of population in a country. Aid inflows in institutionalized
autocracies create positive externalities to public goods such as trade openness, foreign direct in-
vestment and economic development. Compared to other types of autocracies, dictatorships with
pseudo-democratic institutions are likely to spend non-tax revenues from foreign aid inflows to
deliver the better governance. In particular, more institutionalized autocracies utilize foreign aid
not only to benefit their patronage but also to buy off potential political challengers outside the
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winning coalition. Hence, the relatively better governance in institutionalized dictatorships may
reduce the potential challengers’ incentive to resort to anti-American behaviors.
Autocratic leaders with pseudo-democratic institutions tend to pursue more extensive and in-
clusive policies to co-opt ruling elites and a broader swath of society; domestic constituencies have
little incentive to divert their discontent with their governments that are economically and militar-
ily supported by the United States. In contrast, autocrats without those kinds of institutions tend
to rely more on co-optation of ruling coalition groups and more repression of potential challengers
and dissent groups. Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) argued that “seemingly democratic institutions”
such as legislature play an instrumental role in making more extensive policy concessions by in-
ducing cooperation from a larger segment of population in a society. Specifically, institutionalized
autocracies tend to focus more on public goods such as trade openness (Hankla and Kuthy 2013),
investment (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011, 2012), and economic growth (Gandhi 2008; Wright 2008).
Hankla and Kuthy (2013) found that autocrats with more institutional constraints tend to rely on
an open economy, which may lead to economic development because of their longer time horizons
and relative regime stability. In addition, Wright (2008) maintains that dictators with more binding
institutions experience higher economic growth rates and domestic investment. He also investi-
gates the impact of foreign aid on economic growth in recipient countries. Wright (2008) found
that dictators with longer time horizons have an incentive to invest foreign aid in public goods,
which is strongly associated with good economic performance. Kim and Gandhi (2010) demon-
strated that autocratic regimes retaining various institutions face lower levels of labor protests than
military dictatorship because of the trade-off between material benefits and workers’ cooperation
with the regime. Wright (2008) argued that foreign aid tended to promote economic growth in
dictatorships with long time horizons, which led to stable authoritarian regimes.
76
Again, autocrats buy off opposition groups to prevent or deter potential challenges or revo-
lutionary threats. Autocratic regimes with pseudo democratic institutions can effectively co-opt
potential challengers through this institutional channel. At the same time, institutional autocra-
cies tend to extract public support by investing more in public goods such as investment, trade,
and social spending. Those kinds of relatively inclusive policies may improve regime legitimacy
and instead, weaken the political power of some opposition groups and/or revolutionaries that are
excluded from the power-sharing political process.
As free resources such as foreign aid increase, institutional autocracies are more likely to use
them for the long-term economic performance and expansion of public goods because of their
tenures’ long time horizons. Consequently, institutional dictators can even gather strong support
from domestic constituencies. As revolutionaries or dissidents lose their political legitimacy to
oppose the autocratic incumbents, they tend to boost nationalist sentiments by targeting foreigners
or foreign countries. When autocrats are more dependent on foreign aid, the revolutionaries target
donor countries. Or they target foreigners or Americans.
Some studies have posited that foreign aid helps incumbents win the elections, even in autocra-
cies. Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) discussed autocrats’ manipulation of elections to ensure their
political survival. They emphasized the cooptation of opposition groups in autocratic countries.
For example, autocrats take advantage of elections by “provid(ing) mixed incentives to opposition
parties, who may oppose the current dictatorship but also want to benefit from the spoils of gov-
ernment” (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009, 405). Hence, dictators who even allow the elections and
multiple parties take advantage of foreign aid to win elections, compared to opposition parties or
groups. Incumbent autocrats possess enormous resources in part from aid flows in the elections.
For instance, Jablonski (2014) examined the relationship between foreign aid and electoral out-
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comes by exploring how the incumbent diverted foreign aid to draw political support from voters
in the elections. This may make some segment of opposition groups weak in terms of political
power. Even when incumbent dictators allow some opposition groups to join the existing political
process but exclude others, the excluded groups of the opposition can become radicalized.
Within a political system, according to Lust-Okar (2004), there are two types of groups-the loy-
alists and the illegal opposition. The opposition can be divided into moderate and radical groups.
Moderate groups can be coopted by incumbent dictators through quasi-democratic institutions. In-
cumbent dictators may allow moderates to participate in political institutions and also distribute
economic benefits and political privilege to them. As foreign aid inflows increase, autocratic in-
cumbents can strategically use this unearned income to buy off the opposition moderates in part
through power-sharing arrangements. However, dictators still exclude other segments of the oppo-
sition, such as radical or extremist groups, from the winning coalition. The selective co-optation
and repression strategy in institutional autocracies make the radicals or dissidents within opposi-
tion groups lose their public support and become weak. The power-sharing argument posits that
power sharing between incumbent autocrats and their supporting elites through institutions tends
to deter potential rebellion. After all, institutions reduce autocrats’ commitment problems in terms
of their power-sharing promises to them. This power sharing even expands the size of the winning
coalition through coopting opposition groups (Boix and Svolik 2013; Svolik 2009).
This kind of institutional autocrats’ governance may make a certain opposition groups radical-
ized. In other words, radicalized groups within the opposition cannot help, given their weakened
power, but resort to political violence to express their grievances or discontents. In particular, when
U.S. foreign aid inflows increase and help autocrats effectively co-opt moderates within opposition
groups, radical groups are excluded and have a weak political stance. Thus, they are more likely to
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rely on violent behaviors against foreigners or a foreign country in part to boost nationalism and a
rally-round-the-flag. From the above two competing arguments, I draw the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3.2 As U.S. foreign aid increases, autocratic countries with pseudo-democratic insti-
tutions experience fewer anti-American incidents than those with no such institutions or democra-
cies.
Hypothesis 3.3 As U.S. foreign aid increases, autocratic regimes with nominal democratic insti-
tutions experience more anti-American incidents than do other political systems.
3.4 Research Design and Data
This section examines the systematic impact of U.S. aid on anti-American incidents. The
dependent variable is the count of anti-American incidents, which capture both violent and non-
violent behaviors against Americans. They include protests, demonstrations, terrorist activities
and/or violence such as bombing, physical attacking, and kidnapping. The data for analysis are
based on a composite indicator using multiple sources rather than one separate source.4 Anti-
American incidents data come from three sources including the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, the RAND Database of
4Existing data on terrorism do not include some incidents of anti-American incidents because those incidents are
not considered as terrorist attacks. For instance, an incident that occurred in El Salvador in 1987 was not included in the
terrorism datasets such as Global Terrorism Database (GTD) or the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents
(RDWTI). The annual report of anti-American political violence released by U.S. Department of State describes some
anti-American incidents that are not recorded in other terrorism datasets. For instance, there was an incident against
American government property in El Salvador in1987. It is not reported in either GTD or RDWTI dataset. The 1987
report of Political Violence Against Americans describes that “[A]pproximately 250 leftist students marched to the
American Embassy where they staged a protest against U.S. support of the Duarte government” (Significant Incidents
of Political Violence Against Americans: 1987, April 1998).
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Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) of the RAND Corporation and the reports of Political
Violence against Americans released by the U.S. Department of State.5 For the validation of mea-
surement, the study adopts following strategies that cover 117 developing countries from 1970 to
2007, broken down into country-year observations. First, the study takes into account only in-
cidents that target Americans and/or U.S. owned properties on purpose. On April 22, 1999, for
instance, guerrillas with the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN) hijacked an airplane that
carried 46 passengers including some U.S. citizens. I exclude cases in which international terrorist
groups that were not bound in the country. I also exclude the cases in which international terrorist
groups involve with the multiple bases of their operations. For example, many religion-based ter-
rorists such as al-Qaeda in the Middle East have operated within a large number of countries from
the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and even Europe. Certainly, incidents against Americans carried out
by those kinds of terrorists should not be considered as anti-American violence due to their relative
lack of domestic political consideration in a given country’s territory. Regarding coding strategies,
I do not include the cases in which an attacker group’s nationality and/or origins is different from
that of an incident’s location and then reconfirm it after checking the description of the incident in
the GTD database, in particular. RDWTI dataset and PVAA reports tend to describe the incidents’
information in detail and thus I can figure out the incidents’ full stories. Third, I check the over-
lapped incidents cross datasets by taking into account incidents’ time, location, targets, attackers,
and incidents’ contents. For example, when a similar incident occurs at same location with the
same target and the same content but different reported date, I consider is as the same incident.
5The report of Political Violence Against Americans - formerly Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against
Americans and formerly Lethal Attacks Against Americans Abroad 1968-1997-is created by the Bureau of Diplo-
matic Security’s Office of Intelligence and Threat analysis (DS/DSS/ITA) with “a comprehensive picture of the broad
spectrum of political violence that American citizens and interests have encountered abroad on an annual basis.” The
series have been released for the years 1968-2013 while not produced for the years 2003-2007.
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Different reported data should be within less than a 2-day range. Practically, most of the incidents
across datasets share the same dates but are at least within a 1 or 2-day time range.
3.4.1 Independent Variables
The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the impacts of the U.S. foreign aid on anti-American
incidents in the developing world. The independent variable is U.S. foreign aid representing U.S.
aid (% GDP). U.S. aid/GDP (%) is a country’s annual inflows of U.S. economic assistance as a
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). The data for U.S. aid are collected by the AidData
(Tierney et al. 2011). The study expresses U.S. aid as a percentage of GDP because it not only is
commonly used in aid studies but it also does capture a recipient country’s aid dependence (Kono
and Montinola 2009; Licht 2010).
In measuring the institutionalization of political regimes, the study makes use of the regime
indicator taken from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010)’s the Democracy and Dictatorship
(DD) dataset. The variable Institutions is measured as a trichotomous indicator, which is coded 0
if a non-democratic regime does not have pseudo-institutions, 1 if a non-democratic regime allows
for nominal-democratic institutions such as legislatures and at least one political party, and 2 as
democracy (Kim and Gandhi 2010).
3.4.2 Control Variables
Previous literature has discussed potential determinants of violence against Americans. First,
economic sanctions may influence the frequency of anti-American political violence. Economic
sanctions is positively associated with the political violence against Americans because they tend to
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negatively affect the socio-economic and political conditions of ordinary people in a target nation.
For the variable of U.S. economic sanctions (US sanction), the study treats it as a dichotomy based
on the fact that a state is either subject to sanctions in a given country-year or not. The indicator is
coded as 1 for every year that the sanctions were in place and 0 otherwise. But, the variable is also
one-year lagged because it can be assumed that the last-year sanctions have realistic impacts on
the target in current year. The study uses the dataset of economic sanctions compiled by Hufbauer,
Schott, Elliott and Oegg (2007). Secondly, to measure Regime duration, the study uses “agereg”
in the CGV dataset that measures the total number of years that the current regime type has existed
in the country.
Another control is alliance between U.S. and weaker counterparts. The alliance should also be
a potential indicator to increase the motivations and incentives of a ally’s people to express anti-
American sentiment primarily based on the nationalist assumption (Tai, Peterson and Gurr 1973).
An asymmetric alliance (US defense alliance) can lead to anti-American violence as it involves a
more powerful country and a less powerful one. One important distinction about an asymmetric
alliance is that powerful nations are strong enough to provide weaker counterparts with security
guarantees. The study codes a country as 1 if it is in an alliance with the U.S. and 0 otherwise.
None of the authoritarian countries are signatories of a symmetrical alliance with the U.S.6 The
alliance data come from Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) created by Leeds,
Ritter, Mitchell and Long (2002).
Besides these, the study also includes a set of control variables widely used in explaining
political actions such as domestic protests or unrest and terrorism. First, the study uses GDP per
6My consideration of major powers is primarily based on the criteria of the Correlates of War (COW) designate it
as a major power. It includes U.S. United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, China, and Japan.
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capita (log) to account for the impact of economic development on anti-American terrorism. The
data of GDP per capita are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).
In addition, population that also comes from WDI, is logged. Political violence is measured as
the “total summed magnitudes of all societal” conflicts including civil violence, civil war, ethnic
violence, and ethnic war. The data come from ‘Major episodes of political violence and conflict
regions, 1946-2012’ (the Center for Systemic Peace). To control the effects of regional variation
and the change of international structure, the study uses region-fixed dummies from the World
Bank and a dummy of Cold War.7
The study also includes two different sources of foreign aid that may influence the occurrence
of anti-American incidents. When a country receives more foreign aid from other countries or
international institutions than from the United States, it may not experience anti-U.S. sentiment.
To test the impacts of other aid sources on anti-American violence, the study include non-U.S. aid
amount divided by the GPD of the recipient country (Non-US aid/GDP (%)). Non-US aid measure
is also taken from AidData (Tierney et al. 2011). Another source of foreign aid is multilateral aid
(Multilateral aid/GDP (%)). This is the total official gross disbursements from multilateral aid
agencies controlled by Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in OECD (Kersting and Kilby
2014).
7I include region-fixed effects in order to control unobserved heterogeneity. In general, a number of time series-
cross national analyses employ country-fixed effects to control potential heterogeneity across countries. However,
despite my attempt to use country-fixed effects, the convergence problem in (zero-inflated) negative binomial models
fails to produce results. Instead, I use group-fixed estimators within models as “intermediate to pooled and fixed effects
estimators” (Bester and Hansen 2016). In addition, I include the alternative measure of civilization that consists of
ten categories: African, Buddhist, Hindu, Islamic, Japanese, Latin American, Orthodox, Sinic, Western, and Others
(Henderson and Tucker 2001)
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3.5 Methods and Result
The study examines whether U.S. foreign aid determines the frequency of anti-American po-
litical incidents using a series of count-data estimation. Its dependent variable is a nonnegative
integer-counts of anti-American incidents. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is appropriate if the de-
pendent variable is independently and identically distributed. However, the use of OLS for count
outcomes can result in inefficient, inconsistent and biased estimates if one or more OLS assump-
tions go unmet. Thus, statistical techniques other than OLS regression have been used to deal with
the count data. This study considers two possible regressions-the Poisson regression and the nega-
tive binomial regression models. First of all, the Poisson model assumes that the variance of Y is
equal to the means. But, in the study’s incident data there is high probability that the count vari-
able has a variance greater than the mean, which is called over-dispersion. In this case, the Poisson
model is not appropriate so it is necessary to employ the negative binomial regression model.
To begin with, the study checks whether or not the data has a Poisson distribution. If the mean
of the dependent variable (i.e., political incidents against Americans) is surely less than the vari-
ance, then the candidate model will be a negative binomial model. The descriptive statistics shows
that the variance(5.943) is higher than the mean (0.494). For the next step, I run the negative bi-
nomial regression model and then compare it with the Poisson model using the Vuong test for the
model selection. The test rejects the null hypothesis that two models are not different. Thus, the
negative binomial regression model-an alternative to the Poisson model- is preferred. However,
the study also considers the zero-inflated negative binomial regression to deal with the excessive
zeros because the large portion of the dependent variable is zero counts (e.g., > 80 percent). For
the model selection, an additional Vuong tests is performed along with AIC/BIC post-estimation
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statistics to check the comparative appropriateness of the two models. The test statistics show
both Vuong (z=7.07***) and AIC/BIC tests prefer the zero-inflated model to the standard negative
binomial model with the statistical significance. In addition, the hurdle model can be another esti-
mation to deal with many zeros. In the zero-inflated model, the zero values include two different
sources. The first source consists of countries that always have zero counts of anti-U.S. violence
(Long 1997; Zorn 1998). For instance, some countries had undergone anti-American violence but
not in a given year. Other countries were entirely free of anti-U.S. incidents. That is, their experi-
encing anti-American violence was assumed to be on a negative binomial distribution that includes
both zero and non-zero counts. However, the hurdle model assumes that the zero observations can
come from only countries that always have non-zero counts. The Vuong tests consistently prefer
the zero-inflated negative binomial model to the hurdle model (z=1.607*) (See Table 3.4 in the
Appendix II).
The lagged values for all independent and control variables were used for two reasons. On
one hand, regressors are going to take some time to influence anti-American incidents. Many
studies on domestic violent behaviors (e.g., protests, demonstration, unrest, and terrorism) tend to
use lagged regressors for that reason (Murdie and Bhasin 2011; Pierskalla and Hollenbach 2013).
Secondly, to lag all explanatory variables help avoid potential endogeneity problem and reverse
causality (Garriga and Phillips 2014; Krieger and Meierrieks 2015).
Table 3.1 presents the main results of zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models with
standard errors clustered on country. First, the study introduces the base-line analysis. Model 1
represents the comparison between a democracy and an autocracy regarding the outcome of anti-
American violence. In the count equation, the predictor US aid/GDP (%) has a coefficient of 0.251
with a statistical significance at 99.9% confidence level. This indicates that for one-unit increase
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Table 3.1: ZINB Regression of Anti-US Political Violence, 1970-2007: Full Sample
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
democracy vs. autocracy democracy/institutional vs. non-institutional autocracy
Interaction Additive Interaction
Count Binary (zero) Count Binary (zero) Count Binary (zero)
US aid/GDP (%) 0.251*** 0.245 0.028 -0.159 0.005 -0.424
(0.077) (0.154) (0.041) (0.168) (0.072) (0.393)
Democracy 0.354* 0.795* -0.176 -1.057 -0.157 -0.152
(0.211) (0.462) (0.229) (0.683) (0.254) (0.771)
Institutional autocracy -0.518*** -2.045** -0.717*** -1.364
(0.182) (0.840) (0.228) (1.025)
Democracy x US aid/GDP (%) –0.244*** -0.401** -0.157 -0.152
(0.090) (0.163) (0.072) (0.388)
Institutional autocracy x US aid/GDP (%) 0.422*** 1.136*
(0.155) (0.595)
Regime duration 0.006 0.014 0.011** 0.046** 0.011* 0.029
(0.007) (0.018) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.021)
Openness with US (log) 0.167 0.221 0.213*** 0.314 0.214** 0.381
(0.111) (0.337) (0.080) (0.244) (0.096) (0.260)
US defense alliance 1.722*** 2.316* 1.692*** 2.849** 1.809*** 2.484*
(0.241) (1.296) (0.283) (1.186) (0.281) (1.287)
US sanctions 0.260 -0.337 0.157 -0.875 0.208 -0.346
(0.174) (0.571) (0.171) (0.706) (0.182) (0.600)
Political violence 0.042 -0.992 0.050 -2.496 0.059 -0.536*
(0.040) (0.791) (0.037) (2.423) (0.043) (0.322)
GDP per capita (log) -0.013 -0.510 -0.165 -0.849** -0.084 -0.591
(0.169) (0.380) (0.134) (0.391) (0.177) (0.379)
Population (log) 0.014 -0.953*** -0.010 -1.386*** -0.027 -1.143***
(0.106) (0.277) (0.087) (0.333) (0.101) (0.295)
Cold war 0.239 -0.564 0.277** -1.027** 0.282* -0.435
(0.151) (0.417) (0.136) (0.476) (0.151) (0.353)
Latin American & Caribbean 0.501 -1.507 0.509 -1.654 0.162 -2.361
(0.460) (1.578) (0.440) (1.768) (0.478) (1.760)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.920** 2.360* 0.655* 2.750 0.757* 2.004**
(0.389) (1.254) (0.368) (1.699) (0.429) (0.920)
Middle East & North Africa 0.750 -0.033 0.415 -15.996*** 0.157 -2.362
(0.591) (1.819) (0.487) (2.290) (0.576) (2.679)
Asia 0.403 0.456 0.256 1.146 0.060 -0.443
(0.520) (1.723) (0.432) (1.928) (0.540) (1.682)
Past anti-US violence 0.123*** -2.358*** 0.128*** -2.008*** 0.117*** -2.154***
(0.026) (0.539) (0.025) (0.506) (0.026) (0.457)
Constant -3.770** 10.419*** -2.321* 17.243*** -2.507 12.816***
(1.596) (3.722) (1.368) (4.881) (1.627) (3.958)
Observations 3,282 3,282 3,282
Alpha 1.507 1.307 1.593
(0.200 (0.149) (0.198)
lnalpha 0.410**** 0.495*** 0.369***
(0.132) (0.121) (0.133)
AIC 3722.135 3291.502 3717.696
BIC 3935.503 3437.383 3955.448
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference region is West.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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in U.S. aid/GDP, the expected log count of the number of anti-U.S. incidents increased by 0.251,
given the other variables are held constant. In other words, for every additional percentage in
U.S. aid/GDP, an anti-American incident’s mean increases approximately by 28.6 %, holding all
other predictors constant. Democracy variable shows that a democracy experiences more anti-U.S.
violence than an autocracy and is statistically significant. But, the coefficients on the constituent
variables of interaction terms should be conditionally interpreted in the context of interactions.
Regarding the interaction effect of U.S. aid/GDP and democracy variable, Figure 3.1 shows that as
U.S. aid increases, an autocracy is more likely than a democracy to experience “No” anti-American
violence in the zero-inflation equation. In other words, an autocracy has a lower likelihood of
experiencing anti-American incidents than a democracy when it receives U.S. foreign aid. But, of
countries experiencing anti-U.S. incidents, an autocracy is expected to have a higher number of
anti-American incidents than a democracy as it is more dependent on U.S. aid (Figure 3.2).
Model 2 in Table 3.1 introduces the diverse effects of U.S. aid/GDP on anti-U.S. violence in
different political systems-democracy, institutionalized autocracy, and non-institutionalized autoc-
racy. First, in the count equation, regarding the effect of U.S. aid/GDP, for a standard deviation
increase in the percentage of U.S. aid/GDP, the expected count of anti-U.S. violence increases by
4.8 %, holding all other variables constant. The coefficient, however, is not statistically significant.
In regard to the effects of different political systems, being an institutional autocracy (compared to
a non-institutional autocracy) multiplies the expected count of anti-U.S. violence by 0.518, holding
other explanatory variables constant. In other words, an institutionalized autocracy decreases the
number of anti-American incidents by 40.4 % compared to a non-institutionalized autocracy.
Model 3 shows the interaction effect of U.S. aid and a recipient country’s political system. The
coefficients on the interaction terms between U.S. aid/GDP and a recipient’s political system are
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positive and statistically significant at the level of 0.01 in the count model and 0.1 in the inflate
model, respectively. First, in the count equation, the positive coefficient indicates that when a
recipient country is an autocracy under nominal democratic institutions (institutionalized autoc-
racy=1), an increase in the percentage of U.S. aid/GDP leads to an increase in the expected count
of anti-American violence. However, the substantive interpretation of the interaction terms 8 is
complicated. Hence, the study shows the marginal effects of US aid/GDP on the expected values
of anti-U.S. incidents conditioned by a recipient’s political institutions. Figure 3.2. displays the
difference in the predicted values of anti-U.S. violence against three different types of political in-
stitutions. When the percentage of U.S. aid/GDP is zero, the expected value of anti-U.S. violence
in institutional autocracies is a little higher than both democracy and non-institutional autocracy.
However, as the U.S. aid/GDP percent increases, the expected count of anti-American violence
increases until U.S. aid/GDP is around 2 %. Once past this point, the predicted count of anti-
American incidents decreases. The expected value reaches almost zero as U.S. aid/GDP becomes
around 15 %. For non-institutionalized autocracies, the expected value of anti-U.S. incidents in-
creases as the percentage of U.S. aid/GDP grows.
Models 4-6 in the Table 3.2 show the results using the reduced sample in which the study
conducted several outlier tests such as Bonferroni-adjusted outlier tests. Based on those tests,
Columbia, Argentina, Chile, South Korea and Philippines were excluded from the analysis. The
main findings of Table 3.2 are similar to those of Table 3.1 with regard to the interacted effect of
U.S. aid/GDP and political systems.
8Brambor and Golder (2006) emphasize that analysts need to focus on the marginal effect of an independent
variable conditioned by another independent variable when using the interaction term. According to Berry and Esarey
(2010), analysts do not necessary get the significant interaction in influencing the dependent variable (e.g., a binary
logit model).
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Figure 3.1: Plot for ZINB regression: Inflation model
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Pr
("N
O"
 a
nt
i-U
S 
vio
len
ce
)
0 10 20 30 40
US Aid/GDP (%)
Autocracy Democracy
Figure 3.2: Plot for ZINB regression: Count model
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Figure 3.3: Plot for ZINB regression: Inflation model
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Figure 3.4: Plot for ZINB regression: Count model
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Table 3.2: ZINB Regression of Anti-US Political Violence, 1970-2007: Reduced Sample
Model 4: Baseline Model 5: Non-US Aid Model 6: Multilateral Aid
Count Inflate Count Inflate Count Inflate
US aid/GDP (%) -0.0002 -0.203** -0.018 -0.216* 0.0004 -0.175
(0.042) (0.101) (0.058) (0.127) (0.048) (0.116)
Institutional autocracy -0.494** -1.980 -0.562** -1.244 -0.644** -1.782
(0.233) (1.223) (0.243) (0.914) (0.257) (1.604)
Democracy 0.171 1.089 -0.117 -0.441 0.079 0.022
(0.270) (0.899) (0.298) (0.793) (0.284) (0.900)
Institutional autocracy x US aid/GDP (%) 0.269** 1.244*** 0.422*** 0.998** 0.410** 1.111**
(0.106) (0.453) (0.149) (0.411) (0.165) (0.532)
Democracy x US aid/GDP (%) -0.056 -0.903* 0.319* 0.395 -0.086 -0.759
(0.064) (0.528) (0.170) (0.287) (0.085) (0.580)
Non-US aid/GDP (%) 0.033 0.075*
(0.049) (0.044)
Multilateral aid/GDP (%) 0.009 0.032
(0.065) (0.089)
Regime duration 0.010 0.051** 0.007 0.019 0.007 0.027
(0.006) (0.024) (0.007) (0.020) (0.007) (0.023)
Trade openness with US 0.177* 0.159 0.210* 0.363 0.248** 0.440
(0.101) (0.369) (0.119) (0.333) (0.119) (0.358)
US defense alliance 1.675*** 3.278* 1.742*** 2.589** 1.639*** 2.696
(0.246) (1.807) (0.257) (1.066) (0.292) (1.881)
US sanctions 0.159 -0.657 0.209 -0.221 0.216 -0.107
(0.184) (0.769) (0.187) (0.635) (0.203) (0.770)
Political violence 0.039 -1.861* 0.050 -0.595* 0.051 -0.646
(0.039) (1.035) (0.044) (0.339) (0.048) (0.593)
GDP per capita (log) -0.095 -0.486 -0.020 -0.330 -0.113 -0.533
(0.153) (0.369) (0.196) (0.355) (0.202) (0.447)
Population (log) 0.006 -1.240*** -0.014 -1.091*** -0.064 -1.231***
(0.114) (0.359) (0.126) (0.365) (0.138) (0.387)
Cold war 0.221 -0.805 0.253* -0.323 0.272* -0.301
(0.142) (0.534) (0.144) (0.375) (0.154) (0.438)
Latin American & Caribbean 0.356 -1.987 0.083 -2.346 -0.036 -2.963
(0.444) (1.617) (0.525) (1.807) (0.499) (2.257)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.767* 3.369 0.813** 2.254** 0.728* 2.332
(0.429) (2.295) (0.405) (1.118) (0.425) (1.770)
Middle East & North Africa 0.385 -6.432* 0.362 -1.899 0.229 -2.737
(0.531) (3.454) (0.600) (2.551) (0.606) (2.911)
Asia 0.354 1.092 0.162 -0.378 0.042 -0.726
(0.424) (1.831) (0.543) (1.554) (0.547) (2.036)
Past anti-US violence 0.179*** -2.027*** 0.151*** -2.607*** 0.158*** -2.604***
(0.033) (0.507) (0.033) (0.478) (0.039) (0.653)
Constant -2.890* 12.874*** -3.251 10.259** -2.182 12.758***
(1.746) (4.462) (2.019) (4.177) (2.161) (4.556)
Observations 3,093 3,093 3,024
Alpha 1.730 1.494 1.537
(0.251) (0.250) (0.324)
lnalpha 0.548*** 0.401** 0.430**
(0.145) (0.167) (0.211)
AIC 3036.479 3040.19
BIC 3271.918 3287.703
Wald χ2 15.39*** 14.91*** 11.03**
Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Reference region is West.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Regarding the impacts of control variables on the dependent variable, the study includes three
regressors that may influence anti-American incidents: U.S. sanctions, U.S. security alliance, and
U.S. trade openness. Those control variables may directly affect domestic politics and socio-
economic conditions in US targeted countries or U.S. allies. Only U.S. alliance is positively and
significantly associated with anti-American violence across all models. In the inflate equation,
a country under the U.S. alliance system have a higher likelihood of experiencing “no” violence
against Americans. Of those experiencing anti-U.S. violence, an increase in anti-American inci-
dents in a hosting country results from a U.S. security alliance. A country’s trade openness with the
U.S. also leads to the increase in anti-U.S. incidents in the count equation of Models 2 and 3. But
U.S. sanctions variable is not significant even if the causal direction is positive in the count equation
and negative in the inflate equation, respectively. This indicates that U.S. sanctions are positively
correlated with anti-American incidents. Regarding the effect of general political violence, the
political violence variable has a positive and significant impact on anti-American incidents only in
the zero equation of Model 3. In regard to regional effects, countries in the Middle East and North
Africa, for example, have a lower chance of experiencing “always zero” incidents of anti-U.S. vio-
lence only in Model 2. The impact of international structure (cold war dummy) is also significant.
In Models 2 and 3, countries have more expected count of anti-American incidents during the Cold
War than during the Post Cold War. The results reflects the fact that anti-U.S. violence frequently
occurred during the Cold War when the U.S. was often offering economic and political supports to
dictators in exchange for policy concessions (i.e., anti-communist policy).
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3.6 Robustness Checks
To confirm whether my analysis is robust, a series of additional regressions were conducted
regarding both alternative specifications and methodological issues. First, the study estimates the
analysis using alternative measures of the dependent variables. The analysis disaggregates anti-
American violence into two separate incidents-anti-U.S. government violence and anti-U.S. civil-
ian violence (Models A3-A6). According to some studies on anti-Americanism, this sentiment may
hold an ambivalent attitude toward the United States (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007; Diven 2007).
People around the world tend to criticize U.S. foreign policy and international influence while they
accept U.S. culture and like buying products made in U.S. (Diven 2007). So, once anti-American
violence is said to have resulted from the U.S. foreign policy (bilateral aid) impacting domestic
politics, U.S. foreign aid should have more of an impact on the anti-U.S. government violence
than on anti-U.S. civilian violence. To test this alternative explanation, the study measured anti-
U.S. government incidents as incidents in which the targets were U.S. government properties (e.g.,
U.S. Embassy, U.S. culture center, etc.) and U.S. government officials. The study also measured
anti-American civilian violence as violent incidents in which the targets were American civilian
citizens and local branches/offices of U.S.-based multinational corporations. The results show that
an increase in U.S. aid leads to a decrease in expected violence against U.S. government prop-
erties and/or officials in autocratic regimes having institutions, compared to non-institutionalized
autocracies. However, when a rise in U.S. aid results in an increase in anti-U.S. civilian incidents
in autocracies having institutions, it would seem to indicate that revolutionary groups or extrem-
ist groups tend to target non-government Americans such as U.S.-owned multi-corporations (e.g.,
McDonalds, Citibank branches, etc.) rather than U.S. government properties because American
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civilian targets are relatively easy to attack.
The study estimated zero-inflated models using civilization dummies instead of the simple
regional geographic dummies. At the same time, the study also took into account the outliers’
influence by using both full sample and reduced sample excluding outlier states (Berger 2014;
Henderson and Tucker 2001; Huntington 1993). The findings in Models A7-A12 overall support
the hypotheses. Regarding the effects of different civilizations, Islamic countries have a lower
probability of experiencing “no” anti-US violence at 0.1 confidence level. Developing countries
in the Western world also have a lower likelihood of experiencing “no” anti-American incidents at
0.05 or 0.001 levels. However, among countries experiencing anti-American incidents, countries
in the West have fewer expected count of anti-American violence.
Second, the study used two alternative indicators of U.S. aid to confirm the previous results
in Models A13-18 (i.e., U.S. aid/GNI (%) and U.S. economic aid/GDP (%). The overall findings
support the main results.
Finally, in addition to model specifications with lagged dependent variables (LDVs), the study
ran the models without LDVs for a robustness check for my statistical findings (Models 19-21).
Some political methodologists raised doubts about the utility of using LDVs in the model. They
believe the inclusion of LDVs might increase the risk of making inaccurate inference leading other
regressors to lose their explanatory power (Achen 2000). The results of count data models without
LDVs shows that coefficients for the interaction term between U.S. foreign aid and autocracy is still
statistically significant and have more explanatory power than models with LDVs in zero-inflated
negative binomial regression models.
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3.7 Conclusion
This study has investigated whether and/or how U.S. foreign aid leads to anti-American inci-
dents in a recipient country. Using the composite data based on several sources for 117 developing
countries for the period between 1970 and 2007, the study has found the evidence suggesting
that anti-American incidents are incited by U.S. foreign aid conditioned by autocrats’ survival
strategy through their institutional channels. Compared to democracies and non-institutionalized
autocracies, in other words, institutions in autocracies play an moderating role in influencing the
frequency of anti-American incidents. However, as the percentage of U.S. aid/GDP rises, so does
the expected count of anti-U.S. violence, though it soon decreases in autocracies with pseudo-
democratic institutions.
The study found, however, that U.S. foreign aid itself does not affect the likelihood of anti-
American incidents regardless of its expected direction. Of those that do experience anti-Americans
incidents, U.S. foreign aid is expected to increase their frequency in some model specifications.
Nominal democratic institutions in autocracies influence the variation in autocrats’ use of U.S. for-
eign aid. The number of anti-American incidents is affected by an interaction between U.S. aid and
autocratic institutions in recipient countries. There are some policy implications in the findings.
Pseudo-democratic institutions have a mediating effect on the causal nexus between the harmful
role of U.S. aid and anti-American violence.
The results may create several avenues for further research. First, to deal with the endogeneity
problem appropriate instrumental variables are needed. Even if this study tried to cope with reverse
causality or endogenous issues, it is not sufficient enough to check reverse causality through the
regression estimation on U.S. foreign aid/GDP (%). Also, the lagged variable on the right side of
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the model equation partially, at most, dealt with the endogeneity problem.
Second, despite its broader range of anti-American incidents, this project needs to add more
information on demonstrations and protests against U.S. government properties (e.g. demonstra-
tions in front of U.S. Embassies in recipient countries). Further study could focus on collecting
data on anti-American demonstrations and/or protests by looking into a variety sources including
media coverage (e.g., New York Times, BBC News, etc.)
Lastly, another future study could reflect the recent phenomena in the Middle East and Africa.
During the Arab Spring, people in several countries expressed anti-American sentiments on the
street using nonviolent and sometimes violent protests. So it may be interesting to investigate the
relationship between democratization or regime change and anti-American incidents.
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3.8 Appendix II
3.8.1 List of Countries in the Sample (117)
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Benin,
Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African
Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hon-
duras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait,
Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mau-
ritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russia,
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa,
South Korea, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo,
Trinidad and Tobago , Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam,
Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
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3.8.2 Summary Statistics
Table 3.3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Anti-US political violence 0.531 2.534 0 62 4490
US aid/GDP (%) 0.821 1.971 0 34.141 3763
Non-US aid/GDP (%) 3.123 5.308 0 78.804 3763
Multilateral aid/GDP (%) 3.225 5.012 0 86.173 3717
Regime type 0.89 0.74 0 2 4271
Regime duration 17.863 15.062 1 109 4271
Trade openness with US 5.466 2.418 0 12.881 4137
US defense alliance 0.263 0.441 0 1 4340
US sanctions 0.165 0.371 0 1 4229
Political violence 0.909 1.856 0 10 4088
GDP per capita (log) 7.165 1.198 3.913 10.49 3772
Population (log) 8.797 1.727 4.477 14.086 4262
Cold war 0.487 0.5 0 1 4490
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3.8.3 Robustness Checks
1. Table 3.4: Comparison of ZINB and Hurdle Models
2. Table 3.5.: Alternative Dependent Variables: Anti-US Government and Anti-US Civilians
3. Table 3.5: Using civilization dummies (full sample)
4. Table 3.6: Using civilization dummies (reduced sample)
5. Table 3.7: Using an alternative measure of US aid - US Aid/GNI (%)
6. Table 3.8: Using an alternative measure of US aid - US Economic Aid/GDP (%)
7. Table 3.8: Without Lagged Dependent Variables
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Table 3.4: ZINB Regression of Anti-US Political Violence, 1970-2007: Full Sample
Model A1: ZINB Model A2: Hurdle
Count Inflate (zero) Count Logit
US aid/GDP (%) 0.002 -0.424 -0.013 0.028
(0.069) (0.359) (0.030) (0.030)
Institutional autocracy -0.708*** -1.293 -0.482* -0.539***
(0.230) (1.008) (0.287) (0.209)
Democracy -0.179 -0.234 -0.116 -0.292
(0.259) (0.829) (0.280) (0.211)
Institutional autocracy x US aid/GDP (%) 0.421*** 1.110** 0.272** 0.029
(0.150) (0.550) (0.113) (0.042)
Democracy x US aid/GDP (%) 0.010 0.284 0.005 0.018
(0.069) (0.357) (0.019) (0.035)
Regime duration 0.012* 0.030 0.003 0.002
(0.006) (0.021) (0.007) (0.005)
Trade openness with US 0.204** 0.385 0.121* 0.171*
(0.100) (0.255) (0.065) (0.103)
US defense alliance 1.804*** 2.405** 1.536*** 1.254***
(0.278) (1.166) (0.267) (0.297)
US sanctions 0.205 -0.390 0.326* 0.292
(0.186) (0.616) (0.176) (0.192)
Political violence 0.061 -0.512* 0.168*** 0.061
(0.043) (0.280) (0.038) (0.047)
GDP per capita (log) -0.084 -0.595 -0.021 -0.138
(0.180) (0.382) (0.120) (0.146)
Population (log) -0.029 -1.128*** 0.278*** 0.153
(0.098) (0.286) (0.080) (0.107)
Cold war 0.274* -0.469 0.459*** 0.399**
(0.148) (0.348) (0.154) (0.194)
Latin American & Caribbean 0.170 -2.275 -0.183 11.299***
(0.479) (1.668) (0.511) (0.757)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.747* 1.914** -0.211 11.057***
(0.443) (0.882) (0.496) (0.664)
Middle East & North Africa 0.123 -2.477 0.560 11.475***
(0.588) (2.828) (0.521) (0.670)
Asia 0.074 -0.457 -0.516 10.695***
(0.546) (1.594) (0.496) (0.755)
Past anti-US violence 0.118*** -2.132*** 0.453*** 0.113***
(0.026) (0.449) (0.065) (0.024)
Constant -2.420 12.766*** -6.046*** -14.460***
(1.607) (3.957) (1.247) (1.465)
Observations 3,295 3,481
Alpha 1.319
(0.211)
lnalpha 0.373*** 1.047***
(0.131) (0.333)
AIC 3759.89 4125.987
BIC 3997.796 4366.035
Vuong z-statistic: 1.607* ZINB > Hurdle
Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Reference region is the West.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: ZINB Regression of Anti-US Political Violence, 1970-2007: Full Sample
Model A7: Baseline Model A8: Non-US Aid Model A9: Multilateral Aid
Count Inflate Count Inflate Count Inflate
US aid/GDP (%) -0.037 -0.547** 0.087 -0.131 -0.087 -0.664*
(0.062) (0.260) (0.107) (0.170) (0.088) (0.394)
Institutional autocracy -0.593** -0.635 -0.488** -0.247 -0.585** -0.677
(0.235) (0.679) (0.246) (0.704) (0.236) (0.673)
Democracy -0.157 0.080 -0.057 0.355 -0.162 0.011
(0.234) (0.628) (0.255) (0.667) (0.234) (0.617)
Institutional autocracy x US aid/GDP (%) 0.351*** 0.725** 0.253 0.314 0.399*** 0.846**
(0.119) (0.281) (0.163) (0.203) (0.134) (0.384)
Democracy x US aid/GDP (%) 0.036 0.358 -0.075 -0.006 0.083 0.490
(0.059) (0.259) (0.118) (0.205) (0.082) (0.368)
Non-US aid/GDP (%) 0.043 0.086
(0.080) (0.074)
Multilateral aid/GDP (%) 0.050 0.019
(0.042) (0.037)
Regime duration 0.013** 0.026** 0.012** 0.022* 0.013** 0.026*
(0.005) (0.013) (0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014)
Trade openness with US 0.157 0.177 0.153 0.167 0.154 0.181
(0.117) (0.270) (0.112) (0.257) (0.126) (0.299)
US defense alliance 1.253*** 0.089 1.304*** 0.144 1.257*** 0.066
(0.360) (0.881) (0.418) (1.045) (0.375) (0.936)
US sanctions 0.143 -0.614 0.181 -0.602 0.179 -0.568
(0.201) (0.575) (0.203) (0.612) (0.206) (0.588)
Political violence 0.061 -0.347* 0.064 -0.366 0.071 -0.328*
(0.046) (0.198) (0.051) (0.235) (0.048) (0.172)
GDP per capita (log) -0.199 -0.976** -0.101 -0.731** -0.123 -0.991**
(0.183) (0.428) (0.226) (0.368) (0.203) (0.450)
Population (log) -0.018 -0.811** 0.012 -0.731** 0.014 -0.824**
(0.129) (0.363) (0.133) (0.316) (0.141) (0.371)
Cold war 0.254 -0.409 0.299* -0.238 0.274 -0.455
(0.159) (0.399) (0.169) (0.413) (0.169) (0.416)
Buddhist -1.187*** -1.163 -1.132*** -1.018 -1.078*** -1.139
(0.385) (0.938) (0.426) (1.041) (0.407) (0.979)
Hindu -0.427 -0.689 -0.304 -0.498 -0.335 -0.819
(0.540) (4.401) (0.477) (3.065) (0.482) (3.038)
Islamic -0.005 -1.175* 0.052 -1.086* 0.117 -1.084
(0.302) (0.654) (0.313) (0.660) (0.338) (0.734)
Latin America 0.289 -0.846 0.280 -0.791 0.377 -0.727
(0.514) (1.002) (0.568) (1.133) (0.557) (1.094)
Orthodox -0.822* -0.859 -0.749* -0.702 -0.650 -0.857
(0.423) (1.002) (0.449) (0.956) (0.423) (1.005)
Sinic 0.551 2.113** 0.418 1.980* 0.613 2.222**
(0.829) (1.020) (0.927) (1.068) (0.854) (0.999)
Western -1.335** -21.416*** -1.235 -4.472 -1.078* -17.114***
(0.643) (0.944) (0.987) (3.441) (0.648) (0.988)
Others -0.005 -0.725 0.020 -0.671 0.104 -0.698
(0.520) (0.891) (0.577) (1.074) (0.546) (0.944)
Past anti-US violence 0.112*** -2.043*** 0.111*** -2.224*** 0.110*** -1.981***
(0.025) (0.472) (0.026) (0.584) (0.026) (0.430)
Constant -0.771 15.240*** -2.023 12.127*** -1.851 15.346***
(1.505) (4.771) (2.041) (3.632) (1.980) (4.889)
Observations 3,295 3,295 3,268
Alpha 1.319 1.892 1.317
(0.211) (0.271) (0.200)
lnalpha 0.277* 0.283* 0.275*
(0.160) (0.162) (0.152)
AIC 3765.222 4071.151
BIC 4051.93 4266.357
Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Reference civilization is African.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: ZINB Regression of Anti-US Political Violence, 1970-2007: Reduced Sample
Model A10: Baseline Model A11: Non-US Aid Model A12: Multilateral Aid
Count Inflate Count Inflate Count Inflate
US aid/GDP (%) -0.020 -0.484* 0.007 -0.447 -0.005 -0.425
(0.063) (0.251) (0.121) (0.369) (0.088) (0.406)
Institutional autocracy -0.540** -0.501 -0.528* -0.502 -0.602** -0.495
(0.269) (0.746) (0.271) (0.753) (0.262) (0.705)
Democracy -0.120 0.161 -0.109 0.153 -0.107 0.228
(0.273) (0.732) (0.281) (0.680) (0.259) (0.656)
Institutional autocracy x US aid/GDP (%) 0.329*** 0.677** 0.296 0.625* 0.318* 0.620
(0.124) (0.283) (0.210) (0.380) (0.191) (0.450)
Democracy x US aid/GDP (%) 0.031 0.298 0.014 0.253 0.014 0.236
(0.063) (0.251) (0.101) (0.362) (0.083) (0.385)
Non-US aid/GDP (%) -0.023 0.011
(0.049) (0.062)
Multilateral aid/GDP (%) -0.033 -0.013
(0.058) (0.087)
Regime duration 0.013** 0.022 0.013** 0.020 0.012** 0.021
(0.006) (0.016) (0.006) (0.015) (0.006) (0.016)
Trade openness with US 0.230* 0.254 0.229* 0.263 0.276*** 0.343
(0.118) (0.293) (0.117) (0.308) (0.103) (0.260)
US defense alliance 1.101*** 0.373 1.077*** 0.350 1.064*** 0.322
(0.241) (0.655) (0.243) (0.686) (0.215) (0.676)
US sanctions 0.283 -0.341 0.277 -0.354 0.273 -0.369
(0.223) (0.528) (0.221) (0.587) (0.216) (0.522)
Political violence 0.041 -0.392 0.032 -0.436 0.041 -0.402
(0.047) (0.344) (0.065) (0.587) (0.051) (0.277)
GDP per capita (log) -0.294 -0.977** -0.315 -0.955** -0.396* -1.113***
(0.192) (0.475) (0.196) (0.445) (0.209) (0.429)
Population (log) -0.077 -0.834* -0.078 -0.821** -0.145 -0.931***
(0.135) (0.453) (0.132) (0.396) (0.124) (0.343)
Cold war 0.147 -0.493 0.137 -0.453 0.118 -0.512
(0.182) (0.493) (0.168) (0.460) (0.162) (0.415)
Buddhist -1.017*** -1.278 -0.965* -1.207 -1.078*** -1.296
(0.327) (0.799) (0.567) (1.183) (0.349) (0.806)
Hindu -0.365 -0.517 -0.375 -0.598 -0.459 -0.796
(0.973) (7.781) (0.645) (5.993) (0.568) (3.621)
Islamic 0.046 -1.189* 0.070 -1.161* -0.020 -1.264**
(0.323) (0.627) (0.483) (0.628) (0.320) (0.591)
Latin America 0.292 -1.264 0.320 -1.220 0.206 -1.363*
(0.383) (0.821) (0.501) (0.870) (0.383) (0.816)
Orthodox -0.752 -0.947 -0.726 -0.832 -0.653 -0.861
(0.516) (0.934) (0.747) (1.104) (0.449) (0.887)
Sinic -2.077** -3.219 -2.091** -3.490 -2.094*** -3.320
(0.816) (16.370) (0.946) (21.014) (0.607) (13.887)
Western -1.278** -16.467*** -1.195 -15.803*** -1.339** -16.005***
(0.587) (1.053) (0.772) (1.714) (0.531) (1.088)
Others -0.014 -0.852 0.027 -0.772 -0.134 -1.027
(0.531) (0.845) (0.657) (1.031) (0.487) (0.824)
Past anti-US violence 0.127*** -2.167*** 0.129*** -2.191*** 0.132*** -2.264***
(0.037) (0.561) (0.043) (0.630) (0.032) (0.615)
Constant 0.002 15.080** 0.195 14.711*** 1.269 16.460***
(1.726) (6.125) (1.838) (5.222) (2.080) (4.850)
Observations 3,128 3,128 3,059
Alpha 1.212 1.220 1.195
(0.370) (0.406) (0.200)
lnalpha 0.192 0.199* 0.178
(0.305) (0.332) (0.285)
AIC 2956.39 2956.792
BIC 3240.653 3247.103
Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Reference civilization is African.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8: ZINB Regression of Anti-US Political Violence, 1970-2007: US Aid/GNI
Model A13: Baseline Model A14: Non-US Aid Model A15: Multilateral Aid
Count Inflate Count Inflate Count Inflate
US aid/GNI (%) 0.978 10.052 0.048 3.164 0.085 3.847
(1.297) (7.606) (1.444) (5.857) (1.690) (6.689)
Institutional autocracy -0.668*** -1.779* -0.696*** -0.852 -0.703*** -1.020
(0.200) (0.997) (0.257) (1.329) (0.215) (0.968)
Democracy -0.044 0.050 -0.139 0.239 0.001 0.362
(0.211) (0.711) (0.330) (1.182) (0.226) (0.742)
Institutional autocracy x US aid/GNI (%) 9.947*** 13.566 14.384*** 19.388* 14.558*** 20.616**
(3.167) (11.093) (3.095) (10.371) (3.471) (9.603)
Democracy x US aid/GNI (%) -1.821 -34.988 -0.707 -12.848 -1.068 -11.408
(1.909) (21.771) (1.720) (11.605) (1.706) (10.469)
Non-US aid/GDP (%) 0.059 0.102**
(0.049) (0.050)
Multilateral aid/GDP (%) 0.040 0.045
(0.073) (0.076)
Regime duration 0.009** 0.034 0.011 0.025 0.009** 0.030
(0.005) (0.022) (0.007) (0.022) (0.005) (0.019)
Trade openness with US 0.252*** 0.454 0.206* 0.347 0.269*** 0.465
(0.076) (0.362) (0.108) (0.322) (0.088) (0.298)
US defense alliance 1.917*** 2.610*** 1.812*** 2.354* 1.839*** 2.452
(0.235) (0.999) (0.272) (1.250) (0.315) (1.650)
US sanctions 0.256* -0.392 0.224 -0.448 0.339* -0.076
(0.155) (0.595) (0.214) (0.834) (0.200) (0.530)
Political violence 0.054 -1.949* 0.079 -0.503 0.079* -0.478
(0.034) (1.172) (0.051) (0.476) (0.047) (0.326)
GDP per capita (log) -0.157 -0.768 0.001 -0.279 -0.085 -0.451
(0.119) (0.473) (0.208) (0.404) (0.168) (0.337)
Population (log) -0.027 -1.287*** -0.019 -1.047*** -0.058 -1.170***
(0.080) (0.347) (0.104) (0.318) (0.100) (0.318)
Cold war 0.338** -0.655 0.303** -0.294 0.364** -0.334
(0.150) (0.501) (0.153) (0.395) (0.162) (0.391)
Latin American & Caribbean 0.033 -2.551* 0.181 -1.888 -0.044 -2.605
(0.420) (1.494) (0.490) (1.801) (0.471) (2.047)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.570 2.309 0.769 2.348* 0.711* 2.117**
(0.376) (1.436) (0.475) (1.296) (0.381) (1.078)
Middle East & North Africa 0.315 -3.259 0.138 -1.889 0.199 -2.669
(0.398) (2.311) (0.687) (3.638) (0.450) (2.488)
Asia -0.045 -0.034 0.109 0.006 -0.085 -0.659
(0.421) (1.528) (0.546) (1.720) (0.508) (1.876)
Past anti-US violence 0.127*** -1.937*** 0.116*** -2.156*** 0.115*** -2.096***
(0.021) (0.440) (0.027) (0.544) (0.025) (0.495)
Constant -2.380** 14.812*** -3.324* 8.888** -2.724 10.860***
(1.113) (4.973) (1.816) (4.159) (1.689) (3.524)
Observations 3,482 3,280 3,309
Alpha 1.570 1.442 1.419
(0.0.151) (0.228) (0.148)
lnalpha 0.451*** 0.366** 0.350**
(0.096) (0.158) (0.148)
Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Reference region is the West.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.9: ZINB Regression of Anti-US Political Violence, 1970-2007: US Economic Aid
Model A16: Baseline Model A17: Non-US Aid Model A18: Multilateral Aid
Count Inflate Count Inflate Count Inflate
US economic aid/GDP (%) 0.037 0.931 0.018 0.283 0.002 -0.025
(0.047) (1.105) (0.025) (0.231) (0.026) (0.067)
Institutional autocracy -0.514*** -1.379* -0.649*** -1.935** -0.683*** -0.960
(0.188) (0.832) (0.200) (0.911) (0.219) (0.998)
Democracy -0.057 -0.267 -0.198 -0.730 -0.044 0.200
(0.209) (1.065) (0.228) (0.670) (0.223) (0.640)
Institutional autocracy x US economic aid/GDP (%) 0.149 -1.078 0.326** 0.523 0.602*** 0.902**
(0.107) (1.204) (0.135) (0.390) (0.203) (0.447)
Democracy x US economic aid/GDP (%) -0.030 -1.413 -0.004 -0.396 0.001 -0.128
(0.053) (2.164) (0.024) (0.400) (0.020) (0.329)
Non-US aid/GDP (%) -0.019 -0.069
(0.023) (0.048)
Multilateral aid/GDP (%) 0.024 0.024
(0.071) (0.080)
Regime duration 0.010** 0.041** 0.013** 0.043** 0.009* 0.029
(0.004) (0.019) (0.006) (0.019) (0.005) (0.022)
Trade openness with US 0.222*** 0.254 0.203*** 0.258 0.256*** 0.422
(0.071) (0.285) (0.077) (0.235) (0.087) (0.282)
US defense alliance 1.902*** 2.829*** 1.744*** 2.655*** 1.836*** 2.328
(0.246) (0.926) (0.246) (0.913) (0.329) (1.787)
US sanctions 0.231 -0.424 0.185 -0.714 0.298 -0.169
(0.155) (0.708) (0.171) (0.623) (0.200) (0.531)
Political violence 0.046 -3.410 0.045 -2.018** 0.072 -0.468*
(0.037) (2.341) (0.038) (0.965) (0.045) (0.244)
GDP per capita (log) -0.190* -0.668 -0.167 -0.696* -0.118 -0.512
(0.111) (0.513) (0.134) (0.392) (0.183) (0.370)
Population (log) 0.001 -1.322*** -0.029 -1.260*** -0.035 -1.088***
(0.078) (0.415) (0.086) (0.316) (0.099) (0.308)
Cold war 0.311** -1.098** 0.212 -1.063** 0.334** -0.366
(0.139) (0.466) (0.143) (0.461) (0.161) (0.358)
Latin American & Caribbean 0.296 -1.549 0.310 -2.000 0.019 -2.374
(0.413) (1.391) (0.395) (1.346) (0.472) (2.058)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.661* 3.042** 0.563 2.437 0.683* 1.878*
(0.361) (1.536) (0.367) (1.583) (0.367) (0.973)
Middle East & North Africa 0.574 -5.892*** 0.183 -5.471** 0.280 -2.603
(0.411) (2.084) (0.490) (2.629) (0.454) (2.641)
Asia 0.153 1.330 0.165 0.826 -0.070 -0.624
(0.415) (1.588) (0.400) (1.579) (0.505) (1.823)
Past anti-US violence 0.129*** -2.090*** 0.128*** -1.931*** 0.115*** -2.193**
(0.022) (0.634) (0.024) (0.441) (0.025) (0.895)
Constant -2.417** 15.002** -1.827 15.630*** -2.562 11.078***
(1.104) (6.054) (1.434) (4.827) (1.820) (3.840)
Observations 3,481 3,305 3,308
Alpha 1.420 1.615 1.622
(0.213) (0.479) (0.1888)
lnalpha 0.484*** 0.479*** 0.351**
(0.096) (0.110) (0.150)
Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Reference region is the West.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.10: ZINB Regression of Anti-US Political Violence, 1970-2007: With No LDVs
Model A19: Baseline Model A20: Non-US Aid Model A21: Multilateral Aid
Count Inflate Count Inflate Count Inflate
US aid/GDP (%) -0.038 -1.766*** -0.042 -1.788*** -0.041 -1.763***
(0.030) (0.634) (0.031) (0.588) (0.032) (0.582)
Institutional autocracy -0.696*** -4.537** -0.712*** -4.391** -0.677*** -4.450**
(0.225) (2.302) (0.218) (1.720) (0.220) (1.999)
Democracy -0.007 -1.673 -0.107 -1.723* 0.046 -1.400
(0.247) (1.033) (0.256) (1.042) (0.251) (0.993)
Institutional autocracy x US aid/GDP (%) 0.295*** 2.441*** 0.306*** 2.449*** 0.307*** 2.514***
(0.051) (0.918) (0.057) (0.749) (0.051) (0.795)
Democracy x US aid/GDP (%) 0.009 0.465 0.016 0.382 0.010 0.455
(0.025) (1.307) (0.025) (1.190) (0.027) (1.251)
Non-US aid/GDP (%) -0.010 -0.0009
(0.026) (0.076)
Multilateral aid/GDP (%) -0.032 -0.413*
(0.0225) (0.234)
Regime duration 0.006 0.059** 0.008 0.059* 0.007 0.067**
(0.007) (0.029) (0.008) (0.032) (0.007) (0.034)
Trade openness with US 0.188* 0.353 0.138 0.356 0.171 0.155
(0.100) (0.344) (0.105) (0.285) (0.105) (0.433)
US defense alliance 2.135*** 3.247 1.959*** 2.538 2.045*** 2.919
(0.267) (2.458) (0.291) (2.320) (0.289) (2.896)
US sanctions 0.311 -1.675 0.269 -1.701 0.341 -1.573
(0.222) (1.349) (0.218) (1.274) (0.223) (1.252)
Political violence 0.114** -5.497* 0.113** -5.526** 0.119*** -5.949**
(0.046) (3.239) (0.047) (2.715) (0.046) (2.924)
GDP per capita (log) -0.026 -0.971* 0.083 -1.062* 0.010 -0.778
(0.135) (0.520) (0.151) (0.641) (0.140) (0.528)
Population (log) 0.117 -1.884*** 0.135 -1.936*** 0.116 -1.753***
(0.114) (0.521) (0.131) (0.530) (0.115) (0.515)
Cold war 0.474*** -1.123* 0.423** -1.115* 0.466*** -1.124*
(0.177) (0.622) (0.178) (0.592) (0.176) (0.594)
Latin American & Caribbean 0.673 -1.854 0.898* -1.032 0.819 -0.486
(0.517) (1.634) (0.526) (2.513) (0.515) (2.234)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.701 3.958** 0.732* 3.922* 0.775* 4.812**
(0.433) (1.832) (0.420) (2.161) (0.428) (2.016)
Middle East & North Africa 0.558 -21.593*** 0.504 -20.491*** 0.637 -28.086***
(0.468) (4.890) (0.512) (3.951) (0.468) (5.219)
Asia 0.046 1.645 0.265 2.190 0.182 3.036
(0.511) (1.429) (0.521) (2.326) (0.514) (2.100)
Constant -4.645*** 22.352*** -5.234*** 23.432*** -4.895*** 19.776***
(1.604) (7.044) (1.915) (8.419) (1.700) (7.128)
Observations 3,472 3,333 3,365
Alpha 1.420 1.615 1.622
(0.213) (0.479) (0.1888)
lnalpha 0.865*** 0.895*** 0.847***
(0.157) (0.150) (0.156)
Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Reference region is the West.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 4
Making Dictators’ Pockets Empty: How U.S. Sanctions
Influence Social Policies in Autocratic Countries?
Abstract. This work examines how U.S. economic sanctions affect social welfare spending in au-
thoritarian countries. U.S. economic sanctions play a role of inducing autocratic targets to change
social policy through two theoretical channels. First, U.S. economic sanctions may reduce auto-
crats’ resources to buy off supports from ruling elite groups and so force autocrats to reallocate
government expenditure in favor of their supporting groups. Consequently, autocrats facing longer
U.S. sanctions are likely to cut spending on public goods and services, especially on education
and health care spending. Second, the impacts of U.S. sanction duration on social spending varies
according to political variables such as autocrats’ pseudo-democratic institutions. The empirical
findings show that, even when U.S. sanctions last a long time, autocrats under nominal democratic
institutions cut spending on education and health to a lesser degree than do autocrats with no such
institutions.
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4.1 Introduction
Do U.S. economic sanctions have substantial effects on social welfare policies in authoritarian
targets? The conventional wisdom demonstrates that “sanctions often produce unintended and un-
desirable consequences” for the society of sanctioned countries (Haass 1997). According to the
literature on sanctions, economic sanctions reduce a targeted state’s available resources for public
goods and services (Wood 2008). Especially, authoritarian countries seem to be worse off after
sanctions than before (Brooks 2002; Haass 1997). Are all autocracies equally bad at maintaining
social welfare policies when they face sanctions? This study offers a new theoretical and empir-
ical study on the impact of U.S. economic sanctions on social welfare spending by looking into
the variations among targeted autocratic states. The existing literature on sanction studies pays
attention to the counterproductive effects of sanctions on target states. Scholars find that eco-
nomic sanctions fail to extract policy concessions from a target country while producing unwanted
negative externalities (Allen and Lektzian 2013; Brooks 2002; Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010;
Peksen 2009, 2011; Peksen and Drury 2009, 2010; Wood 2008). For instance, Brooks (2002)
demonstrated that sanctions retain “distributional implications” for the social welfare of different
political actors within a target nation while they have “adverse macroeconomic effects” on its en-
tire population. Sanction costs hurt the general population, who tend to feel deprived of basic
needs (e.g., consumption goods including food, water, etc.) and consequently, are more likely to
act out against the government (Allen 2008b). Scholars also place an emphasis on the conditional
effects of political institutions on the costs of sanctions. Democratic targets are easily affected by
the counterproductive costs of sanctions due to their high sensitivity to “domestic audience costs”
(Allen 2008a). So, democratic leaders are more likely than authoritarian rulers to concede the
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demands of a sender, as sanctions aggravate the macroeconomy and thus hurt the general pop-
ulation. As a result, a democratic target may be less likely to suffer economic sanctions while
experiencing shorter duration of sanctions (Lektzian and Souva 45; McGillivray and Stam 2004).
In contrast, autocrats often resist economic sanctions because of their relative lack of political con-
straints. Making concessions to sanctioning states may not only weaken authoritarian leadership
but threaten their political survival as well. Therefore, autocrats’ resistance to economic sanctions
forces the ordinary citizens to suffer sanction costs (Allen 2008a; Lektzian and Souva 2007).
A growing number of sanction studies seek to evaluate the negative externality of sanctions
against a target country, mostly looking into its variation according to regime type-democracy ver-
sus autocracy. However, scholars of international politics have recently focused on authoritarian
countries adopting a variety of research topics including international trade, foreign direct invest-
ment, and public policies. They find that autocratic regimes show significant variation in their
political and economic performances. By the same token, we might expect that not all autocracies
implement equally well social welfare policies as they respond to U.S. economic sanctions. Sec-
ond, the majority of sanction targets are non-democratic countries. According to Escribà-Folch
and Wright (2010, 336) and Kaempfer, Lowenberg and Mertens (2004), 85% of U.S. sanctions tar-
gets are “not-fully-democratized” countries. One reason for this pattern is that democratic leaders
are more likely “to accommodate the sender’s demands” because they are more vulnerable than
their authoritarian counterparts to economic costs (Hufbauer et al. 2007, 166-167). In this sense,
democratic regimes are more likely to make concessions to the demands of the senders after sanc-
tion imposition or even under sanction threats to prevent and/or lower the negative economic and
political consequences of sanctions.1
1For a democratic leader, continuous sanctions can threaten her political survival. Democratic audiences or con-
stituencies punish their leaders through (re-) election in the sense that voters in democracies judge governments’
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As noted above, autocrats tend to experience and resist economic sanctions for a longer time.
Authoritarian rulers can make use of foreign sanctions for a longer tenure by scapegoating the
sender. In this respect, autocrats rely heavily on the use of nationalistic sentiments and “rally-
round-the-flag” events. They also have a strong incentive to reallocate their government resources
in favor of satisfying their core supporting groups and/or repressing the domestic public who may
have grievances over lower living standards that are a result of economic sanctions. In the end,
economic sanctions can considerably affect autocrats’ social welfare policies. The effect is varied,
however, according to political institutions.
This study shows that a dictatorship’s expenditure on social welfare goods and services depends
on U.S. sanction duration and its political institutions. When dictators suffer economic sanctions
that are sustained for a long time, the rulers have no choice but to reallocate their government rev-
enues in public expenditure to ameliorate the negative impacts on their political survival. For ex-
ample, a trade embargo imposed by the U.S. may worsen a national economy in a non-democracy.
The economic devastation results in huge socioeconomic problems such as skyrocketing unem-
ployment and higher costs for basic needs. Thus, an authoritarian government will face political
pressure to reallocate its spending on social security, education, and public health. Dictators may
lose their free sources because of a specific sanction (i.e., the suspension of foreign aid). Author-
itarian regimes in the third world produce weak economies and inefficient governance. In those
conditions, losing free income from abroad makes it difficult for autocrats to provide enough pri-
vate goods to members of their ruling coalition. Dictators cut their expenditures on public goods
to compensate for the huge losses of private goods to their ruling elites. It may thus be expected
commitments to public goods and services that may be aggravated by foreign economic sanctions (Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2003; Fearon 1994) Thus, democratic regimes become the sanction targets during a shorter time compared to
autocracies.
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that an autocrat under U.S. economic coercion will reduce spending on social welfare goods and
services, expecting and/or experiencing economic hardships from sanctions.
However, the diversity of a political system within authoritarian countries leads to diverse
policies of social welfare. Autocrats ruling with “some degree of (political) institutional con-
straints” and autocrats free of such constraints will implement quite different policies. Some dic-
tators may strategically create political institutions to mimic ones in democracies. Those quasi-
democratic institutions (e.g., political party and legislature) enable autocrats to survive longer in
power. The institutions do this by providing the society relatively higher levels of public goods
and by strengthening regime stability through the institutionalization of leadership change. Even
under economic hardship, autocrats having institutions may expand the proportion of social wel-
fare spending over government expenditure, comparing with autocrats having no such institutions.
At the least, pseudo-democratic regimes refrain from sharply decreasing social spending, in part
because they care about the public discontent and support for the revolutionary movement. It is
thus hypothesized that U.S. sanction duration is positively associated with the changes in social
expenditure when autocracies are constrained by pseudo-democratic institutions.
To test this argument, a series of econometric estimations are conducted to evaluate the impacts
of U.S. sanction duration on changes in social welfare spending of autocratic governments. This
study collects social spending data of 95 countries under dictatorial rule from 1970 to 2007. As
concrete evidence and to minimize missing value problems, the study fills gaps in the data by us-
ing multiple imputations. A matching estimation is also conducted to improve the causal inference
of the model by incorporating the potential outcomes in quasi-experimental settings. The empir-
ical evidence confirms the diverse impacts of U.S. economic sanction duration on considerable
variation in social spending among autocracies even with several controls.
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This essay is divided into four sections. The first section briefly reviews of the negative exter-
nalities of economic sanctions against a target country. The second section discusses theoretical
arguments regarding the impacts of sanctions on social welfare policies in autocratic targets. It
also puts forward testable hypotheses. The third section lays out the research design and explains
the measurement and the methodological techniques. As a statistical model, the study employs a
panel error-correction regression with fixed effects using a multiple imputation to avoid inference
problems from a large proportion of missing values. The section presents the regression results
and their substantive interpretation using a matched dataset. Finally, I conclude this paper with a
discussion of policy implications of the analysis and recommendations for the future research.
4.2 Literature Review
A growing number of quantitative studies have paid attention to the negative externalities of
economic sanctions against target nations. Previous scholarship on economic sanctions has mainly
focused on sanction effectiveness or sanction outcomes, asking whether economic sanctions extract
targets’ policy concessions. In contrast, recent studies on the political-economic consequences of
economic sanctions have found that sanctions negatively influence the subjects outside winning
coalitions in authoritarian countries.Existing studies on sanction initiation show that “democratic
targets are more likely to be held responsible for economic failings and are more likely to view
the threatened costs of sanctions as sufficiently severe. So, while democracies use sanctions more
frequently, they tend not to use them against other democracies as often as they use them against
autocracies” (Lektzian and Souva 2007, 856).
Recent studies has maintained that economic sanctions inadvertently harm the socioeconomic
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and political conditions of a target nation. Such studies may be divided into two broad topics of
interest: (1) sanction effects on social welfare conditions in targeted countries; and (2) sanction
effects on political environments of targeted countries. On one hand, scholars have found that eco-
nomic sanctions worsen public health conditions-such as infant or child mortality, and immuniza-
tion (Peksen 2011)- and government commitments to public goods in the sanctioned states (Allen
and Lektzian 2013). The second group of scholars have attempted to test the impacts of sanctions
on political freedom (Peksen 2009; Peksen and Drury 2009), political repression/terrorism (Choi
and Luo 2013; Escribà-Folch 2012; Wood 2008), and democratization (Peksen and Drury 2010).
Most such studies have found that with regard to the aforementioned socio-political outcomes,
economic sanctions have brought devastating consequences to the public in sanctioned states.
Arguments on sanctions’ devastating effects demonstrate that economic sanctions worsen the
social welfare environment for the public, weakening a target state’s public goods and services.
Peksen (2011) evaluated how economic sanctions affected the health conditions of civilians us-
ing the child mortality rate as an indicator. Economic hardships resulting from sanctions increase
unemployment, inflation and poverty. Those unhealthy conditions of a target’s economy “reduce
people’s ability to afford health-care services to maintain a healthy life and standard of living” and
force “the government to cut health-care services” (Peksen 2011, 240). Peksen (2011) found that
U.S. sanctions and sanction costs significantly and consistently increase child mortality rates, con-
firming his hypothesis of sanctions’ detrimental effect on public health conditions. Another study
attempted to analyze more indicators of public health conditions including several immunization
rates, life expectancy, and food availability (Allen and Lektzian 2013). Allen and Lektzian (2013,
123) maintained that reduced resources caused by economic sanctions inevitably led to “allocation
decisions” that negatively and indirectly influenced health outcomes in targeted countries. How-
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ever, their study produced relatively mixed findings in different model specifications, which can
neither confirm nor disconfirm the negative impacts of sanctions on public health.
Other scholars have focused on the reallocation of government expenditures on social welfare
responding to economic sanctions. For example, Allen and Lektzian (2013) estimated the impact
of sanctions on government spending on public health, finding a negative externality of sanctions.
Interestingly, they took a sample of year-cases under military conflict and evaluated whether sanc-
tions reduced government spending on public health. The result showed that high-cost and low-
cost sanctions both significantly led governments to decrease their health expenditures. They also
found that democracy has a positive effect on government health spending across several model
specifications. Focusing mainly on authoritarian responses to economic sanctions, Escribà-Folch
(2012) suggested that economic sanctions might affect autocratic governments’ decisions to redis-
tribute their public goods as they confront a sanctions-induced scarcity of resources. Escribà-Folch
(2012) found that in all autocratic types the total government expenditure decreased under sanc-
tion imposition while single-party regimes increased government spending even under economic
sanctions to a greater degree than did personalist regimes (the reference-regime in the model). He
interpreted the result as single-party and military regimes “benefit[ting] their main support groups
and thus negate(ing) the destabilizing effect of an increase in the price of loyalty brought on by
sanctions” (Escribà-Folch 2012, 699). Despite his findings, the analysis with many missing val-
ues lost a considerable amount of information in the dataset, increasing the risk of inefficient and
biased estimation (King et al. 2001; Honaker and King 2010).2
2Escribà-Folch (2012) analyzes the impact of economic sanctions on government expenditure using the data with
70 countries from 1970-2000. The number of observations in his dataset is around 800-1000. Almost half of his
original data are missing. Alternatively, increasing number of scholars in international relations and comparative
politics employ the multiple imputation technique to avoid missing data problems (e.g., Ross (2006)).
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Sanction studies also have an interest in the effect of economic sanctions on political environ-
ments in a target nation. Those works primarily focus on political freedom, democratization and
political repression. Scholars of sanctions have evaluated whether and how economic sanctions
worsen political freedom and increase state repression within the targeted countries (Peksen 2009;
Peksen and Drury 2009; Wood 2008). Wood (2008) estimated, for the first time, the relationship
between economic sanctions and state repression, suggesting that economic sanctions tended to
increase incentives for target incumbents to repress potential challengers and public discontents.
In other words, incumbent leaders in a sanctioned country take advantage of using sticks against
opposition groups and civilians so as to stabilize the country and set their core supporters at ease
under gloomy effect of sanctions. He finds that “the results of the interaction terms for sanctions
imposed on democracies provide partial support for (the hypothesis) on the mitigating effect of
democratic institutions” in part because “democratic and autocratic states respond differently to
sanctions events” (Wood 2008, 504). In addition, democracies tend to decrease, compared with
autocratic regimes, their use of political repression even under economic sanctions imposed by
the U.N. In a similar study, Peksen (2009) found that sanctions led to an increase in human rights
abuses represented by physical integrity rights including disappearances, extrajudicial killings, po-
litical imprisonment, and torture. The difference between Wood (2008) and Peksen (2009) is the
fact that the latter makes use of disaggregated indicators of human rights abuses in addition to two
composite indicators such as physical integrity index and political terror scale; the former uses
only political terror scale as his outcome variable. Peksen (2009) found that economic sanctions
increased the human rights abuses in targeted nations across various model specifications. Un-
like Wood (2008), however, he does not look into the conditional effect of economic sanctions on
human rights given the variation in states’ political systems.
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Despite numerous studies on the negative externalities of sanctions, relatively few have paid
attention to variation in autocrats’ commitments to public goods under economic sanctions. Most
studies focus on variation in government policies between democracy and autocracy. Previous
findings have shown that democracies tend to improve public goods for the ordinary population
and increase expenditures for them and a high portion of economic sanctions have been imposed
against non-democratic regimes. Thus, existing empirical results do little to provide new and
interesting policy implications (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). For these reasons, the project
focuses on the cases of non-democratic countries and their policy commitments under the influence
of economic sanctions.
4.3 Theory: U.S. Sanction Duration and Social Welfare In Au-
tocratic Targets
Under what conditions does U.S. sanction duration influence variation in social welfare pol-
icy within autocratic countries? As found in the literature, autocratic regimes provide ordinary
civilians with relatively lower levels of public goods and services. Regarding social services, non-
democracies seem to lack the capacity to reduce poverty, infant mortality, and illiteracy. When
the sender imposes economic sanctions to a target state, target leaders should decide whether to
make a concession to the sender’s demands. If conceding to the sender’s demands, a target leader
can get more rewards from the sender through the direct assistance or the withdrawal of trade
sanctions. If not, sanction costs will be influential. Sanctions aggravate the social-economic con-
ditions of ordinary people rather than political elites in targeted countries (Allen 2008b; Lektzian
and Souva 2007). For example, economic sanctions may lead some authoritarian rulers to bring
hardship to their people by raising taxes and more repression (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010).
116
Marinov (2005, 571-572) found that democratic leaders were more likely to be susceptible to eco-
nomic sanctions than autocratic leaders. After all, “domestic publics if they could, replace their
leaders” if sanction were more costly to the target state. It should be noted that a large proportion
of sanctioned states are in fact non-democracies and less developed countries. It is said that au-
tocratic countries tend to spend less on social welfare services and public goods than democratic
ones. When targeted with sanctions, authoritarian rulers can, with a relatively small winning coali-
tion, change social policies easier than can their democratic counterparts (Bueno de Mesquita et al.
2003). When economic sanctions are imposed against targeted autocracies, those autocracies are
supposed to decide how to allocate governments’ resources in order to decrease both political and
economic costs caused by sanctions. Those kinds of sanction costs are closely associated with
dictators’ political calculation in regard to political survival. This section presents the theoretical
mechanisms by disaggregating the effects of economic sanctions on social policies in autocracies.
Economic sanctions play a devastating role, through a variety of channels, in hurting economic
wealth and changing political environments. First, a foreign embargo on import and export gen-
erate a negative externality to national economy. That is, a trade embargo on export reduces the
export of industries in authoritarian states. Bans on exports tend to give rise to skyrocketeting
unemployment rates and lead to the bankruptcy of whole industries. The negative impacts of a
trade embargo would be worse to economies containing less competitive industries. The subse-
quent increase in unemployment leads to a reduction in household income, which gives rise to
growing poverty and the consequent malnutrition of children in poor households. In particular, the
bankruptcy of domestic industries and the consequent high unemployment carry a heavy impact
for many unskilled workers (specially women) who work mostly in labor-intensive industries in
developing countries. For example, the U.S. trade embargo on Myanmar worsened the economic
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conditions of garment workers, who “earn as little as 30 cents a day” and forced many girls and
young women to “turn to prostitution or other marginal means to make a living” (Welsh 2003).
In response to those kinds of economic difficulties, governments must decide whether to increase
social spending to minimize the disastrous impacts on the public of a trade embargo on the public.
However, autocrats are more concerned about maintaining power than responding to the costs
of sanctions that influence the life of the general population. As the duration of economic sanctions
persists, dictators have a strong incentive to reallocate limited resources at least to compensate-by
reducing government expenditure on public goods-for the loss of private goods for their coalition
members. In addition, autocrats manipulate information and propaganda as they appease a dis-
contented public, by diverting sanction costs to sanctioning states and at the same time boosting
nationalism (Brooks 2002; Byman and Lind 2010).
Another theoretical rationale comes from aid reduction or suspension. Since the end of the
World War II, U.S. foreign assistance has been ranked number one in foreign aid. Cutting off U.S.
economic/military aid robs dictators of their “free resources” that mostly flow into sources of pri-
vate goods for winning coalition groups (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010). To compensate for the
loss of foreign assistance, dictators have a strong incentive to reallocate sources of public goods to
private goods by reducing education and health expenditures of government consumption. With-
out free resources, dictators can no longer offer enough financial sources to allow their supporting
groups to buy and enjoy imported products including luxury commodities. In this context, rul-
ing elites give much weight to potential losses to their existing benefits from economic sanctions.
So to buy their support for the regime, they are likely to force incumbent autocrats to reallocate
government resources to compensate for the lack of free resources. The above logic outlines the
general allocation decision autocrats make when they face foreign economic sanctions, suggesting
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the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4.1 Main effect of U.S. sanction duration: An increase of U.S. sanction duration will
be negatively associated with a change in social spending (social security/protection, education,
and health.
I expect that there might some diversity in social welfare policy changes as reactions to foreign
economic sanctions. Policy changes vary in terms of the political system of sanctioned govern-
ments. The allocation of social spending in autocracies may be influenced to the extent to which
they rely on institutions. Institutions in authoritarian governments are created for the purpose of
political survival. In other words, autocrats’ political institutions play a role in preventing poten-
tial revolutionary threats from the inside and/or even outside the winning coalition. For doing so,
autocratic rulers sometimes co-opt their potential challengers or repress them. Autocrats with in-
stitutional constraints tend to increase public goods that benefit a much broader size of the winning
coalition to deter revolutionary or opposition movements.
When an autocrat becomes a target of U.S. sanctions, the commitment(s) to social welfare
policy depends on the autocrat’s political institutions. As sanctions persist, autocrats may face
both economic costs and political risks. Economic sanctions result in economic hardships and poor
economic performance in targeted countries. Worsened economic circumstances may increase
public discontent with and grievances against the incumbent autocracy. The mass public will have
a strong incentive to support opposition groups that used to be relatively weak (Wood 2008, 494).
Potential challengers or the opposition represent imminent threats to a dictatorship because they
can mobilize a protest on behalf of regime change or revolution through the public’s economic
grievances (Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Those groups prefer revolution or rebellion against
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autocracies. To deter this revolutionary threat, autocrats need to handle public grievances and
prevent the opposition from becoming stronger. Thus, some autocrats have strong incentives to
favor more public goods than do some other autocrats. When dictators have nominal-democratic
institutions including political parties and a legislature, they tend to adopt a more inclusive policy
on public goods when economic sanctions may threaten their political survival by way of triggering
a potential revolution or a mass movement.
When facing economic difficulties from sanctions, autocrats with institutions implement a more
extensive policy on public goods than those without institutions. Existing literature on power-
sharing argument provides some theoretical backgrounds to solve this puzzle. According to the
power-sharing argument, autocracies with pseudo-democratic institutions tend to be less sensitive
to regime breakdown than non-institutionalized autocracies. For instance, Boix and Svolik (2013,
301) argued that quasi-democratic dictatorships have relative transparency in power because of
“regular interaction between the dictator and his allies” within the party and legislature. Even if
the political process within institutionalized autocracies is still less transparent than in democra-
cies, it is relatively transparent comparing to autocracies without institutions. Autocratic regimes
with seemingly-democratic institutions are advantageous in terms of regime resilience due to their
transparency and commitment problem solutions. Hence, the institutional dictator, once estab-
lished, is less likely to experience the threat of a coup (Svolik 2009). In addition, power-sharing
institutionalization between autocrats and ruling elites can make a ruling coalition more stable,
even under unfavorable conditions (Boix and Svolik 2013, 301). Co-optation through nominal-
democratic institutions is closely associated with the long-term political careers within political
system because members of the winning coalition care about more than just the immediate mate-
rial benefits such as cash and subsidies (Svolik 2012).
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When economic sanctions last longer and devastate the economy, ruling elites calculate the
cost-benefits of defecting from the incumbent autocrats. Deciding to defect relies on the equation
of the probability of success and the guarantee of privileges/benefits that at least reach the level of
the old regime. Such uncertainty may lead ruling elites to prefer the status quo to defection. At
the same time, public spending on education and health play a signaling role of caring about the
broader segment of the population and improving the long-term prospects of them because those
public goods are closely associated with promoting human capital (Tenorio 2014). As sanctions
are imposed for a longer time, autocrats with institutional constraints seek to deter potential mass
movement connected with the opposition. They do so by showing their costly signals to the public-
i.e, providing at least moderate social welfare.
Hypothesis 4.2 Interaction effect of U.S. sanction duration: An increase of in the duration of
U.S. sanctions duration will be positively associated with a change in social spending (social
security/protection, education, and health) when an autocrat has pseudo-democratic institutions.
4.4 Data and Methodology
This examines whether U.S. economic sanctions affect social welfare spending based on a
country-year panel data with 95 authoritarian countries between 1970 and 2007. To measure so-
cial welfare expenditures, the study uses data of “expenses by function of government” in Gov-
ernment Finance Statistics (GFS) yearbook (1977-2011) published by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Public spending on social security/protection, education and health is calculated as
121
percentage of total government expenditure.3
4.4.1 Dependent Variable
The outcome variables in this essay are the amount of social welfare expenditures as the per-
centage of total government spending. The social security/protection expenditure represents public
spending on social security and welfare/services including labor interventions, pensions, and un-
employment assistance. The education expenditure is used, as it indicates a government’s expenses
on education that include spending for “pre-primary and primary education, secondary education”
and so on, for instance. The health expenditure includes spending on “services provided to individ-
ual persons and services provided on a collective basis” referring to “hospital services and public
health services” (IMF 2001, 97-101).4
This study covers 95 authoritarian countries from 1970 to 2007, thus including both the Cold
War and post-Cold War.5 I adopts Przeworski and Limongi (2000, 28-29)’s definition of dictator-
ship. They classified a country as a dictatorship, which does not satisfy all the following conditions:
(1) the government should be elected; (2) the legislature should be elected; (3) there should be more
than two parties; and (4) there should be alternation which provides a real chance of opposition’s
taking power in the future.
3There are two reasons to use each social spending as percentage of total government spending. On the one
hand, social expenditure as “a share of total government spending” reflects government policy priorities better than
“as a share of GDP” even if many studies employ the latter measure (Rudra and Haggard 2005, 1022-1023). GFS
yearbooks, on the other hand, do not consistently provide information of government expenditures on social spending
as a share of GDP across time-periods. GFS yearbooks are more useful than the World Development Indicators in the
sense of data availability for specific sectors of social spending - social protection, education and health.
4In addition, I try to include social welfare spending in aggregating all three expenditures on social security,
education and health. However, I do not analyze whether the U.S. sanctions influence this aggregated social spending
due to missing data across three expenditures in an irregular way.
5I exclude authoritarian countries that have no data in each social spending. A large portion of those excluded
countries have a very small size in population.
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4.4.2 Independent Variables
The main explanatory variable for the analysis is the duration of the U.S. sanctions. The U.S.
sanction duration is measured as the cumulative years of sanctions imposed by the U.S. This indi-
cates that as economic sanctions are imposed, their effect on political leaders and civilians in each
state is in the long term rather than the short term.
Secondly, in measuring the institutionalization of autocratic regimes, this study makes use of
an indicator taken from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010)’s the Democracy and Dictatorship
(DD) dataset. The institution variable is measured as a dichotomous indicator, which is coded as
1 if a dictatorship allows for nominal-democratic institutions such as legislatures and at least one
political party, and 0 otherwise (Kim and Gandhi 2010).
4.4.3 Control Variables
Previous literature provides alternative explanations for social welfare spending. To include
additional determinants to social spending is likely to reduce the risk of a spurious relationship
between the outcome and explanatory variables. So several alternative variables are included for
control: GDP per capita, trade openness, aid/GDP, oil income, government consumption, popula-
tion, and civil war.
First, I include some economic variables as controls. The income variable (GDP per capita),
indicating economic development, is measured as the natural log of GDP per capita.6 The GDP
per capita comes from the Penn World Tables (PWT). Trade openness is logged and measured
as a percentage of exports plus imports divided by GDP at 2005 constant prices. It also comes
6This variable is logged to make positively skewed distribution of data more normalized.
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from the PWT. Trade openness is logged and measured as a percentage of exports plus imports
divided by GDP at 2005 constant prices. It also comes from the PWT. It is widely used as a driving
force to increase government revenues that “collected at the border are among the least difficult to
obtain. Because they have to pass through a few checkpoints to leave or enter a territory legally,
imports and exports form a base upon which governments may impose a tax with relative ease. For
this reason, foreign trade taxes have tended to represent the main source of government income”
(Cheibub 1998; Escribà-Folch and Wright 2010).
To measure free resources for dictators, both foreign aid and oil-revenues are used. Aid indica-
tor refers to foreign aid as a percentage of GDP (Aid/GDP). The foreign assistance data come from
World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI). Another free resource is generated from oil-
production. This variable (Oil income) is measured as the total oil income per capita provided by
(Haber and Menaldo 2011).7 Government spending is measured with the percent share of GDP and
the data come from PWT. The increase in government expenditure might flow into social spending.
Population, which also comes from PWT, is logged.
Lastly, civil war, a dichotomous variable, is coded as 1 if a country has experienced an intra-
state conflict with at least 1,000 battle deaths in a given country-year and coded as 0 otherwise. The
data come from Version 4 - 2012 of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch 2002).8
7Haber and Menaldo (2011, 14) describe in their supplementary appendix that total oil income per capita is
calculated as “crude oil production times the price of crude oil in 2007 dollars, divided by population.”
8See, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_prio_armed_conflict_dataset/
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4.5 Estimation & Results
4.5.1 Methodology
Since the data are characterized as the pooled time-series, I takes into account the method-
ological issues of both time-series and cross-sectional features. In other words, the study needs to
control for the possibility of autocorrelation and heteroskedsticity. First, to control for autocorre-
lation, it is recommended to include a lagged dependent variable (LDV) an independent variable
(Beck and Katz 2011). Some political scientists raise questions about the effectiveness of using
LDVs in the model because the inclusion of LDVs might increase the risk of making inaccurate
inference leading other independent variables to lose their explanatory power (Achen 2000). How-
ever, Keele and Kelly (2006, 17-18) suggested some criteria for applied researchers to use LDVs:
(1) under the dynamic situation, without LDVs, linear regression can lead to a biased estimation,
(2) an Autoregressive-Moving-Average (ARMA) model is recommendable even under the ‘weakly
dynamic’ the data generating process, and (3) under the dynamic process, regression with LDVs
produces a better model than the alternatives. For deciding whether to use LDVs and/or to take into
account the dynamic situation in this research question, the study employs an appropriate method
to estimate the impact of U.S. sanctions on the ‘change’ of social welfare spending in autocratic
countries. It is expected that U.S. economic sanctions have dynamic effects on social spending.
For this, I use error-correction model (ECM) to account for dynamic processes, which is modeled
in the following way (De Boef and Keele 2008).
∆ Yt = α0 + α1Yt−1 + β1∆ Xt + β2Xt−1 + εi
This model becomes popular among political scientists who primarily focus on the dynamic
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change of their dependent variables that are affected by independent variables. ECM is recom-
mendable for both non-stationary and stationary data to primarily analyze the dynamic change of
the outcome variables (De Boef and Keele 2008; Keele and Webb 2016).
Another issue to be considered in data analysis here is missing values in the data. There is
some degree of missing values in this data.9 In particular, missing values in social spending data
of authoritarian countries may cause serious problems in the analysis (Honaker and King 2010).
The study estimated the regressions using the imputed dataset. To increase the validity of the
statistical inference from the multiple imputation, the study generated five imputed dataset (as
the default of Amelia II). The imputation procedure was set up to deal with time-series cross-
sectional datasets (Honaker and Blackwell 2011). The imputation includes all variables used in
the main analysis along with some relevant economic indicators. It is recommended that analysts
should add more information to make imputation more plausible (Honaker and Blackwell 2011).
After doing the imputation, post-imputation diagnostics were carried out using plots to compare
observed with imputed values (See Appendix). Then, I estimated five regression analyses using five
imputed datasets to obtain the mean value of the coefficients and standard errors with significance
levels. The Stata automatically calculated them based on Rubin’s rule (Honaker and Blackwell
2011). Table 4.1 shows the results of the error-correction model using the imputed datasets. Many
explanatory variables for the immediate effects are not significant except for a few variables with
statistical significance. But, with regard to the long-term effects, the interaction effects of U.S.
sanction duration and autocratic institutions are statistically significant, consistent with the main
findings except for the health spending model. Alternatively, the study ran each separate regression
9I generate missing map to detect how many data are missing. Among variables, social spending variables are
missing for more than 40 percent. I make plots to show how similar imputed data are to observed data (see Appendix).
Overall, imputed data closely fit the distribution of observed values.
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using all the imputed data. The finding of each model is more consistent with the study’s main
results and supports the hypothesis.
A third methodological concern is the causality of the empirical findings. Unlike experimental
methods, quantitative analysis using observational data is assumed to be weak in the sense of
controlling extraneous variables (Lijphart 1971). The important concern in the analysis is whether
sanctioned states will tend to reduce spending on social welfare policies compared with ‘similar’
countries without U.S. sanctions. To improve the effect of cause, empirical studies need to consider
the counterfactual or ‘potential outcomes’ of the model (Morgan and Harding 2006). In other
words, empirical studies should take into account both observed and unobserved outcomes.10 For
a quasi-experimental setting, I use propensity score matching to compare authoritarian countries
that were targets of U.S. economic sanctions to very similar autocracies that experience no U.S.
sanction impositions.11 To make appropriate cases, I matched autocratic countries on GDP per
capita, governmental expenditure, trade openness, oil income, population, foreign aid over GDP,
and civil war. This allows for a comparison of closely matched pairs without additional controls
for variables represented as alternative explanations of the level of social spending in autocratic
regimes. In the analysis, the study treated an autocratic country with U.S. sanction imposition as a
treated group and the most similar country except the sanction treatment is included in the control
group to estimate the causal effect of U.S. economic sanctions. For conducting matching, the study
10For instance, let us estimate the effect of democracy on economic development using the case of Chile in 1985
(Kohli et al. 1995). We actually observed 1985 Chile as an authoritarian regime and know the GDP per capita income
of 1985. To estimate the impact of democracy on development, we also need to observe 1985 Chile as a democracy
at the same time. Unfortunately, we can seldom find democratic Chile in 1985 in observed data. Thus, we need to
rely on a quasi-experimental method “to look for a case that is exactly like Chile in all aspects other than its regime”
(Kohli et al. 1995, 16-17).
11There is a variety of matching techniques. Among them, I employ ‘genetic matching’ because it is nonparametric
and so does not predefine the distribution. In addition, genetic matching “automatically finds the set of matches that
minimizes the discrepancy between the distribution of potential confounders (extraneous variables) in the treated and
control groups” (Sekhon 2009, 499).
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employs Matchit program using R (Ho et al. 2011).
Lastly, I used a matching algorithm to construct a sample for both treatment groups (i.e.,
sanction-targeted countries) and control groups (i.e., non-sanctioned countries) that are similar
in several characteristics (see Appendix for balance statistics). For the matching procedure, the
study applied a genetic algorithm (as mentioned above). First, I estimate the analysis combining
all five matched datasets and then produce the point estimates using Rubin’s rule. At the sample, I
attempt to calculate the average values of all five imputed data and then collect the matched data.
After this, I find which country is included in the matched dataset. Based on the selected sample,
I get the matched data using only selected countries from the previous procedure.
4.5.2 Results
In this section, I present the main findings of estimating the impacts of U.S. sanction duration
on social security/protection, education, and health spending, by looking into both the short-term
and the long-run effects. Using the ECM method, I can identify changes in the outcome variable
by looking into both the immediate effect of and a long-run effect of regressors on the dependent
variables.
∆ Social Spendingt = a0 + a1Social Spendingt−1 + b1US Sanction Durationi,t−1
+ b2∆US Sanction Duration + b3Institutionsi,t−1 + b4US Sanction Duration x Institutionsi,t−1
+ b5∆US sanction duration x Institutionsi,t−1 + b6Controlsi,t−1 + b7∆Controls
The analysis begins in Table 4.1 with six models of social security, education, and health spend-
ing, using five imputed datasets. The estimation results are based on the Driscoll and Kraay robust
standard errors estimation that controls for heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and cross-sectional
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dependence (Driscoll and Kraay 1998; Hoechle 2007). The first model specification in each out-
come variable (Models 1, 3 and 5) in Table 4.1 simply conducts a baseline estimation (the main
effects of U.S. sanction duration) with no interaction variables. In regard to the short-term effects,
the study finds that the analysis does not support for my hypothesis that the impacts of U.S. sanc-
tion duration on change in social welfare spending (social security, education, and health). For
instance, the result in Model 1 shows that the changes in U.S. sanction duration have a positive but
insignificant impact on changes in social security spending. Regarding education and health spend-
ing, the changes in U.S. sanction duration also have negative, though not statistically significant,
impacts.
In the interaction models (Models 2, 4 and 6), the effects of U.S. sanction duration on social
spending depend on autocracies’ political institutions. For example, the outcome in Model 2 shows
that the changes in U.S. sanction duration are negatively associated with the changes in social
security expenditure when autocracies have institutional constraints. But, the coefficient for the
variable is not statistically significant. Regarding spending on education and health, interaction
effects of changes in U.S. sanction duration and institutions are also not significant even though
the causal direction is positive.
With regard to the long-term effects, the level of U.S. sanction duration have a positive and
significant influence on the change in social security expenditure (Model 1). The result indicates
that autocratic leaders tend to increase government spending on social security/protection in order
to compensate for the loss of income for their coalition members in part due to economic sanctions.
This result is consistent with some literature on social security policy that tends to be restricted to
the small segment of population in the developing world. When autocrats experience U.S. sanc-
tions, they co-opt regime supporting groups including the military, civil servants, and privileged
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Table 4.1: Panel Regression of US Sanction Duration and Social Spending in Autocracies, 1970-
2007 (Imputed Data)
∆Social security/protection ∆Education ∆Health
Additive Interaction Additive Interaction Additive Interaction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Short-run effects
∆US sanction duration 0.112 0.319∗ 0.0432 -0.0185 0.0108 -0.0296
(0.0726) (0.167) (0.0634) (0.195) (0.0305) (0.0656)
∆US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.260 0.0822 0.0514
(0.180) (0.202) (0.0649)
∆GDP per capita (log) -2.601∗∗ -2.561∗∗ -0.266 -0.294 -0.539 -0.547
(1.177) (1.165) (1.171) (1.161) (0.399) (0.396)
∆Government consumption (%) -0.0170 -0.0137 0.0137 0.0115 0.0521 0.0513
(0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0474) (0.0479) (0.0366) (0.0367)
∆Population (log) 0.985 0.911 0.378 0.436 0.0815 0.0990
(0.847) (0.862) (0.539) (0.550) (0.240) (0.240)
∆Oil income (log) 0.515 0.503 0.140 0.147 0.0838 0.0870
(0.389) (0.395) (0.263) (0.262) (0.122) (0.123)
∆Aid/GDP(%) 0.0328 0.0340 -0.0825∗∗∗ -0.0833∗∗∗ -0.00574 -0.00603
(0.0373) (0.0371) (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0104) (0.0105)
∆Trade openness(%) 0.00489 0.00492 0.00491 0.00490 0.00309 0.00309
(0.00570) (0.00572) (0.00424) (0.00421) (0.00237) (0.00236)
Long-run effects
US sanction durationt−1 0.0789∗∗ 0.188∗∗ -0.0396 -0.124∗∗∗ -0.0172 -0.0443∗∗
(0.0347) (0.0700) (0.0242) (0.0473) (0.0175) (0.0223)
Institutionst−1 0.833∗∗ 1.105∗∗∗ -0.816∗∗ -1.013∗∗∗ -0.127 -0.193
(0.361) (0.380) (0.306) (0.303) (0.164) (0.170)
US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.146∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.0364
(0.0780) (0.0534) (0.0288)
GDP per capita (log)t−1 -1.136∗∗ -1.104∗∗ -0.522 -0.551 -0.202 -0.212
(0.519) (0.521) (0.446) (0.446) (0.163) (0.163)
Government consumption (%)t−1 -0.0708∗∗ -0.0685∗ 0.0161 0.0139 0.0241 0.0235
(0.0356) (0.0360) (0.0503) (0.0508) (0.0164) (0.0164)
Population (log)t−1 1.724∗∗∗ 1.601∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.134 0.165
(0.521) (0.511) (0.296) (0.298) (0.156) (0.155)
Oil income (log)t−1 -0.186 -0.187 -0.210 -0.213 -0.0422 -0.0423
(0.187) (0.188) (0.174) (0.174) (0.0815) (0.0814)
Aid/GDP (%)t−1 0.0173 0.0192 -0.0651∗∗∗ -0.0667∗∗∗ -0.0105 -0.0110
(0.0209) (0.0207) (0.0160) (0.0162) (0.00746) (0.00755)
Trade openness (%)t−1 0.0118∗ 0.0118∗ 0.00674∗ 0.00679∗ 0.00282∗∗ 0.00284∗∗
(0.00600) (0.00603) (0.00352) (0.00355) (0.00137) (0.00137)
Civil wart−1 -0.440 -0.323 0.768∗ 0.680 0.413∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗
(0.480) (0.495) (0.422) (0.422) (0.160) (0.163)
Lagged dependent variables -0.688∗∗∗ -0.692∗∗∗ -0.730∗∗∗ -0.731∗∗∗ -0.728∗∗∗ -0.729∗∗∗
(0.0281) (0.0279) (0.0308) (0.0306) (0.0381) (0.0380)
Constant -0.824 -0.191 7.984∗ 7.547∗ 4.184∗∗ 4.040∗∗
(5.035) (4.992) (4.056) (4.064) (1.694) (1.689)
No. of obs. 2502 2502 2502 2502 2502 2502
No. of country 95 95 95 95 95 95
No. of imputation 5 5 5 5 5 5
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test, using Stata 12.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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organized constituencies in the developing states (Huber and Stephens 2012; Wibbels 2006).12
Regarding education and health spending, the level of U.S. sanction duration have negative but
insignificant impacts.
The result in Model 2 shows that the interaction term with the level of U.S. sanction dura-
tion and institutions is statistically significant with negative signs for the change in social security
spending. These results may be surprising regarding the interactive effects of U.S. sanction du-
ration and autocratic institutions. Autocracies with pseudo-democratic institutions may want to
implement more inclusive and extensive social welfare policies than non-institutional autocracies
when U.S. sanction duration increases. But, empirical findings suggest that dictators with institu-
tional constraints tend to reduce expenditure on social security when they experience U.S. sanction
longer. In other words, as U.S. sanctions are imposed and persist, autocrats with quasi-democratic
institutions may reallocate government resources to the sectors of public goods to deter public dis-
content and potential revolutionary threats created by economic hardships. So, they may decrease
spending on social security because most beneficiaries are a part of winning coalition and may
prefer regime survival to regime breakdown and/or change by sacrificing some portion of their ma-
terial benefits. Regarding the estimation results of education and health spending, the interaction
term with U.S. sanction duration and institutions is positive with expected signs in Models 4 and
6. However, the only statistical significant interaction term is in the education spending equation.
12Most public policies retain the characteristics of both private and public goods (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith
2010). But, some policies may favor a specific segment of the population as considered as a part of private goods.
Here I regard social security spending in autocracies as private rather than public goods for a few reasons. Government
expenditure on social security tends to be restrictive in the developing world. A number of scholars argue that social
security spending or transfer is mainly associated with pensions. In particular, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001)
posit that each subtype of social welfare spending has its own “political logics.” According to Kaufman and Segura-
Ubiergo (2001, 576), the general social security includes “antipoverty programs and targeted assistance to the poor”
but pensions mainly target “the middle class” and “workers in the formal sector” in Latin American countries. ?)
argue that pension systems in many Asian countries tend to be “skewed toward urban areas and the formal sector” and
“initially covered only government workers.”
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Regarding the effects of control variables, some findings should be noted particularly. First,
logged GDP per capita income has both a short-term and long-term effect in the model of social
security spending. It has no immediate or long-term effects on changes in education and health
spending. This result is relatively consistent with previous studies’ findings of the inconsistent
impacts of GDP per capita on social spending (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo 2001).
Second, non-tax revenues such as oil income and foreign aid have mixed results, even if they
have the expected direction mentioned in some of the literature. On one hand, the level of oil
income has a negative sign but insignificant effect on the change in all three kinds of social spend-
ing. Foreign aid, on the other hand, has a negative and significant effect on government expenditure
only on education all model specifications (Models 3 and 4). The result confirms the current ar-
gument about the effect of foreign aid; as a recipient government is more dependent on foreign
assistance, it pays less attention to long-term economic development through the improvement of
human capital such as education.
Third, the level of trade openness is statistically significant in explaining the changes in social
spending. In models of all three social spendings, the effect of trade openness has a positive
significance only in the long run.
Lastly, I used a matching algorithm to construct a sample for both treatment groups (i.e.,
sanction-targeted countries) and control groups (i.e., non-sanctioned countries) that are similar
in several characteristics (see Appendix for balance statistics). For the matching procedure, the
study applied a genetic algorithm (as mentioned above). I produce five matched data from multi-
ple imputations and then estimate the regression using each matched data (Table 4.2). Overall, the
findings support for my argument.13
13I estimate the analysis combining all five matched datasets and then produce the point estimates using Rubin’s
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Table 4.2: Regression using Matched Samples (Imputed Datasets)
∆ Social security ∆ Education ∆ Health
Additive Interaction Additive Interaction Additive Interaction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Imputed Dataset 1
∆US sanction duration 0.0693 0.356∗∗∗ 0.0560 -0.0455 0.0190 -0.0105
(0.0466) (0.0995) (0.0607) (0.0663) (0.0134) (0.0415)
US sanction durationt−1 0.206∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ -0.0834 -0.288∗∗∗ 0.0115 -0.0433
(0.0658) (0.114) (0.0525) (0.0876) (0.0157) (0.0333)
Institutionst−1 1.714∗∗ 2.870∗∗∗ -0.828∗ -2.534∗∗∗ -0.249 -0.699∗∗
(0.824) (1.048) (0.447) (0.490) (0.245) (0.329)
∆US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.347∗∗∗ 0.127 0.0372
(0.124) (0.112) (0.0498)
US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.187∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.0808∗∗
(0.0980) (0.0829) (0.0363)
No. obs. 493 493 493 493 493 493
No. of country 51 51 51 51 51 51
Imputed Dataset 2
∆US sanction duration 0.134∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.00993 -0.212∗∗∗ 0.0269 -0.00618
(0.0701) (0.104) (0.0603) (0.0639) (0.0161) (0.0296)
US sanction durationt−1 0.138∗∗ 0.235∗∗ -0.0555 -0.258∗∗ 0.00522 -0.0387∗∗
(0.0636) (0.104) (0.0617) (0.109) (0.0184) (0.0178)
Institutionst−1 0.816 1.579 -0.427 -2.019∗∗∗ -0.239 -0.584∗
(1.192) (1.029) (0.626) (0.482) (0.248) (0.299)
∆US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.284∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗ 0.0414
(0.0995) (0.106) (0.0365)
US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.127 0.288∗∗∗ 0.0639∗∗
(0.112) (0.0977) (0.0247)
No. obs. 495 495 495 495 495 495
No. of country 51 51 51 51 51 51
Imputed Dataset 3
∆US sanction duration 0.140∗ 0.465∗∗ 0.0182 -0.129 0.0122 -0.0162
(0.0739) (0.181) (0.0486) (0.0844) (0.0107) (0.0331)
US sanction durationt−1 0.201∗∗ 0.294∗∗ -0.0469 -0.234∗∗ 0.00722 -0.0209
(0.0852) (0.125) (0.0393) (0.0981) (0.0187) (0.0341)
Institutionst−1 1.459 2.275∗ -0.635∗ -2.251∗∗∗ 0.132 -0.111
(0.935) (1.337) (0.351) (0.616) (0.229) (0.368)
∆US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.390∗∗ 0.181∗ 0.0351
(0.189) (0.105) (0.0338)
US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.116 0.273∗∗∗ 0.0411
(0.119) (0.0886) (0.0381)
No. obs. 483 483 483 483 483 483
No. of country 50 50 50 50 50 50
Imputed Dataset 4
∆US sanction duration 0.197∗ 0.218 0.00374 -0.102 0.0267∗ 0.00624
(0.105) (0.148) (0.0505) (0.0712) (0.0133) (0.0408)
US sanction durationt−1 0.180∗∗∗ 0.224∗ -0.0462 -0.163∗ 0.0305 -0.00662
(0.0584) (0.116) (0.0655) (0.0827) (0.0207) (0.0233)
Institutionst−1 1.390 1.777 1.120∗∗ 0.0964 -0.00128 -0.321
(0.969) (1.186) (0.540) (0.657) (0.255) (0.296)
∆US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.0270 0.133 0.0265
(0.161) (0.0985) (0.0438)
US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.0725 0.186∗∗∗ 0.0604∗∗
(0.134) (0.0624) (0.0281)
No. of obs. 490 490 490 490 490 490
No. of country 51 51 51 51 51 51
Imputed Dataset 5
∆US sanction duration 0.0979 0.388∗∗ 0.0357 -0.0656 0.0265∗∗∗ 0.0227
(0.0713) (0.171) (0.0455) (0.0913) (0.00947) (0.0341)
US sanction durationt−1 0.0949∗ 0.226∗ 0.0545 -0.172 0.0433∗∗ -0.00980
(0.0523) (0.130) (0.0739) (0.127) (0.0184) (0.0401)
Institutionst−1 1.488∗ 2.552∗∗ 0.480 -1.333∗∗ 0.329 -0.0904
(0.813) (1.088) (0.342) (0.508) (0.325) (0.395)
∆US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.349∗ 0.123 0.00562
(0.194) (0.111) (0.0387)
US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.168 0.319∗∗∗ 0.0764∗∗
(0.144) (0.103) (0.0357)
No. of obs. 493 493 493 493 493 493
No. of country 51 51 51 51 51 51
Note: Driscoll and Kraay standard errors in parentheses.. Two-tailed test, using Stata 12.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the essential features of social spending in autocratic regimes in regard
to U.S. economic sanctions. It is argued that free resource reduction and economic difficulties
from foreign economic sanctions make a distinctive difference in the pattern of social spending in
dictatorships. States under U.S. economic sanctions invest less in public goods and services. Gov-
ernment expenditures on social protection, public education and health care is clearly lower (using
aggregated data, 1970-2007) when an autocratic country experiences U.S. economic sanctions for
longer.
The evidence showed that in authoritarian countries U.S. economic sanctions decreased the
level of social spending in spite of controls for alternative explanations-the level of political de-
velopment, economic conditions, and so forth. The study also improved the casual inference of
sanction effects on social expenditure using matching estimation, which takes into account the
counterfactual framework. The results from matching method confirmed the negative externality
of economic sanctions with regard to authoritarian governments’ commitments to public goods. In
addition, this paper also verified the negative effects of sanctions on “changes” in social expendi-
ture in the dynamic processes. But the counterproductive consequences of U.S. sanction duration
vary according to a target autocracy’s institutional constraints. More specifically, autocracies re-
lying on pseudo-democratic institutions do not sharply cut government spending on public goods
such as expenditure on education and health but reduce social security spending a little more than
did non-institutional autocracies.
rule. At the sample, I attempt to calculate the average values of all five imputed data and then collect the matched data.
After this, I find which country is included in the matched dataset. Based on the selected sample, I get the matched
data using only selected countries from the previous procedure.
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A few of the findings should receive special emphasis. First, the findings are consistent with
the hypothesis that more inclusive autocracies having institutions have systematically different pol-
icy preferences over social welfare spending compared to non-institutionalized autocracies. This
means that autocrats with institutions are concerned not only about their ruling coalitions in fa-
vor of regime survival but also care about the potential threats from opposition and revolutionary
groups in hard times such as those involving sanctions-induced economic hardship. In order for
them to remain in power, autocrats have a strong incentive to prevent the general public from sup-
porting a revolution or a revolutionary-led regime collapse. Second, autocrats tend to provide their
ruling coalition groups placated with a sufficient store of private goods. But to survive economi-
cally tough times, autocracies that rely on nominal democratic institutions do cut some government
spending such as social security. In this context, the social security system in autocracies may in
general have more characteristics of private goods rather than of public goods. In addition, the
results suggest that not always do U.S. sanctions produce adverse effects on the general populace
in autocracies. At the same, autocracies having pseudo-democratic institutions tend to survive for-
eign sanctions by providing the general population with more inclusive public goods and services
than do autocrats without such institutions.
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4.7 Appendix III
4.7.1 Summary Statistics (Table 4.3)
4.7.2 Panel ECM of US Sanction Duration and Social Spending in Autocra-
cies, 1970-2007: Original Dataset (Table 4.4)
4.7.3 Panel ECM using Unmatched and Matched Samples: Original Dataset
(4.5)
4.7.4 Balance Statistics of Genetic Matching (Table 4.6)
4.7.5 Post-imputation Diagnostics (Figure 4.1)
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics (Original dataset)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Social security spending 8.772 10.022 0 54.23 1312
Education spending 13.619 6.089 0.17 30.45 1401
Health spending 5.402 2.832 0.03 20.93 1399
US sanction duration 2.331 6.890 0 58 3070
Institutions 0.662 0.473 0 1 3070
Polity -4.795 4.794 -10 10 3005
Civil war 0.117 0.321 0 1 2996
Government consumption 12.098 8.936 0.732 58.641 2862
Trade openness 67.368 48.248 1.161 428.955 2862
Aid/GDP 7.596 10.682 -0.453 108.325 2470
Population (log) 8.907 1.557 4.824 14.086 2975
Oil income (log) 2.351 3.143 0 11.272 2979
GDP per capita (log) 7.679 1.148 5.081 11.514 2862
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Table 4.4: Panel ECM of US Sanction Duration and Social Spending in Autocracies, 1970-2007
(Original Data)
∆Social security/protection ∆Education ∆Health
Additive Interaction Additive Interaction Additive Interaction
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Short-run effects
∆US sanction duration 0.138∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ -0.0474∗ -0.0423 -0.0249 -0.0266
(0.0575) (0.0562) (0.0282) (0.0513) (0.0167) (0.0221)
∆US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.250∗∗∗ 0.0169 0.0177
(0.0903) (0.0619) (0.0192)
∆GDP per capita (log) -4.037∗∗ -4.025∗∗ -1.388 -1.390 -0.399 -0.402
(1.741) (1.700) (1.020) (1.009) (0.602) (0.606)
∆Government consumption (%) -0.0871 -0.0884 -0.0523 -0.0512 0.00862 0.00915
(0.0619) (0.0619) (0.0429) (0.0423) (0.0286) (0.0284)
∆Population (log) 5.731∗∗∗ 5.837∗∗∗ 11.90∗∗∗ 11.86∗∗∗ 6.028∗∗∗ 6.006∗∗∗
(1.685) (1.588) (0.616) (0.620) (1.042) (1.062)
∆Oil income (log) 0.206 0.184 -0.225 -0.216 0.104 0.110
(0.232) (0.228) (0.301) (0.302) (0.0784) (0.0770)
∆Aid/GDP(%) 0.0591∗∗ 0.0569∗ -0.0795∗∗∗ -0.0797∗∗∗ -0.0384∗∗∗ -0.0384∗∗∗
(0.0293) (0.0291) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0116) (0.0115)
∆Trade openness(%) 0.00335 0.00397 -0.00400 -0.00413 -0.00189 -0.00197
(0.00581) (0.00568) (0.00685) (0.00680) (0.00366) (0.00365)
Long-run effects
US sanction durationt−1 0.107∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ -0.105∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.0231 -0.0404∗
(0.0430) (0.0696) (0.0290) (0.0482) (0.0161) (0.0221)
Institutionst−1 0.769∗∗ 1.207∗∗ -0.346∗∗ -0.453∗∗∗ -0.151 -0.214
(0.352) (0.485) (0.140) (0.152) (0.136) (0.157)
US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.269∗∗∗ 0.0700 0.0415∗
(0.0919) (0.0578) (0.0217)
GDP per capita (log)t−1 -0.477 -0.386 0.642∗ 0.602∗ -0.157 -0.183
(0.593) (0.545) (0.334) (0.341) (0.168) (0.182)
Government consumption (%)t−1 -0.0110 -0.000617 -0.0392∗ -0.0409∗ -0.0224 -0.0235
(0.0297) (0.0313) (0.0236) (0.0230) (0.0195) (0.0197)
Population (log)t−1 1.213∗ 1.161∗∗ 1.259∗∗∗ 1.302∗∗∗ 1.038∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗
(0.631) (0.581) (0.348) (0.345) (0.206) (0.204)
Oil income (log)t−1 -0.553∗∗∗ -0.535∗∗∗ -0.448∗∗∗ -0.453∗∗∗ -0.112∗ -0.114∗
(0.190) (0.194) (0.155) (0.155) (0.0574) (0.0575)
Aid/GDP (%)t−1 -0.0145 -0.0156 -0.0675∗∗∗ -0.0680∗∗∗ -0.0167∗ -0.0169∗
(0.0324) (0.0316) (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.00929) (0.00947)
Trade openness (%)t−1 0.00912∗∗ 0.00989∗∗ -0.00455 -0.00464 -0.00265∗ -0.00269∗
(0.00420) (0.00436) (0.00348) (0.00348) (0.00139) (0.00138)
Civil wart−1 -1.002∗ -0.783∗ 0.197 0.128 0.300 0.258
(0.549) (0.459) (0.294) (0.286) (0.252) (0.240)
Lagged dependent variables -0.321∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.330∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ -0.332∗∗∗ -0.333∗∗∗
(0.0441) (0.0497) (0.0369) (0.0367) (0.0338) (0.0337)
Constant -4.133 -4.702 -9.685∗∗∗ -9.638∗∗∗ -5.615∗∗∗ -5.557∗∗∗
(3.867) (3.844) (2.475) (2.396) (1.984) (1.976)
No. of obs. 951 951 1039 1039 1036 1036
No. of country 80 80 80 80 80 80
R2 0.1860 0.1985 0.2295 0.2309 0.1998 0.2016
Note: Driscoll and Kraay standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test, using Stata 12.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.5: Panel ECM using Unmatched and Matched Sample (Original Dataset)
Matched Sample Unmatched Sample
∆ Social security ∆ Education ∆ Health ∆ Social security ∆Education ∆ Health
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
∆US sanction duration 0.459∗∗∗ -0.107 0.00329 0.240∗∗∗ -0.0423 -0.0266
(0.139) (0.105) (0.0250) (0.0562) (0.0513) (0.0221)
∆US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.564∗∗∗ 0.0147 -0.0754∗∗ -0.250∗∗∗ 0.0169 0.0177
(0.152) (0.108) (0.0364) (0.0903) (0.0619) (0.0192)
US sanction durationt−1 0.0727 -0.452∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗∗ -0.0404∗
(0.213) (0.116) (0.0324) (0.0696) (0.0482) (0.0221)
Institutionst−1 1.704∗ -2.265∗∗∗ -0.351 1.207∗∗ -0.453∗∗∗ -0.214
(0.935) (0.770) (0.290) (0.485) (0.152) (0.157)
US sanction duration x Institutionst−1 -0.360∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.0906∗∗∗ -0.269∗∗∗ 0.0700 0.0415∗
(0.119) (0.107) (0.0319) (0.0919) (0.0578) (0.0217)
No. of obs. 166 166 166 951 1039 1036
No. of country 25 25 25 80 80 80
Note: Driscoll and Kraay standard errors in parentheses.. Two-tailed test, using Stata 12.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.6: Balance Statistics, 5 imputed data sets
Before matching After matching Improvement (%)
Variables Mean treated Mean control Mean treated Mean control Mean diff. (%) eQQ mean (%)
Imputation 1 GDP per capita (log) 7.5954 7.3737 7.5954 7.5904 97.7535 62.513
Before matching Population (log) 10.0068 9.0673 10.0068 9.9673 95.7928 51.4803
n: 1962 Government consumption (%) 11.5078 12.6331 11.5078 11.2814 79.8842 47.9449
After matching Trade openness (%) 48.0563 59.4896 48.0563 47.7397 97.2306 65.4469
n: 633 Aid/GDP (%) 6.5494 9.2440 6.5494 5.9226 76.7396 29.5393
Civil war 0.2349 0.1267 0.2349 0.2349 100.0000 69.9597
Oil income (log) 2.3169 1.5924 2.3169 2.3545 94.8138 57.8344
Propensity score 0.3079 0.2042 0.3079 0.3037 96.0186 62.9601
Imputation 2 GDP per capita (log) 7.5882 7.3734 7.5882 7.5557 84.8704 61.3718
Before matching Population (log) 10.0092 9.0696 10.0092 9.9837 97.2891 61.2981
n: 1962 Government consumption (%) 11.6424 12.5714 11.6424 11.4822 82.7497 52.9598
After matching Trade openness (%) 48.0701 59.4715 48.0701 47.9472 98.9217 55.5284
n: 645 Aid/GDP (%) 6.8039 9.3359 6.8039 6.5281 89.1091 44.7310
Civil war 0.2349 0.1254 0.2349 0.2349 100.0000 90.7854
Oil income (log) 2.3044 1.5872 2.3044 2.2875 97.6479 64.6359
Propensity score 0.3078 0.2042 0.3078 0.3029 95.2422 63.2169
Imputation 3 GDP per capita (log) 7.5905 7.3732 7.5905 7.5927 98.9921 37.3799
Before matching Population (log) 9.9864 9.0666 9.9864 9.9398 94.9268 54.1351
n: 1962 Government consumption (%) 11.6195 12.6331 11.6195 11.3881 77.1513 54.0200
After matching Trade openness (%) 48.3329 59.4003 48.3329 47.3903 91.4829 70.5902
n: 646 Aid/GDP (%) 6.8499 9.4103 6.8499 6.7615 96.5491 34.3810
Civil war 0.2327 0.1267 0.2349 0.2260 93.6643 90.4416
Oil income (log) 2.2995 1.5965 2.2995 2.3138 97.9710 50.3288
Propensity score 0.3042 0.2053 0.3042 0.2992 95.0250 52.5996
Imputation 4 GDP per capita (log) 7.5964 7.3748 7.5964 7.5697 87.9591 46.9223
Before matching Population (log) 9.9824 9.0714 9.9824 11.5652 94.9882 48.4589
n: 1962 Government consumption (%) 11.7638 12.6781 11.7638 11.5652 78.2837 38.6941
After matching Trade openness (%) 48.0429 59.5422 48.0429 46.9323 90.3426 69.8488
n: 629 Aid/GDP (%) 6.5244 9.3075 6.5244 6.1736 87.3957 24.3808
Civil war 0.2394 0.1267 0.2394 0.2371 98.0139 85.2637
Oil income (log) 2.2990 1.5868 2.2990 2.3233 96.5801 46.8798
Propensity score 0.3051 0.2050 0.3051 0.3005 95.4427 54.3292
Imputation 5 GDP per capita (log) 7.5899 7.3720 7.5899 7.5703 90.9810 61.8629
Before matching Population (log) 10.0038 9.0739 10.0038 9.9634 95.6566 53.4051
n: 1962 Government consumption (%) 11.6280 12.6331 11.6280 11.3830 74.1028 48.7665
After matching Trade openness (%) 47.8972 59.5614 47.8972 46.7920 90.5253 70.4859
n: 633 Aid/GDP (%) 7.0383 9.3328 7.0383 6.8508 91.8309 21.8756
Civil war 0.2371 0.1228 0.2371 0.2371 100.0000 81.1512
Oil income (log) 2.2986 1.5821 2.2986 2.2823 97.7309 40.1189
Propensity score 0.3091 0.2038 0.3091 0.3054 96.4679 64.3556
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Figure 4.1: Plots of Observed and Imputed Values
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Figure 4.2: Plots of Observed and Imputed Values
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
How does U.S. economic statecraft influence the politics of target countries? Studies on U.S.
foreign aid and sanctions have become one of the most popular topics in international relations and
comparative politics. In particular, many scholars pay attention to the adverse impacts of foreign
aid on the domestic political economy of a recipient county. At the same time, sanction literature
focuses on sanction effectiveness and its counterproductive consequences in a target state. Despite
a large volume of research on economic statecraft, more investigation is still needed to uncover
the relationship, on a variety of issues, between U.S. economic statecraft and political phenomena
or policy changes of a target state. This dissertation has evaluated the effects of U.S. economic
statecraft on nuclear development policy changes, social policy changes, and political violence
against Americans.
In this concluding chapter, I summarize the argument and findings of each chapter including
the methods used. Then, I conclude with an overall contribution of this dissertation to the existing
scholarship
5.1 U.S. Economic Statecraft and Nuclear Reversal
In Chapter 2, I focused on investigating the role of U.S. economic statecraft (i.e., economic
sanctions and foreign aid) in nuclear reversal of nuclear proliferating states, which had already
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explored and/or pursued nuclear weapons development. Based on theoretical discussions of nu-
clear nonproliferation, the study produced three main hypotheses: (1) nuclear proliferating states
targeted by U.S. negative sanctions have a lower likelihood of reversing their nuclear pursuit; (2)
nuclear aspiring states targeted by U.S. multilateral sanctions through international organizations
have a higher likelihood of reversing their nuclear pursuit; and (3) nuclear proliferants receiving
U.S. foreign aid have a higher likelihood of reversing their nuclear pursuit.
To test the argument, the study disaggregated nuclear reversal outcomes into three categories:
non-nuclear, nuclear latency and nuclear pursuit. These nuclear reversal stages were based on a the-
oretical framework in international relations-the willingness and opportunity. This study assumes
that a state in the non-nuclear status has no willingness to pursue nuclear weapons development and
no technical capability to build nuclear bombs. In contrast, I assume that a state has a nuclear latent
capacity to construct nuclear weapons when the circumstances suggest even if it has withdrawn the
intention to make nuclear weapons or to pursue nuclear weapons development but maintain some
degree of nuclearness. In the dissertation’s first essay, it was found that U.S. economic statecraft at
least induces a nuclear-aspiring state to suspend its existing nuclear weapons program and to only
maintain nuclear latent capabilities. The conventional wisdom that U.S. economic instruments are
relatively ineffective at leading to the withdrawal of ongoing nuclear development results from
the higher standard of nonproliferation. However, even if U.S. economic statecraft fails to extract
perfect compliance of nonproliferation, it does work well at producing partial compliance-nuclear
latency without nuclear weapons. U.S. economic sanctions are said to be effective at deterring non-
nuclear states from pursuing nuclear weapons. In addition to its deterrence effect, U.S. economic
sanctions through international organizations are powerful enough to induce a nuclear aspirant
to come to the negotiating table and reach a deal with a sub-optimal outcome. As the recent Ira-
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nian nuclear deal indicates, the secondary sanctions were considerably effective at pressing Iranian
leaders. Thus, further work is needed to understand the role of the secondary sanctions in leading
to nuclear reversal or other policy changes of a target state.
5.2 U.S. Foreign Aid and Anti-American Violence
Chapter 3 investigated the impacts of U.S. aid on anti-American violence by suggesting the-
oretical arguments that explained how U.S. foreign aid caused radical opposition groups outside
the ruling coalition to exercise violent attacks on Americans. In particular, this essay argued that
U.S. foreign aid flowing into dictators resulted in more violent incidents against the U.S. properties
and Americans in a recipient country than it does when flowing to a democracy. However, such
an effect varies relying on domestic political institutions in a recipient country. Following this
discussion, I generated several testable hypotheses: (1) as U.S. aid flowing into a recipient country
increases, autocratic recipient regimes experience more anti-American incidents than democratic
counterparts; (2) as U.S. foreign aid increases, autocratic countries with quasi-democratic insti-
tutions experience fewer anti-American violent incidents than those without such institutions or
democratic regimes; and (3) as U.S. foreign aid increases, autocratic countries under institutional
constraints experience more anti-American incidents than do other regimes. To test these hypothe-
ses, the analysis implemented a series of zero-inflated negative binomial regressions to deal with
zero-abundant count data for 117 developing countries from 1970 to 2007.
The findings of the second essay showed that U.S. foreign aid has a detrimental effect on and
unintended consequences for recipient countries. Among the counterproductive outcomes of U.S.
foreign aid, that essay focused on anti-US violence in the world. Recently, a growing number of
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studies have examined anti-Americanism in an attitudinal/opinion dimension, but the research is
scant evaluating the impacts of U.S. foreign aid on anti-American political violence. First, the
essay argued that U.S. foreign aid increased the number of anti-American incidents in autocra-
cies compared to those in democracies. Second, the essay proposed two competing hypotheses.
One contended that the effects of U.S. foreign aid were conditioned by autocracies’ institutional
constraints such as pseudo-democratic institutions. It was thus proposed that autocrats relying on
nominal democratic institutions may either “increase” or “decrease” anti-US incidents compared
to non-institutionalized autocracy and democracy when they are more dependent on U.S. foreign
aid. A series of quantitative analyses showed that the impacts of U.S. foreign aid were signifi-
cant, and the substantive effect decreased when a recipient country was an autocracy relying on
quasi-democratic institutions.
5.3 U.S. Sanction Duration and Social Spending of Autocracies
The study in Chapter 4 estimated the dynamics of social spending in autocratic countries suf-
fering costs from longer U.S. economic sanctions. In general, autocratic leaders tend to reallocate
limited resources in favor of ruling elites when experiencing the longer U.S. sanctions. Thus, they
reduce government expenditure on public goods and services. However, the diverse political sys-
tem within autocratic countries lead to diverse policies of social welfare. In other words, I hypoth-
esized that autocrats under some institutional constraints are likely to implement more inclusive
policies toward a broader segment of population in a society due to their logic of political survival.
Based on literature on comparative authoritarianism, it was supposed that autocrats having pseudo-
democratic institutions implemented more inclusive policies compared to autocrats without those
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institutions and so even when sanctioned by the U.S. they do not cut social spending sharply. To
test this argument, I conducted panel error-correction models to capture the dynamic changes of
social spending in autocracies. The statistical estimation was conducted with 95 country-cases
under authoritarian rule from 1970 to 2007.
The findings showed that U.S. sanction duration leads autocrats to reduce their social spend-
ing but the duration has different effects on the changes in social spending varying according to
political system. Autocrats having institutional constraints do not reduce much their government
spending on education or health while cutting spending on social security and protection. This
indicates that social security spending in authoritarian countries may be quite narrow in the sense
that social security benefits specific and small segments of the population.
5.4 Contributions and Plans for Future Research
The main contribution of this dissertation is to improve our understanding of the role of U.S.
economic statecraft in the policies and politics of target countries. Despite a large volume of studies
on foreign aid and economic sanctions, studies on the effects of U.S. economic statecraft are still
underdeveloped. This dissertation explores policy changes in the development of nuclear weapons
and in social spending, as well as the counterproductive consequences.
In addition, this dissertation sheds light on the debates over the relationship between U.S.
economic statecraft and policy changes of target states. The results suggest that U.S. economic
statecraft is still an effective foreign policy, as it leads to policy changes in target countries. But,
its counterproductive and adverse impacts vary according to the target country’s political system.
The findings in this dissertation provide a basis for some possible further investigations. First,
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as Iran and powerful Western countries reached a nuclear deal, we might expect Iran to be be soon
included as another non-proliferator. When this happens, a re-examination on nuclear nonprolifer-
ation should be conducted. Second, regarding anti-American violence, a study should investigate
the effects of democratic transitions on anti-American incidents.
Based on the literature on the diversionary conflict, it may be expected that countries undergo-
ing democratic transitions and/or political instability tend to experience anti-American violence.
Third, in regard to social policy changes, a study should conduct more thorough analysis using
comparative case studies to improve the causal inference (e.g., the synthetic control method). In
this case, there should be an almost complete dataset with no missing values. A study could thus
focus on social welfare outcomes such as infant mortality, child mortality, school enrollment and
completion instead of social expenditure.
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